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ABSTRACT 
 
RHETORICAL LESSONS IN ADVOCACY AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY:  
FAMILY METAPHORS AND DEFINITIONS OF CRISIS AND CARE IN UNPAID 
FAMILY CAREGIVING ADVOCACY RHETORIC 
by 
Rachel D. Davidson 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Kathryn Olson 
 
In this rhetorical analysis, I analyze pro-caregiving advocates, individuals and 
organizations who are attempting to energize policy change for unpaid family caregiving. 
I piece together an expansive text that includes online advocacy discourse, public policy 
statements, and hard copies of organizational promotional materials. Pro-caregiving 
advocates are attempting to expand shared responsibility for an issue that is traditionally 
assumed to be private--unpaid family caregiving.  
Throughout this dissertation, I argue that pro-caregiving advocates are standing in 
the way of their own goals by rhetorically constructing inherent barriers to policy change. 
	  	   iii 
Each analysis chapter analyzes a dominant frame that is commonplace in pro-caregiving 
advocacy rhetoric (i.e., family, crisis, and care) and reveals inherent barriers to shared 
responsibility. In addition to locating the inherent barriers, each analysis chapter offers 
suggestions for navigating the barriers using the practical tools of rhetoric. As such, this 
dissertation will have practical usefulness for other social advocates who are 
championing a cause assumed to be private.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
There are only four kinds of people in the world: those who have been caregivers, 
those who are currently caregivers, those who will be caregivers, and those who 
will need caregivers--Former First Lady Rosalynn Carter (Carter & Golant, 1994, 
p. 3) 
 
In a proclamation about National Family Caregivers Month, President Obama 
(2009) began by stating, “The true strength of the American family finds its roots in an 
unwavering commitment to care for one another” (para. 1). Since the president expressed 
these words in 2009, stories about financial, health, and interpersonal strains facing 
unpaid family caregivers have been steadily increasing, and such narratives are expected 
to continue becoming more common as the caregiver to care-receiver ratio grows 
increasingly lop-sided. In fact, writers, thinkers, and advocates exploring issues relevant 
to unpaid family caregiving have progressively begun to use the term a “caregiving 
crisis” to describe various negative material conditions impacting individuals who care 
for aging or disabled loved ones.  
This increased attention and rhetorical labeling of a “caregiving crisis” can be 
attributed, in part, to unpaid family caregiving being more frequently associated with 
alarming health risks for caregivers. In January 2012, the American Psychological 
Association identified caregivers as a high-risk group for developing chronic illness due 
to extremely high levels of stress associated with caregiving (Rieder, 2012, para. 7). 
Depression can be a common outgrowth of chronic illness and, as reported on LVB.com, 
“An estimated 20 percent of caregivers suffer from depression—a rate double that of the 
general population” (“The Crisis in Caregiving,” 2013, para. 7). Although “caregiving” 
encompasses many different types of dependency relationships, the hardships facing 
unpaid family caregivers of aging or disabled family members, in particular, are expected 
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to grow in the coming years as “the number of potential caregivers aged 45-64 for each 
person aged 80 and older is predicted to decline from a ratio of 7 to 1 in 2010 to 4 to 1 by 
2030, and 3 to 1 by 2050” (McSweeney-Feld, 2013, para. 2).  
In addition to the declining ratio, caring for older loved ones presents some 
unique challenges even within the larger field of family caregiving. For instance, while 
stressful in its own right, mothering growing children also includes the rewarding 
experience of watching one’s charges develop growing independence and reach new 
milestones; caring for aging or declining loved ones often involves witnessing increasing 
dependence and declining health. One connection to stress is likely due to what is being 
called “caregiver stress syndrome.” In her research on caregiver stress syndrome, author 
Sandra Tunajeck (2010) observes, 
The stress is not only related to the daunting work of caregiving, but also the grief 
associated with the decline in the health of their loved ones. Often their stress is 
associated with physical strains, financial constraints, emotional effects, and 
social isolation. (p. 22) 
In an article about a caregiving crisis in New York, Eisenstadt (2014) reports, “They 
[caregivers] should be aware that they are at a higher risk for depression and suicide” 
(para. 2). The American Psychological Association urges that Americans “pay particular 
attention to the impact of these responsibilities on caregivers, who report higher levels of 
stress, poorer health and a greater tendency to engage in unhealthy behaviors to alleviate 
their stress than the general public” (Reider, 2012, para. 5). Glenn (2010) confirms the 
negative health impact when she reports, “Numerous studies have shown that caregivers 
experience higher rates of heart disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, and depression” 
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(p. 3). The public conversation surrounding unpaid family caregiving is offering much 
evidence to suggest that material conditions of unpaid family caregivers are deteriorating. 
In fact, Bill Courturie, producer/director of Caregivers, a film documenting the perils of 
the increasingly common situation of long-term caring for another, laments, “It’s not 
uncommon for the caregiver to die before the patient” (Courturie, 2011). It seems the 
president’s comments about finding strength in the American family is not only timely 
but necessary in order to address the situation of our nation’s unpaid family caregivers, 
those caring for an aging or disabled loved one.  
 In addition to the negative individual consequences to the caregiver, there are also 
social costs, or costs to a larger community beyond the family, associated with unpaid 
family caregiving. For example, when care-receivers out-live their unpaid family 
caregiver or the unpaid family caregiver’s health worsens to the point that they can no 
longer care, care-receivers must find an alternative source of care. One report reveals, 
“Fifty percent of nursing home admissions occur due to a change in the caregiver’s 
health” (“Why it is important to know if you are a family caregiver,” 2014, para. 6). To 
pay for the nursing home, care-receivers either draw from their own personal savings or 
apply for Medicaid. Because Medicaid is funded, in part, by payroll taxes, when the 
program is used by recipients to help pay for nursing home expenses, taxpayers are 
financially contributing to the care for patients.  
Another social cost is that businesses can be impacted by the unpredictability that 
is commonly associated with unpaid family caregiving. For example, The National 
Partnership for Women and Families insists that “unpredictable scheduling harms 
workers and businesses” because it “leads to lower worker productivity and higher 
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employee absenteeism and turnover” (“Not enough family friendly policies,” 2014, p. 3). 
Anderson (2012) confirms that the American economy is also impacted by unpaid family 
caregiving when he argues, “MetLife found that American businesses lose an estimated 
$34 billion each year due to employees’ need to care for aging loved ones” (para. 7). In a 
recent American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) update on the costs of family 
caregiving, Feinberg, Reinhard, Houser, & Choula (2011) contend, “If family caregivers 
were no longer available, the economic cost to the U.S. health care and long-term 
services and supports (LTSS) systems would increase astronomically” (p. 1). They 
further report, “Caregiving has economic consequences not only for the caregiver but 
also for employers, especially in lost productivity and higher health care costs” (p. 7). 
AARP estimates that  “U.S. businesses lose up to $33.6 billion per year in lost 
productivity from full-time caregiving employees” (Feinberg, 2012, para. 35). AARP also 
points to higher health care costs in addition to the lost productivity. For instance, 
“Recent research shows a link between employed family caregivers of older relatives and 
their health care costs. In this study, employers were found to be paying about 8 percent 
more for the health care of employees with eldercare responsibilities compared to 
noncaregiving employees, potentially costing U.S. businesses an additional estimated 
$13.4 billion per year” (Feinberg et al., 2011, p. 7). Taxpayers and businesses, then, 
represent at least two aspects of the social costs associated with unpaid family caregiving.  
Emerging from the growing concern for our nation’s caregivers are groups and 
organizations advocating for unpaid family caregivers. Some recent advocacy attempts 
include Diane Schuster’s Caregiver Corps Proposal (Schuster, 2013), National Domestic 
Workers Alliance’s Caring Across Generations (“Caring Across Generations,” 2012), the 
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Neighbor Works program Aging in Place (“Aging in Place,” 2011), and the Caring 
Economy Campaign (2014). The Rosalyn Carter Institute for Caregiving is an 
organization that works in the areas of advocacy, education, research, and service to 
support both unpaid family caregivers and paid caregivers. In these advocacy efforts, the 
organizations sometimes advocate for policy change (e.g., The Caregiver Corps) and 
other times advocates look for ways to ameliorate the detrimental conditions facing 
caregivers (e.g., providing social support for unpaid family caregivers or encouraging 
non-caregivers to take on a caregiving role to relieve day-to-day stressors facing unpaid 
family caregivers). Such different types of approaches to advocacy for unpaid family 
caregiving muddy the view on whether caregiving is primarily an individual/social 
support issue or a social matter that requires systemic public policy changes.  
Regardless of the advocacy approach, aims, or effectiveness, it is clear that we are 
witnessing inaugural debates about policy attention for unpaid family caregivers. Public 
advocacy for unpaid family caregiving represents a complex narrative because, despite 
increased rhetorical attention and efforts by many advocates, recurring stories about the 
financial, health, and interpersonal struggles of caregivers are also on the rise; however, 
public policy for our nation’s caregivers continues to go unrecognized as a pressing 
social issue, or even as a shared social responsibility. For example, there is currently only 
one federal policy in place that “addresses the need to take time off from work to care for 
family members” (Feinberg, 2013, pp. 1-2):  the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 
However, FMLA is unpaid federal aid, and it “covers [only] 59.2 percent of the 
workforce, leaving about 60 million workers with no such protection under federal law” 
(Feinberg, 2013, para. 2-4). Furthermore, “[l]ow-income workers covered by the FMLA 
	  	   6 
are especially vulnerable [because] they cannot afford to take time off” (para. 6). In fact, 
as Kittay (1999) argues, “These family and medical leave policies have been aimed not at 
impoverished women, but at women situated well enough to contribute financially to the 
family income” (p. 134). Another problematic aspect of FMLA includes its outdated and 
non-inclusive definition of family (Kittay, 1995; Glenn, 2010). In her critique of FMLA, 
Kittay (1995) argues, “The term ‘spouse’ is restricted to husband or wife, leaving out 
nonmarried adults who are cohabitating, gay and lesbian families, and so forth” (p. 16). 
Given these considerations, this dissertation begins with the question of why unpaid 
family caregiving advocates are not getting a desired public response, like structural 
policy change for unpaid family caregivers, even though they are providing cogent 
evidence to suggest that negative material conditions will only worsen for this population 
and that unpaid family caregiving has social costs that often go unnoticed.  
I suggest that one possible explanation is that social actors attempting to energize 
public policy change (hereafter referred to as pro-caregiving advocates1) are encountering 
a consequential rhetorical problem that relates to public advocates who are championing 
an issue that is assumed to be private and does not typically command social and shared 
responsibility. Stated another way, this essay suggests that there is a communication 
barrier in the public arguments of pro-caregiving advocates that might explain the lack of 
structural change in policy attention for unpaid family caregiving issues.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Pro-caregiving advocates are those individuals and organizations who have set as their 
instrumental goal to support and/or advance public policy change for unpaid family 
caregivers. Some examples of pro-caregiving advocates include The Rosalyn Carter 
Institute on Caregiving, AARP, Family Caregiver Alliance, and National Alliance for 
Caregiving.  	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This chapter argues that pro-caregiving advocates are at a unique moment when 
their change rhetoric might help address potential future effects in unpaid family 
caregiving. 2015 is a pivotal moment to understand unpaid family caregiving as a 
potentially public issue while other contexts in public discourse simultaneously debate 
about definitions of family and responsibilities regarding healthcare. In light of these 
contexts, unpaid family caregiving stands a chance of being rhetorically recast as a social 
issue, as opposed to one traditionally reserved for families. Examining such rhetoric 
offers promise in understanding unpaid family caregiving, in particular, as well as other 
advocacy efforts where an issue assumed to be “private” must navigate discursive 
complexities to promote shared responsibility. In the pages that follow, this chapter 
demonstrates why unpaid family caregiving is indicative of a larger rhetorical problem, 
why a rhetorical perspective is needed to understand the possibilities and challenges in 
advocacy for unpaid family caregiving, and a justification for why unpaid family 
caregiving stands at the intersection of a unique moment in history that makes this a 
advantageous time to analyze pro-caregiving advocacy arguments. This chapter will 
conclude by offering the research questions for this dissertation and situate them within 
scholarship on care theory.   
Why Is This Indicative of a Larger Rhetorical Problem? 
This contemporary case of unpaid family caregiving represents a larger rhetorical 
problem about the necessity of public advocates carefully negotiating discursive 
complexities of a cause in order to achieve policy gains. For example, pro-caregiving 
advocates are championing a cause where a key term, “caregiving,” invokes largely 
positive and emotional associations while it is simultaneously discounted as a social 
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concern. By way of illustration, current and accepted indicators of the strength of a nation 
are typically measured in economic terms that point to markers of consumer and 
government spending (i.e., Gross Domestic Product). Some pro-caregiving rhetors point 
out that such indicators do not take into account relational and unremunerated aspects 
such as the extent to which a nation’s citizens help and/or are connected to one another. 
The Caring Economy Campaign argues that the GDP “does not show the real condition 
of our people or our economy and leads to imbalanced and unsuccessful policies” (“What 
is the CEC?” 2011, para. 7). Such economic emphases produce conditions where 
caregiving costs and gains are invisible and, as outlined by Gornick, Howes, and Braslow 
(2012), “[c]are policy” becomes a rarity “in American social policy research” (p. 112). In 
contrast to public policy, which is typically evaluated by economic standards and is tied 
to the public market, unpaid family caregiving is traditionally understood in terms of its 
deep-rooted associations to gender and the domestic sphere and is seen as a voluntary 
role. Caregiving has traditionally and historically been associated with the private sphere 
as “women’s work” and has not been recognized as a shared social responsibility (Tronto, 
1993; Wood, 1994). As such, pro-caregiving advocates confront this complex negotiation 
between two disparate entities—unpaid family caregiving and public policy. The 
complex negotiation contributes to the rhetorical problem facing pro-caregiving 
advocates wherein championing a cause that carries strong assumptions to the private 
complicates arguments for policy attention for unpaid family caregiving.  
The rhetorical problem of addressing what is assumed to be a private issue as a 
public problem is not limited to unpaid family caregiving but occurs in different forms. A 
more familiar and better-studied example of this rhetorical problem is encountered in 
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discourses of mothering. Mothering is similarly treated as a private issue because it is 
gendered and always connected to the domestic sphere. Glenn (2010) suggests, “The 
paradigmatic care relationship is that between mother and child, which often serves as the 
template for thinking about caring” (p. 187), but “in this model, caring (mothering) is 
viewed as natural and instinctive and as women’s natural vocation” (p. 187). Many 
feminist scholars argue that this “natural mothering instinct” is rooted in a separate 
sphere ideology where the public and private spheres historically associate gender in the 
public sphere as male-dominated, which is socially and culturally valued, whereas the 
private sphere is traditionally female-centered and under-valued (Benhabib, 1994; Foss & 
Foss, 1991; Fraser, 1994; Ryan, 1994). Theories on the separation of the public and 
private spheres was a common line of thought in the nineteenth century, and American 
educator Catherine Beecher exemplifies this ideology in her written work. Beecher writes 
about and endorses the public and private sphere gendered separation when she 
articulates, “Women’s place was the home and…women’s influence on the world should 
be moral rather than political” (Warner, 2002, p. 22). Gibson (2007) points out, 
Separate spheres ideology flourished after the Industrial Revolution when a 
distinction between the space of work and the space of the family emerged along 
with the belief that men were properly suited for the public sphere of paid labor 
and political activity while women were properly suited to the private sphere of 
child-rearing and homemaking. (p. 162) 
Glenn (2010) connects the “social structure and ideology” of caregiving to “ideologies of 
home [and] motherhood” to suggest that these pervasive structures not only “kept them 
[women] out of the public realm of politics” but also constrained them to the private 
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sphere of the family by “exalt[ing] their role as caregivers” (p. 185). In other words, a 
separate spheres ideology not only dictates gendered assumptions about mothers but also 
keeps a firm grasp on those roles by exalting or rewarding mothers for fulfilling their 
duties in the domestic sphere. Though undermined elsewhere, this theoretical separation 
between public and private is still manifested in the implicit separateness between most 
public policy, understood in social and economic terms, and caregiving, understood as 
women’s work in the domestic sphere such as caregiving for a dependent family member. 
I draw on many other scholars in this dissertation who utilize the language of 
“spheres” with differing perspectives and emphases regarding the kind of arguments and 
norms that are considered relevant for “public” or “private.” In these instances, use of 
“public” and “private” is not meant to imply that these spheres materially exist but rather 
to point to the terms’ usefulness in understanding the constitutive struggle over individual 
and public, or shared, responsibility in unpaid family caregiving. As a point of reference, 
Warner (2005) notes several thinkers’ “attempts to frame public and private as a sharp 
distinction” but argues that such attempts “have invariably come to grief, while attempts 
to collapse or do without them have proven equally unsatisfying” (p. 29). Scholars have 
contributed to this contentious discussion by offering different perspectives for 
interpreting the relationship between “public” and “private.” For example, Warner (2005) 
offers a theory of counterpublics in order to “recognize in newer and deeper ways how 
privacy is publicly constructed” (p. 620). In a similar vein, Berlant (2005) advances a 
theory of infantile citizenship as a way to imagine the relationship between “public” and 
“private” in that the “political public sphere has become an intimate public sphere” that, 
for example, “fuses private fortune with that of the nation” (p. 4).  
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Other scholars use “public” and “private” to illuminate the intersection of 
deliberation and location of arguments. For instance, Goodnight’s (1982) focus is on the 
revitalization of deliberative rhetoric in the public sphere, and he offers a vocabulary and 
approach to the language of spheres. Goodnight (1982) suggests that we communicate 
through “coherent superstructures” that can be interpreted as “the personal, the technical, 
and the public spheres” (p. 216). He describes argument suited to a personal sphere as 
“ephemeral” with “no preparation” where “the subject matter and range of claims are 
decided by the disputants” (p. 218). If, however, the arguments are “preserved” and an 
interlocutor “brings together a considerable degree of expertise with the formal 
expectations of scholarly argument (footnotes, titles, organization, documentation, and so 
forth)” (p. 219), such arguments can be understood within an interpretive frame of a 
technical sphere. A public sphere is invoked when “neither informal disagreement nor 
theoretical contention is sufficient to contain the arguments involved” and then “the 
dispute becomes a matter of public debate” (p. 219). Goodnight (1982) argues, “the 
interests of the public realm—whether represented in an appropriate way or not-extend 
the stakes of argument beyond private needs and the needs of special communities to the 
interests of the entire community” (pp. 219-220). Involving an argument climate and 
norms that concern the interests of the entire community is what marks the public 
approach. His notion of “sphere” is related to “activity” or “the grounds upon which 
arguments are built and the authorities to which arguers appeal” (p. 216). There are 
arguments being deployed by pro-caregiving advocates that are occurring in what 
Goodnight (1982) might interpret as a “public sphere,” but my primary concern in this 
dissertation is that a caregiving crisis is not yet widely accepted as affecting the interests 
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of or require responsibilities by the entire community. Stated another way, my focus in 
this dissertation relates to the rhetorical aspects of pro-caregiving advocacy that shape 
arguments whose concerns matter and what should be done concerning issues relating to 
unpaid family caregiving. Although there exists slippage between each of these 
interpretations of “public” and “private,” in this dissertation, the varied usages are 
difficult to avoid, so it is necessary to qualify here.  
In this dissertation, I utilize the terms “public” and “private” in ways that require 
explanation. First, I sometimes refer to “public” and/or “social” as a way to describe 
society at large or issues that affect the interests of the entire community, as opposed to 
only those individuals or families in the home. When I mention greater shared 
responsibility, I mean to suggest that unpaid family caregiving has the potential to be an 
issue widely treated as a societal concern as opposed to how it is generally considered 
how as an issue only relevant to the individual caregiver and/or the family in which the 
caregiving is occurring. Second, I refer to “private” as a way to describe the domestic 
home or the family and signal that caregiving in all its forms is generally an issue that has 
strong associations with and assumptions about women and what many would call the 
“private” sphere. While I acknowledge the public and private spheres as matters of 
emphasis has been challenged and the spheres do not represent fixed notions, for the 
purpose of this dissertation, I argue that Goodnight’s public/private distinction as an 
interpretive frame, or coherent sets of different argument norms, is a useful way to look 
at how pro-caregiving advocates might be uncritically reproducing or encouraging 
understanding family caregiving as private even as they attempt to invoke shared 
responsibility and call for public policy change. In other words, I do not wish to test the 
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validity of a public/private matter of emphasis or offer a new theory of public/private but 
rather demonstrate that even the advocacy rhetoric animating this case of unpaid family 
caregiving seems to shuttle between the public and private interpretative frames, to the 
detriment of its purported goals.  
The complex historical relationship of motherhood to public advocacy provides a 
window through which to understand this larger rhetorical problem of negotiating 
prevailing assumptions about “private” issue and “public” responsibility as it might apply 
to the current state of unpaid family caregiving as well as to suggest potential successful 
advocacy resources. Prior research suggests that mother-advocates, in particular, have 
faced considerable rhetorical obstacles due to assumptions that motherhood is “private.” 
(Buchanan, 2013; Tonn, 1996). Buchanan (2013) offers a rhetorical analysis of the public 
advocates Margaret Sanger and Diane Nash that illuminates two different situations and 
outcomes where maternal appeals were central to the public advocacy efforts. Buchanan 
argues that Margaret Sanger’s movement from “wild woman writer” to “mother of two” 
reveals a situation in which an advocate deployed maternal appeals to help her achieve 
her social advocacy aims for birth control in the United States. In this analysis, Buchanan 
conceptualizes motherhood as a rhetorical resource that Sanger strategically deployed in 
public discourse. By constructing a powerful maternal ethos, Sanger united mothers for a 
social cause. Although Buchanan argues that Sanger’s universal appeal to mothers 
“excluded significant numbers of women” (p. 59) who were not white, married, or 
middle-class, her case study offers an example of the constraints faced by a mother-rhetor 
that necessitated and suggested negotiations between and innovation involving an issue 
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assumed to be more relevant to the private sphere—birth control—recast as a public 
policy matter.  
In contrast to the Sanger example, Buchanan’s rhetorical analysis of Diane Nash, 
a civil rights activist who was arrested in 1962 for teaching nonviolent protest strategies 
with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, is instructive because it 
demonstrates a situation in which the advocate encountered motherhood as a rhetorical 
barrier because, although Nash invoked motherhood as did Sanger, she did not exploit 
“the available means of persuasion afforded by her pregnancy” (p. 64). Instead of posting 
bail, she decided to serve a two-year prison term while pregnant to protest “southern 
segregation” and send “a message to the broader civil-rights community” (Buchanan, p. 
63). In order to “ensure that her perspective and purpose were clear to others, she detailed 
the problem with current practices as well as her proposed solution in a two-paragraph 
press release and three-page letter to civil-rights workers” (p. 63). In Nash’s press release, 
she devoted one full paragraph to her pregnancy, “employing a “variety of maternal 
appeals to justify activating her sentence while pregnant” (p. 64). Although Nash 
“incorporated motherhood brilliantly” Buchanan argues she “missed a rhetorical 
opportunity” (p. 64) to deploy maternal appeals that might have helped her to be better 
remembered as a “strategist or leader” as opposed to a mother (p. 65). More specifically, 
Buchanan argues that Nash deployed maternal appeals “into the single paragraph devoted 
to the topic” but she “did not otherwise use maternal appeals in either the press release or 
letter” (p. 64). Buchanan suggests that Nash’s pregnancy caused her to be “pushed . . . 
into the background of movement history” because of the way she was re-appropriated by 
historians as a “courageous, committed, pregnant activist” (p. 64). Buchanan’s 
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presentation of Nash’s rhetorical obstacles and use of resources illustrates the rich 
complexity of intermingling maternity with public advocacy and reveals “motherhood’s 
paradoxical capacity to generate rhetorical resources but reduce women to gendered 
stereotypes” (p. 85).  
There exist other examples of imaginatively integrating motherhood in social 
advocacy efforts to overcome or elude what otherwise might be barriers to social change. 
Buchanan (2013) cites an analysis conducted by Hayden of the Million Mom March: 
While acknowledging that motherhood can “reinforce problematic gender norms” 
and “be strategically ineffective” in certain situations, Hayden reaches a different 
conclusion regarding its rhetorical value in “Family Metaphors and the Nation: 
Promoting a Politics of Care through the Million Mom March.” She argues that 
MMM participants consistently stressed maternal priorities and experiences in 
order to promote “alternative modes of political reasoning” that privilege “caring, 
empathy, and nurturance” (203, 198). Motherhood, thus provided women with 
ethical grounds and rhetorical means for reshaping the existing order; what is 
more, in advocating publicly for social change, marchers redefined conventional 
motherhood, “unmooring” it from “essentialist foundations” and transforming it 
into a source of civic strength and political power (209). (pp. 13-4) 
This example illuminates potential rhetorical opportunities for advocates to 
simultaneously draw upon and reshape notions assumed to be private that underpin the 
caregiving role for the purpose of social change. Similar to Hayden’s example, Tonn 
(1996) argues that Mother Jones was able to motivate her audience by crafting a militant 
motherhood persona. In both examples, mother-rhetors deployed, exploited, and re-
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envisioned various aspects of motherhood in order to energize public advocacy efforts. 
The common thread that runs throughout each of these examples is the careful and 
necessary rhetorical negotiation of understandings of the subject of “motherhood” tied to 
public advocacy efforts. Similar to mother-advocates, pro-caregiving advocates must 
negotiate the positive emotional associations that are assumed when the term 
“caregiving,” and its corresponding connotations, intersect with public policy efforts 
without allowing the stereotype that often accompanies the subject to delegitimize issues 
as social concerns and problems.  
The similarities between the rhetorical presentations of motherhood and 
caregiving run deep in that both have been assumed to be part of a woman’s domain and 
concerns of the private sphere alone. Many contemporary researchers suggest that 
gendered connotations accumulate in a way that generate ideological implications and 
argue that caregiving falls primarily on women’s shoulders, impacting their material 
conditions particularly. Harrington Meyer, Herd, and Michel (2000) find that,  
Individual choices regarding care work are highly restricted by a persistent 
ideology about the gendered nature of care work, conflicting demands and 
expectations regarding paid and unpaid labor, the paucity of affordable market-
based options, and the instability of social supports implemented via welfare 
states. (p. 2) 
Similarly, Glenn (2010) argues, “The burden of care (including both the responsibility for 
it and the actual labor) is differentially distributed according to gender, class, race, and 
citizenship” (p. 184). And, further, the “pattern of women taking disproportionate 
responsibility for care is so well established that it is largely taken for granted, often not 
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noticed, and when noticed, seen as natural” (Glenn, 2010, p. 184). That these 
connotations often are unseen and generally accepted as “natural” highlights potential 
inherent barriers for pro-caregiving advocates to secure policy changes and represent a 
rich opportunity for rhetorical scholars to better understand and seek to assist with the re-
situation as a public concern involving the interests of an entire community of an issue 
assumed to be and often argued as private.  
The gendered aspect of caregiving for older adults appears frequently in much 
contemporary public discourse that identifies caregiving as generating a long-term 
problem that disproportionately impacts the female population. Currently women provide 
“over 75% of caregiving support in the United States” (“Caregiving: Introduction,” 2011, 
para. 2). Pillemer and Suitor (2006) explore the relationship status between parent and 
adult child and find that daughters and daughter-in-laws are “are equally likely to 
consider themselves the primary caregiver” (p. 484). They suggest, “Research that 
examines gender differences in elder care consistently shows that daughters are more 
likely than sons to be primary caregivers and to provide hands on care” (p. 484). Their 
research points out that elder mothers, who are in need of care, expect and prefer their 
daughters rather than their sons to care for them, thus suggesting a gendered expectation 
and preference for female caregivers. Essex and Hong (2005) indicate similar findings 
and report, “Gender similarity is likely to play a strong role in the selection of the most 
likely child caregiver, given that older mothers are aware of the potentially intimate 
nature of caregiving” (p. 440). Folbre and Olin Wright (2012) point out, “Family 
members are not always equally willing to care for a child or adult with a disability, and 
daughters often feel more responsibility than sons for [the] care of frail elderly parents” 
	  	   18 
(p. 16). Bianchi, Folbre, and Wolf (2012) report, “Women provide the majority of care,” 
and they cite a 1999 NLTCS study that estimates “71 percent of all ‘primary 
caregivers’—a category that includes in-laws, other relatives, friends, and neighbors—are 
female, including 59 percent of the caregivers who are spouses and 77 percent of those 
who are children of the care recipients” (p. 47). Such statistics indicate that, like 
mothering, unpaid family caregiving is viewed in the context of private familial 
relationships and occurs along gender lines.  
Many times, unpaid family caregiving, other than caregiving for dependent 
minors, is compared to motherhood because mothering is typically the benchmark of all 
dependency relationships. Though related to motherhood, unpaid family caregiving, other 
than mothering underage children, may be more difficult to manage. Bianchi, Folbre, and 
Wolf (2012) suggest, “Care for adults with disabilities or chronic illness is often viewed 
as more onerous than care of children” and state, “The need for this type of care often 
represents an exogenous shock, one that is unexpected, difficult to anticipate, and perhaps 
related to sudden illness or recognition of a trajectory of increased dependency, such as 
when a spouse or parent is diagnosed with dementia or Alzheimer’s disease” (p. 45). I 
suggest, then, that the type of caregiving that occurs within unpaid family caregiving and 
advocacy concerning it should be studied on their own terms, as opposed to assuming 
that the motherhood model sufficiently explains it. Unpaid family caregiving is a unique 
and coherent issue with social possibilities at this moment, and, as such, unpaid family 
caregiving cannot be simply dismissed as a variation on or subset of motherhood-
advocacy.  
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The focus of this dissertation is on pro-caregiving advocate arguments that are 
arguing for greater social responsibility for a particular form of caregiving, unpaid family 
caregiving. There exist many subsets of such caregiving, however, this dissertation will 
primarily address advocacy for the “fastest-growing” subset “engendered by elder care 
responsibilities” (Glenn, 2010, p. 2), which are assumed by unpaid family caregivers2. In 
this dissertation, I define unpaid family caregiving as a type of caregiving where adult 
individuals take care of an aging and/or disabled loved one without remuneration. 
Although there exist different ways to conceptualize unpaid caregiving (e.g., informal 
caregiving), I have chosen to use the term “unpaid family caregiving” as opposed to 
informal caregiving because the label “informal” suggests irregular caregiving, and it is 
my contention that unpaid family caregiving is a regular and formal part of the 
caregiver’s life. By using the label of unpaid family caregiving, I wish to bring attention 
to two main aspects of this role (i.e., unpaid and family) that help keep this type of 
caregiving designated as a domestic sphere issue and one that remains unseen as a 
women’s problem.  
This dissertation begins with the assumption that unpaid family caregiving does 
not have to be understood as “women’s work in the private sphere” and that how we talk 
about caregiving matters in arguments about shared responsibility for unpaid family 
caregiving. Such talk is currently too often organized “around spatial and conceptual 
separation between public and private realms” with “the public sphere of the market 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Chapters four and five on definitions of care and family metaphors, respectively, 
observe content and visual images on Operation Family Caregiver, a program within the 
Rosalyn Carter Institute for Caregiving, a pro-caregiving organization that supports 
caregivers of veterans and newly returning service members. Unpaid family caregiving, 
as defined by this organization includes advocacy for caregivers of both elderly people 
and disabled veterans or newly returning service members.  
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(economy and politics) and the private sphere of family and household…imagined to be 
discrete arenas that serve different purposes, perform different functions, and operate 
according to different principles” (Glenn, 2010, pp. 183-4). However, once one 
understands public and private as sets of argument norms and practices, I contend that 
pro-caregiving advocates, similar to some mother-advocates, have opportunities to better 
negotiate what should be a matter of social concern and shared responsibility supported 
by public policy to make caregiving “a community and collective (public) responsibility 
rather than…purely a family (private) responsibility” (Glenn, 2010, p. 189).  
Why Study Unpaid Family Caregiving from a Rhetorical Perspective?  
The issue of unpaid family caregiving can be productively framed as a rhetorical 
problem because one explanation for public inaction lies in how we talk about caregiving 
and its meanings. As the previous section indicated, there are many similarities between 
mothering and unpaid family caregiving—both represent largely positive (though I am 
not suggesting these are productive) connotations to gender and the domestic sphere. The 
aforementioned works by Tonn (1996) and Buchanan (2013) focus on mother-advocates 
and ethos building but also point to the complexity of a subject with firm associations to 
gender and the domestic sphere that now requires public policy attention.  
A rhetorical perspective is relevant because pro-caregiving advocates are 
encountering and often reproducing by how they argue--a situation where the subject of 
caregiving represents largely positive, though not necessarily productive, connotations to 
gender and the domestic sphere, and these connotations are reinforced symbolically 
through language. Yet, the studies show that “caregiving” is taking shape as a 
phenomenon that will only continue to grow and negatively impact a more encompassing 
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number of individuals and public resources, if unaddressed. Pro-caregiving advocates are 
subject to many of the same essentialist assumptions as mothers, which help keep the key 
subjects in both activities, mothering and caregiving, respectively, deeply entrenched 
within the domestic sphere and implicitly coded as “women’s work.” The implicitness is 
a key aspect here because it is in this respect that mothering and caregiving become 
“naturalized” and taken for granted as gendered and always associated with the domestic 
sphere. A rhetorical perspective, featuring close textual analysis, helps make such 
implicitness explicit and available for critique.  
One reason that mothering and caregiving continue to be assumed to be issues 
only relevant to women is what Glenn (2010) refers to as “status obligations” (pp. 6-7). 
She contends, 
Status obligations are duties assigned to all those in a given status, for example, 
wife, mother, daughter…I will argue that status categories such as race and 
gender continue to shape both market and kin relations. Consequently, women are 
charged with triple status duty to care, on the basis of (1) kinship (wife, daughter, 
mother), (2) gender (as women), and (3) sometimes race/class (as members of a 
subordinate group). (pp. 6-7)  
The notion of status obligation reveals “prevalent patterns in social structure and ideology 
[that] are pervasive and deep-seated and are not easily reformed” (Glenn, 2010, p. 185). 
Here, Glenn (2010) identifies an important and often overlooked aspect of caregiving—
that status obligations are not a given part of a woman’s natural disposition, but rather are 
rhetorically constructed and thus can be seen in and potentially changed or reinforced 
through the ways in which we talk publicly about caregiving and motherhood. Glenn 
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(2010) is concerned with the ways in which caregiving rhetorics are associated with 
women. My focus is related but diverges from Glenn’s (2010) perspective in that I am 
interested in the ways that pro-caregiving advocates are creating arguments that associate 
caregiving rhetorics with women and the domestic sphere even as they attempt to 
challenge those associations. In this dissertation, I contend that the gendering and 
domesticating of public discussions about unpaid family caregiving function as inherent 
barriers for pro-caregiver advocates that create conditions where unpaid family 
caregiving is a subject de-emphasized as a shared.  
Rhetorical scholars have long been interested in the applied aspect of rhetoric and 
the exciting potential the discipline brings for citizen advocates. In fact, Olson (2008) 
argues that “with its centuries-long history of investment in public problems and practical 
tools for effectively identifying and organizing meanings of complex situations, 
rhetorical training is an excellent resource for citizens who must engage in policy 
advocacy” (p. 221). Extrapolating the practical tools that could be beneficial to public 
policy advocates necessitates uncovering the inherent barriers that allow an ill to persist. I 
argue that one possibility for the cause of the lack of public action and shared 
responsibility on caregiving concerns lies in attitudinal and philosophical inherency. 
Olson (2008) asserts a practical aspect of conducting inherency analysis for public 
advocates because “it establishes some reasonable chain of causality showing how the 
present system perpetuates, intentionally or unintentionally, a significant problem” 
pushing “one to look beyond the symptoms of a problem to the causes so that relatively 
more effective solutions can emerge” (p. 225). Attitudinal inherency, as described by 
Jasinski (2001), is resistance to change “attributed to values, beliefs, or attitudes held by a 
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significant majority of the society’s members” (p. 534). Olson (2008) describes 
philosophical inherency as resistance to change due to beliefs that “the present system 
should not adopt the proposed policy reform if it is to be true to its more important values 
or priorities” (p. 227). I believe that pro-caregiving advocates are encountering both 
attitudinal and philosophical barriers to the enactment of more wide-ranging and 
responsible public policy on caregiving in that the key term of “caregiving” invokes 
associations to gender and the domestic that are lower priorities in public policy and 
perceptions of social responsibility. 
The previous section pointed to the complexities that arise when advocates 
intermix maternal appeals with public policy platforms. Although the outcomes are 
varied, scholars suggest that advocates who invoke mothering caregivers are rhetorically 
bound to and must negotiate the “naturalness” of mothering as women’s work in the 
domestic sphere (e.g., Buchanan, 2013). This dissertation highlights one way in which 
unpaid family caregiving also goes publicly unnoticed, is expected of women, and is 
perpetuated as “natural” by analyzing how pro-caregiving advocates themselves talk 
about unpaid family caregiving in a way that may lead to reifying assumptions that 
caregiving is assumed to be private instead of what could be a shared, social 
responsibility. My work in this dissertation is meant to (1) uncover and make visible 
those inherent barriers, which are not easily reformed and which I suggest are limiting 
social responsibility for unpaid family caregiving, and (2) offer practical suggestions 
about how scholars and practitioners can change the conversation and expand the 
possibilities of public discussions about caregiving beyond its essentialist underpinnings 
in order to win some policy gains.  
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A rhetorical perspective also allows critics to understand this specific case of pro-
caregiving advocacy as an issue related to audience and how a rhetorically constructed 
pro-caregiving audience might also enhance justification for looking at unpaid family 
caregiving from a rhetorical perspective. Charland (1987) argues that audiences become 
constituted through rhetoric. Just as a text and context do not pre-exist, audiences are also 
constructed through rhetoric. In this way, rhetoric is just as much about audiences as it is 
about language use.  
Pro-caregiving advocacy constructs a pro-caregiving audience, which implies an 
anti-caregiving position. Based on a survey of “caregiving” in USA Today, CQ 
Researcher, and LexisNexis, there is little evidence to suggest there exists a strong 
oppositional position to pro-caregiving advocacy3. As such, a pro-caregiving audience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Because this dissertation is concerned with rhetoric, and pro-caregiving arguments, I 
conducted a general search of “caregiving” on USA Today, CQ Researcher, and 
LexisNexis in an attempt to find resistance rhetorics to unpaid family caregiving 
advocacy. In USA Today, 297 articles resulted from a search of “caregiving.” Some of the 
articles were related to other types of caregiving including paid caregiving and 
mothering. Of those 297 articles, the only anti-caregiving discourse was related to 
government mishandling of caregiver funds in Michigan. In this article, Erb (2014) 
describes allocating “at least $33 million in services…to individuals that did not qualify 
for them” (para. 12), including 3,786 workers with “felony convictions” (para. 13). I also 
conducted a search of “caregiving” on CQ Researcher and 15 articles that resulted ranged 
from Alzheimer’s to homelessness to mothering. Of those 15 articles, one report 
suggested that “[w]ith more and more Americans living longer, policymakers worry that 
Social Security and Medicare costs will drain money from health and education programs 
for the young” (Baker, 2011, para. 1). In another article about aging issues, Greenblatt 
(2011) indicates the “flood of elderly Americans is putting severe financial stress on 
programs that benefit older citizens” and “congressional proposals for constraining 
Medicare spending have encountered stiff resistance” (para. 1). Each of these articles 
represent either specific events (i.e., mishandling of caregiver funds in Michigan) or 
speculation about funding to care for elderly taking funding away from other social 
programs which does not directly address funding for unpaid family caregivers. These 
examples are isolated and do not represent a larger body of clear resistance to pro-
caregiving advocacy.   	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gets already constituted in pro-caregiver advocacy rhetoric because pro-caregiving 
advocates’ arguments create the logical possibility of an opposing position4. Dow (2003) 
suggests the news media construct oppositional rhetoric even when an opposing side does 
not exist. In her analysis of the “media’s evolutionary narrative about Miss America,” (p. 
145), Dow argues that there is a “tendency toward dualistic thinking characteristic of 
media discourse; that is, not only are there two sides to every story, but there are usually 
only two” (p. 144, emphasis original). Pro-caregiving advocacy is rhetorically 
constructing a pro-position on unpaid family caregiving, which creates the logical 
possibility of an anti-position. What this means for the current study is that pro-
caregiving advocates are building a case where the arguments stand a chance of being 
successful; however, the lack of active resistance, or opposition, further indicates that 
pro-caregiving advocates may be contributing to their own inherent barriers by creating 
social inaction as opposed to energizing shared responsibility. Whether or not opposition 
takes the anti-form or resists in less direct ways, it is important to examine the arguments 
being created by pro-caregiving advocates that might contain built-in resistances in 
themselves, providing more justification that rhetorical perspectives are needed to better 
understand this complex narrative.  
In sum, I suggest that because the current context of unpaid family caregiving 
both shapes and can be shaped by pro-caregiver advocacy rhetoric, a rhetorical 
perspective is needed to understand how the discursive constructions of unpaid family 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I acknowledge that there are other possible opposing positions including, but not limited 
to, responses of apathy, other needs being higher priority, or the impracticality or cost of 
a shared solution; however, even with these other oppositional possibilities, I contend it is 
important to examine pro-caregiving arguments for how they might facilitate a lack of 
change even without a strong “anti” version of opposition.  
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caregiving inform and shape the public efforts created by and for caregivers and how 
rhetoric might more desirably contribute to altering those material conditions. As such, 
this dissertation takes an applied rhetorical perspective in that it offers both scholars and 
practitioners a method for analyzing the inherent barriers facing pro-caregiving advocates 
and offers suggestions utilizing the practical tools of rhetoric to better frame the public 
discussion surrounding unpaid family caregiving. This project’s findings have promise 
for informing advocacy concerning related situations (e.g., advocacy regarding better 
public policies and shared responsibility for mothering caregiving). Furthermore, this 
particular situation exists at a unique moment in history when its arguments have a better-
than-usual chance of being entertained and that make this rhetorical study an heuristic 
undertaking.  
A Unique Moment in History for Unpaid Family Caregiving 
Unpaid family caregiving represents one subset of caregiving discourse that has 
similarities to another widespread case that also requires further, more effective advocacy 
to be adequately supported by public policy and accepted as a shared, not individual, 
responsibility: mothering. Advances in rhetorical approaches, revealed by this case, 
whose rhetorical moment currently seems ascendant, may be beneficial to those 
advocating on behalf of mothering in the long term. Unlike mothering, pro-caregiving 
advocates are encountering a moment in history when this type of caregiving stands a 
chance to be realized as a social issue. There are three contemporary aspects that provide 
insight into why unpaid caregiving advocates, in particular, are part of a unique moment 
in time when a case for broader acceptance and shared responsibility has a timely 
opportunity to be heard: (1) there is a critical mass of citizens directly affected due to 
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growing lop-sidedness in the caregiver to care-receiver ratio; (2) accumulating evidence 
supports that unpaid family caregiving could become a public policy issue partly because 
of its mounting public costs; and, (3) there are concurrent intersecting public 
conversations related to definitions of family and the proper location of health care 
responsibilities.  
First, unpaid family caregiving is moving through a unique moment in history in 
the United States where the baby boomer population needs care but there are fewer 
children to care for them. “As the baby boomer generation ages,” according to Steven 
Zarit (2014), “caregiving will continue to be a crucial issue among Americans” (para. 2). 
He offers, “Looking specifically at older people, the amount of care has increased 
because people are living longer and reach ages where disabilities are common” and 
“smaller family size also means there are fewer offspring for providing care to a parent” 
(para. 6). In addition to the lop-sidedness, unpaid family caregiving is widespread as 
“about 25.8 million family caregivers provide personal assistance to individuals 18 years 
or older who have a disability or chronic illness” and “nearly one out of every four 
households (22.4 million households) is involved in giving care to persons aged 50 or 
older” (Day, 2014, para. 2). Folbre and Olin Wright (2012) indicate that “84 percent of 
all 21.5 billion hours of non-institutional personal assistance—was provided in the home 
by unpaid family and friend caregivers” (p. 13) and that  
despite their documented need, only 33 percent of older adults, 18 percent of 
adults with disabilities between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four, and 68 
percent of adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities (ID/DD) 
received paid help in any venue. (p. 13) 
	  	   28 
As such, the lop-sidedness in the caregiver to care-receiver ratio and the prevalence of 
this type of caregiving is reaching a tipping point where conditions will only continue to 
worsen and more individuals will personally feel the effects if pro-caregiving advocates 
do not generate more shared responsibility.  
 Second, there is emerging recognition of unpaid family caregiving as a potential 
public policy issue. For example, on September 17, 2014, the Caregiver Corps Act of 
2014 was introduced and assigned to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions (govtrack.us, 2014). Similarly, AARP reports on several federal and state 
initiatives that they indicate are signs that family caregiving is “now recognized as a 
central part of health care” (Feinberg et al., 2011, p. 12). On the federal level, AARP 
reports that the Affordable Care Act “explicitly mentions the term ‘caregiver’ 46 times 
and ‘family caregiver’ 11 times” (p. 13). On the state level, AARP points out California’s 
“first paid family leave program” that “provides up to six weeks of partial pay for eligible 
employees who need time off from work to bond with a new child or to care for a 
seriously ill family member” (p. 13). AARP suggests, “These initiatives are promising 
but modest” (p. 14), and, for the purpose of this study, indicate that a moment of public 
policy change could be materializing. 
 Finally, today’s unpaid family caregiving discussions intersect in time and 
relevance with a number of controversial public conversations, including same-sex 
marriage and health care, that could provide potential allies or pools of rhetorical 
resources to draw from in terms of the associations to changing definitions of family 
(same-sex marriage) and proper location of health care responsibility (health care 
reform). For example, same sex marriage has been a highly debated topic in politics since 
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the early 2000s. As of October 2014, 32 states have legalized same-sex marriage 
beginning with Massachusetts in May 2004 to the most recent in October 2014 including 
Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, Colorado, West Virginia, North Carolina, 
Idaho, Alaska, Arizona, and Wyoming. In June 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
“Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage” (Liptak, 2015, para. 1). The 
arguments, including the scope and responsibilities of family and government, on both 
sides are complex and far-reaching. Another highly contested and polarizing issue in 
contemporary politics is health care reform. Health care reform has been debated in the 
political sphere for decades, and in March 2010 the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA) was passed. Even after the passage of PPACA, health care reform 
continues to be controversial and centered on loci of responsibility for care and the scope 
of care to which citizens should be entitled. The 1000+ page document has introduced 
specific provisions for “caregivers,” giving Americans reasons for expanding the focus of 
health care discussions from patients to include family caregivers. For instance, Feinberg 
et al. (2011) reports, “The new health care law of 2010, the Affordable Care Act (P.L. 
111-148), promotes the central importance of person- and family-centered care in the 
design and delivery of new models of care to improve the quality and efficiency of health 
care, including assessment of the family caregiver’s experience of care” (p. 13). In June 
2015, the “Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in the King v. Burwell case to uphold the Affordable 
Care Act’s subsidy provision” (Workers World staff, 2015, para. 1). This recent Supreme 
Court ruling indicates health care reform and responsibility are still contested and a focus 
of public discussion. These controversial issues point to public conversations circulating 
about definitions of family and emphases on caregivers as patients. Despite the recent 
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state legislation and the high court’s rulings, the issues of same-sex marriage and health 
care reform are still hotly debated and polarizing. As such, I argue this is a potentially 
pivotal moment in time where pro-caregiving advocates have prospective entry points 
into public discussions about advocacy for unpaid family caregiving with probable built-
in allies such as AARP. These three larger, intersecting conversations offer insight into 
potentialities that might expand and open up more rhetorical possibilities for pro-
caregiving advocates, in particular.  
My intention in focusing on one type of caregiving is not meant to ignore other, 
very important types of caregiving, but rather to illustrate the ways in which issues that 
are assumed to be private can potentially create rhetorical problems of advocacy, as 
demonstrated in the example of unpaid family caregiving. As such, this study will be 
useful for other advocacy situations where advocates must negotiate a subject with built-
in barriers that may hinder efforts to make the issue a shared responsibility including, but 
not limited to, other rhetorics of caregiving. The way we define caregiving matters 
because it sets up boundaries for how we understand, and thus engage in a public 
conversation about, caregiving. I propose that a rhetorical perspective is needed to 
generate rhetorical alternatives that might open up more possibilities to garner shared 
responsibility for unpaid family caregivers.  
 
Research Questions and Background 
In this study, I analyze the ways that family, crisis, and care, three key terms that 
are pervasive in the discourse surrounding unpaid family caregiving, are invoked in a 
public conversation where the social stakes are high but shared responsibility is low. It is 
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my contention that pro-caregiving advocates are encountering and inadvertently 
perpetuating rhetorical problems related to family metaphors and definitions of crisis and 
care in ways that are impeding public policy improvements to meet shared needs. This 
study identifies a complex social problem that hinges on making caregiving a shared 
responsibility and offers ideas for better promoting a more productive conversation about 
unpaid family caregiving. More specifically, my study identifies the obstacles to pro-
caregiving rhetoric in making a positive material difference and also generates rhetorical 
alternatives to the obstacles. My study will be useful for other disadvantaged populations 
who negotiate a subject assumed to be a private matter, while attempting to appeal to 
social responsibility.  
The research questions guiding this inquiry are: How might the ways pro-
caregiving advocates talk about their subject contribute to the lack of effective public 
action, even if they produce a plethora of uncontested discourse? What alternative 
rhetorical strategies might better serve pro-caregiving advocate goals in increasing public 
concern about and shared responsibility for policy action on unpaid caregiver challenges? 
As such, this dissertation promises to accomplish two goals: (1) through a close textual 
analysis of pro-caregiving advocacy discourse, this dissertation explores three dominant 
frames that work to limit understandings of unpaid family caregiving as a shared 
responsibility; and (2) each analysis chapter offers teachable lessons for maneuvering or 
resisting the inherent barriers to shared responsibility. I argue that by changing the angle 
of the rhetorical approach, the dominant frames can be utilized to promote unpaid family 
caregiving as a public, social responsibility as opposed to a private, biological family 
responsibility. I am not suggesting that, if implemented, these discursive changes are 
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sufficient to resolve the material problems facing contemporary unpaid family caregivers. 
However, I do suggest that some modifications in the conversation are necessary in order 
to provoke or make more possible social change. As long as the conversation continues to 
invoke the same dominant frames uncritically, pro-caregiving advocates will continue to 
sabotage their own efforts to make unpaid family caregiving matter to the entire nation.  
The research questions for this study are informed by the lessons offered by care 
theorists5. In order to situate my research questions within a context of theories of care, it 
is necessary to review some fundamental literature advanced by Gilligan, Kittay, 
Noddings, and Ruddick—four pioneering scholars of care theory. It is essential to map 
out the academic conversation about what is known as theories of care in order to (1) 
distinguish my work and goals from previous scholarship as well as (2) illuminate how 
my efforts in this dissertation will work to provide suggestions for more scholarly work 
and considerations for scholarship on care theory. This larger conversation in theories of 
care reveals two main frameworks that will elucidate work that has already been 
completed and is useful for this dissertation. First, I will explain why the distinction 
between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice matters for this dissertation. Second, I will 
offer a theoretical framework about caring for the caregiver and demonstrate how that 
framework will be a useful guiding point throughout the dissertation. The rest of this 
section will be spent outlining the major theorists’ contributions in care theory and then 
conclude with how the work in this dissertation will draw from and provide 
considerations for this academic conversation. It is important to note here that I am using 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I refer to care theorists as those scholars who take a notion of “care” as their subject of 
analysis. I do not wish to enter into a discussion on definitions of care yet, but rather to 
point out that there are scholars whose primary focus is on the subject of care with 
varying points of focus.	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similar language in this dissertation to that of care theorists. However, care theorists talk 
about “care” in terms of the general idea that we, as members of a common society, 
should consider ourselves in relation to one another and their use of “caregiver” is not 
limited to the unpaid family caregiver, but rather anyone caring for another in a 
dependency relationship.  
First, most care theorists distinguish between what are called ethics of care and 
ethics of justice as two types of languages that inform human reasoning. These languages 
illuminate orientations about the extent to which we understand ourselves in relation to 
others. Care theorists’ discussions on ethics of care and ethics of justice serve as a useful 
starting point for this dissertation because there have been debates about the extent to 
which these two languages are compatible with or better/worse in framing public policy.  
As summarized by Kuhse (1997), Carol Gilligan was one of the first feminist 
scholars to map a “feminist approach to ethics” by asserting “two different moral 
‘languages’—a language of impartiality or ‘justice’ and a relational language of ‘care’” 
(p. 99). In her work, In a Different Voice, Gilligan (1982) posited these two orientations, 
suggesting both are equally valid, but just different ways of reasoning. Gilligan “posited 
that men and women often speak different languages that they think are the same, and she 
sought to correct the tendency to take the male perspective as the prototype for humanity 
in moral reasoning” (Sander-Staudt, n.d., para. 4). The use of ethics of care and ethics of 
justice invite specific terminology associations that reveal the underpinnings of each type 
of reasoning. For example, in Tonn’s (1996) essay on Mary Harris “Mother” Jones, she 
draws from Sara Ruddick’s conceptualization of maternal thinking as she describes an 
ethic of care as privileging “connection, empathy, and contingent reasoning from 
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concrete experiences over abstract, impersonal, absolute, and linear approaches to 
problem-solving” (p. 4). Although Tonn (1996) uses this description to argue that militant 
protective love “broadens the maternal ‘ethic of care’” (p. 5), her associational language 
is useful for the current discussion about characteristics of the languages of care and 
justice. Here, Tonn (1996) associates an ethic of care with concreteness and an ethic of 
justice with abstractness. Similarly, Kuhse (1997) draws from Sara Ruddick’s 
explanation of abstraction and suggests that it “‘refers to a cluster of interrelated 
dispositions to simplify, dissociate, generalize and sharply define’. Its opposite, which 
she calls ‘concreteness’, ‘respects complexity, connection, particularity and ambiguity” 
(p. 120). In sum, this paragraph provides some early definitional work on ethics of care 
and ethics of justice in order to now introduce the ways in which these different 
languages have been raised in academic conversations about their use in public policy.  
After Gilligan posited these two moral languages, other scholars entered into the 
discussion and debated the extent to which one language might be better than the other as 
a method of reasoning. For example, Nel Noddings (1984) wrote Caring: A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education where she considered both perspectives valid 
approaches to reasoning; however, in this work, Noddings gives preference to the 
language of care because she suggests that the ethical ideal or the “vision of best self” (p. 
80) was based on a caring relation rather than on universal moral principles. She states, 
“Principles that seem universifiable…tell us, theoretically, what to do, ‘all other things 
being equal.’ But other things are rarely if ever equal” (p. 85). Additionally, she argues 
that moral judgments are context dependent so we must consider the unique concrete 
aspects to make a well-reasoned evaluation. Noddings (1984) does not suggest that an 
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ethic of caring as a feminine ethic implies “a claim to speak for all women nor to exclude 
men” though “there is reason to believe that women are somewhat better equipped for 
caring than men are. This is partly a result of the construction of psychological deep 
structures in the mother-child relationship” (p. 97). Although Noddings (1984) indicates 
the usefulness of both types of languages, her early work sparked a discussion amongst 
care theorists about the extent to which one language might be better or worse than the 
other.  
Sara Ruddick is also a leading care theorist who contributes to theories of care by 
positing a “maternal thinking” paradigm that asserts a compatibility between an ethic of 
care and an ethic of justice as well as how this paradigm, or way of thinking, might be a 
productive approach to inform a public consciousness. First, Ruddick (1989) asserts in 
Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace that mothering does not just refer to a 
biological mother and that mothering is not strictly a female activity but rather can be 
applied to anyone who commits “oneself to protecting, nurturing, and training particular 
children” (p. 51). Ruddick (1997) argues that mothering, in this broad sense, is both 
powerless and powerful. It is powerless in that “women are less able than men to 
determine the conditions in which their children grow” (p. 585), yet can be powerful 
because “for a child, a mother is the primary, uncontrollable source of the world’s goods; 
a witness and judge whose will must be placated, whose approval must be secured” (p. 
585). She concludes by suggesting that mothering shapes our thinking and offers what 
she calls “maternal thinking” where “intellectual activities are distinguishable, but not 
separable, from disciplines of feeling. There is a unity of reflection, judgment, and 
emotion. It is this unity I call ‘maternal thinking’” (p. 588). Ruddick provides an 
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important aspect to theories of care by relating maternal thinking’s relevance to public 
consciousness and policy. Ruddick argues, “We must work to bring a transformed 
maternal thought into the public realm, to make the preservation and growth of all 
children a work of public conscience and legislation” (p. 598). She suggests, “All 
feminists must join in articulating a theory of justice shaped by and incorporating 
maternal thinking” (p. 598). Ruddick’s perspective invites us to see a maternal thinking 
paradigm that demonstrates the potential compatibility between an ethic of care and an 
ethic of justice.   
The discussion about the extent to which an ethic of care and an ethic of justice 
are compatible serves as one useful framework for understanding this dissertation’s goals. 
It is important to note that care theorists have explored the necessity of making “care” 
compatible with a public consciousness and policy. Although Ruddick argues that a 
maternal ethic can be productive in a social sense, I argue that the associations embraced 
by “maternal thinking” as currently used by many pro-caregiving advocates can 
discourage shared responsibility as opposed to motivating it. As such, I acknowledge that 
other scholars have addressed the necessity of introducing some kind of “ethic of care” 
into public consciousness, but they have disagreed on what that model looks like. In this 
dissertation, I will draw from these previous discussions and present considerations to 
this line of thought by introducing the rhetorical complexities of making caregiving 
matter socially as well as offer suggestions about how this academic discussion can 
advance rhetorical leadership in practice.  
In addition to a focus on languages of care in contrast to justice, care theorists also 
provide a lens and justification for looking at the caregiver, in various capacities, which is 
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a useful framework for this dissertation. For example, Noddings (1984) made significant 
contributions to advancing theories of care by introducing “caring for the caregiver” into 
the academic conversation. She explains her preferred terminology of describing a 
“caregiver” as “one-caring”:  “I do not sacrifice myself when I move toward the other as 
one-caring” (p. 99). This is an important addition to care theory because it suggests that 
“if caring is to be maintained, clearly, the one-caring must be maintained” (p. 100).  
More recently, Eva Feder Kittay (1995, 1999) extended theories of care by 
revisiting what was introduced by Noddings (1984)—that within a caring ethic, there 
needs to exist a notion of care for our caregivers. Kittay offers a look at how the social 
role of caregiver is assumed to be privatized and gendered and further offers insight into 
how caregivers are constituted in social structures such as the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA). Kittay argues in Taking Dependency Seriously (1995), “The gendered and 
privatized nature of dependency work has meant, first, that men have rarely shared these 
responsibilities…and second, that the equitable distribution of dependency work, both 
among genders and among classes, has rarely been considered in the discussions of 
political and social justice” (p. 2). Kittay (1995) provides an informed critique of the 
FMLA and argues that it adheres to a liberal model that construes “society as an 
association of equals, conceived as individuals with equal powers, equally situated in the 
competition for the benefits of social cooperation” thereby disregarding “the inevitable 
dependencies of the human condition” (p. 4). She argues that this social structure “creates 
a secondary dependence in those who care for dependents” in that “they [caregivers] 
remain outside the society of equals insofar as they cannot function as the independent 
and autonomous agents of liberal theory” (p. 4). She argues that this becomes 
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problematic for dependency workers, in general, and women in particular because “when 
the fact of dependency and its social dimensions within the political conception of society 
is omitted, the secondary dependence of the dependency worker and the contribution of 
even the most dependent to the fabric of human relations is missed” (p. 5). Further, “that 
women historically and customarily assume the role of dependency worker means that 
such an account of equality leaves out many women who retain their role and status as 
dependency workers” (p. 5). Kittay’s (1995) analysis offers insight into why an ethic of 
justice might be inadequate in public policy advocacy situations for unpaid family 
caregivers.  
In addition, Kittay (1999) offers a useful theoretical framework for understanding 
the necessity of focusing attention toward the caregiver. For example, in Love’s Labor, 
Kittay (1999) focuses on ways that we might care for caregivers in a “nested set of social 
relationships” (p. 68) characterized by “reciprocity-in-connection” (p. 67). She argues, 
“The dependency worker is entitled not to a reciprocity from the charge herself, but to a 
relationship that sustains her as she sustains her charge” (p. 68). She asserts a doulia 
metaphor, “A term that improvises on the name of a postpartum caregiver (a doula) who 
assists the new mother as the mother cares for the infant” because, in this model, “the 
direction of the obligation in connection-based reciprocity goes from those in position to 
discharge the obligations to those to whom they are relevantly connected” (p. 68). 
Kittay’s (1999) doulia metaphor offers a framework for decentralizing caregiving as 
women’s work because it models a new concept of social cooperation. The doulia is a 
“concept by which service is rendered to those who become needy by virtue of attending 
to those in need, so that all can be well cared for” (p. 11). The doulia metaphor focuses 
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on the idea that we not only need to care for care-receivers (e.g., the elderly, disabled, 
veterans) but that caregiving should be a part of our social responsibility where we should 
extend our focus to our caregivers.  
I see the doulia metaphor as a productive framework to understand the aims of 
this dissertation in that it encourages shared responsibility for caregiving and thus may 
provide a useful resource for pro-caregiving advocates. Kittay (1999) explains, “By 
extending the notion of service (rendered to the postpartum mother by the doula so that 
the mother can care for her child and yet be cared for herself) and by shifting from the 
private circumstance of postpartum care to a public conception of care, we think of the 
circles of reciprocity moving outward to the larger social structures of which we are a 
part and upon which we depend” (p. 133). Important to point out here is the movement or 
shifting from activities assumed to be private to public, or community, responsibility. The 
doulia metaphor emphasizes caregiving as a shared social responsibility in caring for the 
caregiver. 
To summarize and place in the context of this dissertation, Ruddick (1989), 
Noddings (1984), and Kittay (1995, 1999) address the necessity of devoting attention to 
caregivers in addition to care-receivers (e.g., children, elderly, disabled individuals). 
However, these care theorists deviate from each other in the extent to which they agree 
on how to make “care” a public responsibility. Kittay (1995, 1999) critiques societal 
structures that privatize dependency work and Ruddick (1989) argues that society can be 
empowered by moving a maternal ethic into public consciousness. I agree that we should 
be moving toward a society characterized by shared responsibility of caregiving but I 
disagree, based on the upcoming rhetorical analysis, that Ruddick’s (1989) maternal ethic 
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integrated in the public realm offers a clear resolution toward shared responsibility in 
unpaid family caregiving. In this dissertation, I argue that by talking about unpaid family 
caregiving as an issue assumed to be “private,” pro-caregiving advocates are only re-
entrenching and solidifying that caregiving is primarily a biological family concern. As 
such, I argue that inherent barriers are being perpetuated in pro-caregiving discourse, 
which work to retain unpaid family caregiving as a domestic concern, as opposed to a 
shared, public concern. I suggest that, in order to move toward a society characterized by 
shared responsibility in unpaid family caregiving, we need to take concrete steps to 
analyze and change the way we talk about unpaid family caregiving.  
Advancements in theories of care have grown stagnant since Ruddick (1989) and 
Kittay (1999). Although Noddings’s (2012) most recent work advances a theory of care, 
she is primarily concerned with an educational context. My scholarly efforts in this 
dissertation provide considerations for this body of scholarship by theorizing how both 
scholars and practitioners can use the practical tools of rhetoric to analyze and expand 
possibilities in how we discuss how to handle unpaid family caregiving. Given this, my 
contribution functions as a critique of Ruddick’s (1989) maternal thinking in public 
policy in that I will argue that “maternal thinking” cannot be simply transferred to the 
public sphere without accounting for the resulting inherent barriers in unpaid family 
caregiving discourse. I will demonstrate that by revealing the inherent barriers in pro-
caregiver discourse scholars and practitioners can alter the language toward a more 
productive end. Kittay (1995, 1999) outlines the ways in which social structures 
perpetuate care as privatized activities, and I intend to show through the case study of 
pro-caregiving advocacy how the language used to describe unpaid family caregiving 
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mutually reinforces Kittay’s findings, thereby making it difficult to advocate successfully 
for shared responsibility. Because “theories of care provide a much-needed account of the 
morality associated with relationships in the private sphere” (Thompson, 1998, p. 525), 
these perspectives are needed to better evaluate the ways in which pro-caregiving 
advocates themselves contribute to inherent barriers that may impede them from 
encouraging shared responsibility beyond the confines of a “private” sense.  
In order to open up more possibilities for shared responsibility in unpaid family 
caregiving, we first need to understand the inherent barriers that are keeping caregiving 
limited to a domestic concern. I am building on previous work conducted by care 
theorists, in particular Kittay (1995, 1999), not by directly focusing on the social 
structures that perpetuate caregiving as women’s work, as Kittay does, but rather by 
interrogating the language utilized by pro-caregiving advocates themselves. Additionally, 
Kittay’s (1999) doulia model offers a productive framework for encouraging shared 
responsibility that I believe is applicable to the case of unpaid family caregiving.  
Rhetorical perspectives are needed to study and carry on the work of care 
theorists because, although scholars have previously focused their efforts on the 
gendering of caregiving, little scholarly work has been focused on the rhetoric 
surrounding or advocating regarding unpaid family caregiving specifically or the ways 
that a more productive framing of this rhetoric could be enacted using the practical tools 
offered by the rhetorical discipline. I am interested in the practical aspects of rhetoric 
because of my commitment to build a more effective and ethical citizenry by advancing 
applied communication scholarship that will be useful for both scholars and practitioners. 
I envision this project as encompassing more than just ways that pro-caregiving 
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advocates can open up possibilities in their advocacy efforts; I wish to offer all social 
advocates who negotiate an issue assumed to be “private” while trying to garner shared 
responsibility a means for understanding how shifting the perspective, through rhetoric, 
can reveal productive advocacy opportunities toward establishing a society characterized 
by shared responsibility.  
It is my contention that a change in rhetoric is necessary but not sufficient in pro-
caregiving advocacy because of many contextual issues and material limitations. For 
instance, I acknowledge that changing the gendered aspects of this rhetoric is an onerous 
task regardless of the effort on the part of advocates who may be skilled at reconstructing 
arguments. Although this case presents an uphill climb, I believe that understanding the 
rhetorical choices is a first step for the arguments to work toward achieving the 
advocates’ goals. As such, this dissertation functions to extend and expand rhetorical 
possibilities for more effective arguments as opposed to claiming that my proposed 
solutions will directly change the material conditions of unpaid family caregivers. This 
dissertation offers scholars and practitioners a case study to extend applied rhetorical 
knowledge about public advocacy for issues usually assumed to be “private.
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Chapter 2: Theory and Method 
Theories and methods of rhetorical criticisms are often blurred because a theory is a 
method of experiencing rhetoric in the real world. (Brummett, 1984, p. 105) 
 
 In rhetorical theory and criticism, theory and method are deeply intertwined. In 
fact, Brummett (1984) argues that in rhetorical criticism “the method is merged with and 
subordinated to the theory” (p. 99). What this means is that when conducting research, 
the rhetorical critic’s tools for analyzing a text include the theory (or theories) that help(s) 
interpret the discourse as well as provide the method of analysis, which might be based 
on the major components of a theory. Because I adopt this line of thought, I utilize the 
terminology of “critical lens” comprised of both the theories that help me to interpret the 
texts and the methods for analyzing the texts. As such, the theory and method in this 
section are not separated, as they both inform my critical lens and work together to help 
me advance my argument and answer my study’s research questions.  
This chapter is organized around answering the what, why, where, when, and how 
to answer the two research questions for this dissertation. My first research question, how 
might the ways that pro-caregiving advocates talk about their subject contribute to the 
lack of public action, even if they produce a plethora of uncontested discourse, can be 
answered by close textual analysis and argumentation theory. My second research 
question, what alternative rhetorical strategies might better serve pro-caregiving advocate 
goals in increasing public concern about and shared responsibility for policy action on 
unpaid caregiver challenges, can be answered by the rhetorical issue of solvency 
developed through concepts such as metaphor and redefinition. In order to identify the 
ontological questions of what to look for and why, I will first outline and justify why I am 
focusing on one subset of pro-caregiving rhetors (i.e., pro-caregiving advocates) to 
	  	   44 
analyze for this dissertation. The methodological questions of when and where to look 
will be answered by outlining where I found and how I selected the texts and contexts 
surrounding pro-caregiving advocates from among the available choices. How I will look 
at the selected texts will be discussed near the end of the chapter by focusing on 
metaphors, definitions, values, value hierarchies, and loci, specifically. Finally, I will 
conclude this chapter with a synopsis of the rest of the chapters in this dissertation.  
What to Look for and Why  
I suspect that inherent barriers to framing caregiving as a socially shared 
responsibility are built in to the discourse surrounding unpaid family caregiving, and in 
particular, even perpetuated by pro-caregiving advocates themselves. In order to answer 
my first research question, then, I need to conduct a close textual analysis of the texts 
produced by pro-caregiving advocates who are attempting to energize public policy 
change. When I began looking for texts that would allow me to answer my research 
questions, I started by exploring pro-caregiving voices within a rhetorically constructed 
context of a caregiving crisis. I define pro-caregiving voices as those individuals who are 
advancing a public conversation about contemporary unpaid family caregiving, 
including, but not limited to, caregivers, caregiver advocates, and researchers. I found 
that these pro-caregiving voices draw on similar rhetorical frames when contributing to a 
public discussion about greater support for an appreciation of unpaid family caregiving. 
Although I acknowledge that there are many different voices in this rhetoric (i.e., one 
advocating for caregivers might not necessarily be a caregiver), I suggest that pro-
caregiving rhetors are all advancing a public conversation sympathetic to unpaid family 
caregiving; sometimes this is related to public policy advocacy, and other times it is 
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limited to social support. These voices provide a contextual backdrop for understanding 
the texts I analyze in this dissertation because it is within this discursive context that a 
rhetorically constructed unpaid family caregiver living in a rhetorically constructed 
caregiving crisis is being advanced by pro-caregiving rhetors.  
Since many pro-caregiving rhetors are wavering between individual and social 
responsibility, for the purpose of this dissertation I chose to focus only on texts that ask 
that unpaid family caregiving be a social responsibility—pro-caregiving advocates. By 
focusing only on pro-caregiving advocate voices, I wish to isolate the public efforts to 
improve the material conditions facing unpaid family caregivers through policy change, 
though it should be noted here that some policy proposals include individual social 
support for unpaid family caregivers. By doing so, I am able to identify, through close 
textual analysis, the ways in which policy appeals get deployed and what potential 
inherent barriers are being perpetuated by pro-caregiving advocates themselves. As such, 
inherency analysis will help illuminate the inherent barriers within unpaid family 
caregiver discourse, and point the way to more effective rhetorical approaches.  
Because I suspect that pro-caregiving advocates’ use of discourse is limiting the 
necessary concept of understanding caregiving as a shared responsibility, I have reason to 
believe that unpaid family caregiving could be a social responsibility if inherent barriers 
are identified and resisted or replaced by more helpful rhetoric. At the outset, then, 
rhetorical leadership undergirds the critical lens that I develop in this dissertation. 
Rhetorical leadership brings together public advocacy and building a more effective and 
ethical citizenry because leadership is for everybody and “effective leaders…use 
language in ways that allow us to see leadership not only as big decisions but as a series 
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of moments in which images build upon each other to help us construct a reality to which 
we must then respond” (Fairhurst and Sarr, 1996, p. 1). It is my contention that all pro-
caregiving advocates are rhetorical leaders who have opportunities to modify their 
rhetorical approach to encourage a shared interpretation of unpaid family caregiving as a 
social responsibility. Because my larger scholarly goals in this dissertation include 
providing practical takeaways for scholars and practitioners, rhetorical leadership, as a 
scholarly perspective, encouragingly provides a framework that focuses on ways to 
advance teachable rhetorical lessons by analyzing and learning from public advocacy 
efforts (see Olson, 2007).  
Close textual analysis of pro-caregiving advocacy is necessary to reveal the 
inherent barriers that I suspect are creating rhetorical obstacles to productive policy 
change in pro-caregiving advocacy discourse. Close textual analysis is a method of 
criticism in which the scholar unpacks meanings of rhetorical strategies utilized by a 
rhetor within a public artifact. In close textual analysis, there are numerous ways a critic 
can read a rhetorical artifact. In this dissertation, I utilize close textual analysis by 
analyzing both the intrinsic characteristics of the texts as well as the extrinsic factors that 
shape the texts.  
Stock issues in policy debate. Because I believe that shared responsibility is 
possible but may be made difficult by the symbolic choices of pro-caregiving advocates, 
identifying the inherent barriers reinforced in pro-caregiving advocacy discourse, through 
close textual analysis, is necessary. The set of five stock issues in policy debate 
(jurisdiction, significance, inherency, solvency, and consequences) offer scholars and 
practitioners a “hunting ground for arguments” because they “provide general phrasing of 
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potential issues that correspond to the inherent obligations of the advocate of change” 
(Ziegelmueller & Kay, 1997, p. 172). Policy advocates should develop arguments around 
the five stock issues “not because some rhetorical scholar declared it so but because they 
[stock issues] encapsulate what real policymakers expect real advocates to demonstrate 
before they give assent” (Olson, 2008, p. 223). Together, these five stock issues represent 
a set of “possible proofs” to justify policy change (Jasinski, 2001, p. 532). More 
specifically, the advocate should “provide proposals consistent with the terminology 
(scope) of the proposition” (Ziegelmueller & Kay, 1997, p. 172) (jurisdiction); the 
advocate should show that the change is needed by demonstrating the existence of 
“significant harms or ills or needs within the present system” (Ziegelmueller & Kay, 
1997, p. 173) (significance or ill); the advocate must explore inherency, or blame, that 
perpetuates the ill and demonstrate that a “policy approach is warranted…if it can be 
shown that by its very nature the present system cannot (structure), will not (attitude), or 
should not (philosophy) overcome the problems or achieve the goals” (Ziegelmueller & 
Kay, 1997, p. 174); the advocate must offer a workable solution (solvency or cure); and 
the advocate must demonstrate that “disadvantages of the proposed change are not so 
great as to outweigh any benefits” (Ziegelmueller & Kay, 1997, p. 177). Although these 
five issues are addressed separately, they are not mutually exclusive in that they interlock 
and work together to justify policy change. As suggested by Ziegelmueller and Kay 
(1997), “Each of these categories constitutes a vital area of concern—an area in which 
the advocate of change may lose his or her case” (p. 172). As such, the five stock issues 
in policy debate offer an initial framework for understanding and finding arguments as 
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well as potential areas to strengthen the justification for the policy platform of pro-
caregiving advocates.   
Inherency analysis. One of the stock issues, inherency, can be used as a practical 
tool for citizen advocates to diagnose the perpetuation of the ill, or the material suffering 
of unpaid family caregivers, that persists in spite of efforts for policy change. Rhetorical 
leaders have opportunities to examine what plagues the discourse that is preventing 
public policy change with the use of inherency analysis. I suggest that inherency analysis 
is crucial in the contemporary situation of unpaid family caregiving because a public case 
is being constructed by pro-caregiving advocates with little public policy action and 
inherency analysis might reveal underlying causes that are limiting social change.  
I argue that one explanation of this lack of public attention lies in attitudinal and 
philosophical inherency where the reasons that might explain public inaction could be 
revealed in the way pro-caregiving advocates themselves talk about their subject. For 
example, I will suggest that the ways in which pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically 
construct “care” and “family” reveal and unintentionally reinforce inherent attitudinal 
barriers, which is a “form of inherency [that] admits that the present system has the 
capability to solve the ills, but claims that the system will not do so because of a deeply 
rooted attitude” (Ziegelmueller & Kay, 1997, p. 174), by adopting language that implies 
unpaid family caregiving is primarily women’s work in the domestic sphere and not a 
matter of public concern. Furthermore, the rhetorical construction of the situation of 
“crisis” reveals a philosophical inherent barrier, a form of inherency that “admits that the 
ills could be solved, but claims that the ills should not be solved because greater ills 
would result” (p. 175). While pro-caregiving advocates are advancing persuasive ills 
	  	   49 
facing society, care-receivers, and caregivers, the solutions do not demonstrate how 
caregiver ills will be lessened; as such, a solution that does not match all aspects of the 
ills claimed reveals that caregivers are ordered as less important than other crisis sufferers 
(e.g., care-recipients and taxpayers).  
This dissertation will demonstrate the usefulness of inherency analysis for both 
scholars and practitioners in that I use inherency analysis to illuminate one possible way 
that pro-caregiving advocates can identify inherent barriers that plague their own 
discourse in their efforts to advance shared responsibility about unpaid family caregiving. 
Inherency analysis is accessible to advocates themselves, both at the organizational and 
individual level, as well as to critics utilizing this as method for analyzing public policy 
efforts. Beyond accessibility and application, Olson (2008) argues for the practicality of 
inherency analysis for public advocates because it offers a versatile, efficient, flexible, 
and teachable standard that can “prepare effective citizen leaders with practical and 
generative tools for influencing and testing public policy decisions outside the classroom 
or competition arena” (p. 236). This practical tool, in addition to demonstrating a lesson 
in rhetorical leadership, will help me answer research question one: how might the ways 
pro-caregiving advocates talk about their subject contribute to the lack of public action, 
even if they produce a plethora of uncontested discourse. Although inherency analysis 
will not resolve the negative material conditions plaguing unpaid family caregivers, 
inherency analysis has the capacity to equip pro-caregiving advocates with tools to 
analyze the potentially detrimental ways in which they are communicating about the 
material conditions.  
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Solvency. The rhetorical issue of solvency will be equally as important to this 
study as inherency analysis. Solvency, or “whether the cure really solves the problem” 
(Jasinski, 2001, p. 535) is a key element in this dissertation because each analysis chapter 
will offer potential changes in the way that a dominant frame is deployed in pro-caregiver 
discourse that avoid or overcome the inherent barriers identified. Because “inherency 
often complicates the affirmative’s need to establish solvency” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 534), 
inherency analysis will reveal opportunities to conceptualize both solvency and 
workability of potential “cures” to solve the significant ill. Providing the correct “cure” 
for pro-caregiving advocates is not the goal of this dissertation, but rather one goal in this 
study is to propose “a necessary first step that will make it possible to solve the problem 
fully somewhere down the road” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 535). As such, research question two, 
what alternative rhetorical strategies might better serve pro-caregiving advocate goals in 
increasing public concern about and shared responsibility for policy action on unpaid 
family caregiver challenges, will be answered guided by the rhetorical issue of solvency.  
 The set of five stock issues serve as a practical tool for citizen advocates as well 
as for leaders in formal positions of authority to use in policy advocacy efforts because 
“advocates [can] use these stock issues…in strategic planning…[and are] useful in the 
process of rhetorical invention” (Jasinski, 2011, p. 536). Olson (2008) argues that public 
policy advocacy can be an exercise in leadership and not just for those in “positions of 
formal authority” but can include individual rhetors “who serve as leaders on public 
issues with shared stakes” (p. 221). Pro-caregiving advocates include both organizations 
(e.g., The Rosalyn Carter Institute for Caregiving) and individual rhetorical leaders (e.g., 
Diane Schuster’s Caregiver Corps Proposal). Pro-caregiving advocates are working to 
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“shape and interpret situations to guide organizational members into a common 
interpretation of reality” (Smircich & Morgan, 1982, p. 261). In the case of unpaid family 
caregiving, pro-caregiving advocates attempt to propose policy change that appeals to 
policy makers and the American public, answer the call for advocates to provide a 
“topical” proposal (Ziegelmeuller & Kay, 1997, p. 173) (jurisdiction); construct a 
situation that demonstrates the ills that plague unpaid family caregiving because material 
conditions are worsening for unpaid family caregivers (significance or ill); propose 
feasible solutions that offer ways to resolve the ill (solvency/cure) as well as elaborate on 
any additional benefits for enacting change beyond solving the ill and defend against new 
problems that the solution might create (on-balance costs). Despite efforts to provide 
reasonable proofs to enact policy change for unpaid family caregiving, policy change is 
left unrealized. I propose that pro-caregiving advocates look to inherency, or reasons why 
“an array of potential solutions has been offered or even enacted, yet the significant ill(s) 
persists” (Olson, 2008, p. 224) to understand and correct that state. Pro-caregiving 
advocates have opportunities to build a stronger, more solvent case for policy change by 
identifying and addressing the inherent barriers, or blame, in their own discourse that 
may be impeding the advocacy efforts. Inherency analysis, then, will reveal inherent 
barriers in the advocacy efforts as well as reveal opportunities to resist or replace frames 
through the use of more strategic language.  
When and Where to Look 
2015 is a pivotal moment to look at unpaid family caregiving as a potentially 
public issue with shared stakes while other contexts in public discourse debate about 
definitions of family and individual and public responsibilities regarding health care. In 
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light of these swirling contexts, unpaid family caregiving, an issue that is separate from 
motherhood, stands a chance to be a public issue. Examining such discourse offers 
promise in better understanding unpaid family caregiving, in particular, as well as other 
advocacy efforts where an issue assumed to be “private” must navigate discursive 
complexities to promote shared responsibility for a problem and its solutions.  
Unpaid family caregiving rhetoric is made up of many different pro-caregiving 
voices, including, but not limited to, caregivers themselves, caregiving advocates, writers, 
and thinkers who are together advancing a sympathetic conversation directed at unpaid 
family caregiving. For this dissertation I am focusing only on pro-caregiving advocacy 
efforts and those individuals or organizations who are advancing or supporting public 
policy change for unpaid family caregivers. This sub-set of pro-caregiving rhetors also 
contribute to discourse sympathetic to unpaid family caregivers in ways that will likely 
use frames that are positive to describe and advocate for this population. I am interested 
in how advocates themselves may be perpetuating and contributing to their own lack of 
success in garnering shared responsibility in unpaid family caregiving. Because humans 
“seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality” (Burke, 1969a, p. 59), I 
wish to interrogate the public vocabulary of pro-caregiving advocates who are developing 
change rhetoric in hopes of achieving public policy attention. I argue that the texts for 
this study represent vocabularies in unpaid family caregiving advocacy and, as such, 
embody the necessary scope to capture the complexities of promoting shared 
responsibility for a subject that has strong connotations with the “private” sphere. As 
argued in chapter one, the current cultural context being invented and shaped by pro-
caregiving advocates provides a unique and important time to explore the discourse of 
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pro-caregiving advocacy efforts to illuminate and promote new ways that language 
functions in public advocacy.  
How Did I Choose Texts to Analyze?  
When conducting a critical textual analysis, all rhetorical critics assemble a text. 
This aspect of critical analysis is unavoidable as “we create the ‘text’ that serves our 
purposes” (Dow, 2001, p. 341). For the purpose of this dissertation, I piece together a text 
that includes a wide range of advocacy voices with much variation in rhetorical goals and 
aims in order to uncover the larger themes emerging from public discourse aimed at 
situating policy goals within the context of contemporary unpaid family caregiving. My 
intent in doing so was not to “validate some pre-existing text” but to “authorize the 
creation of one” (Dow, 2001, p. 341, emphasis original). The current study creates a new 
interpretation of contemporary unpaid family caregiving that could only be illuminated 
by the unique and disparate voices that make up pro-caregiving advocacy.  
In order to gather evidence for establishing the inherent barriers in pro-caregiving 
advocacy discourse, I construct and argue that what McCarver (2011) describes as a 
conversational text is an effective means for piecing together a text for this project. In 
McCarver’s (2011) analysis of the discourse surrounding Sarah Palin’s bid for the vice 
presidency, she pieces together a “conversational text” and analyzes online discourse 
including comments, Web sites, and blog posts and suggests that she is “not solely 
interested in interpreting the text in and of itself but…with exploring the larger cultural 
practices that engage in and interact with the text and how the text operates as only one 
component of a larger cultural conversation” (p. 23). In this dissertation, I similarly piece 
together a conversational text that operates as a “larger cultural conversation” about 
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contemporary unpaid family caregiving by exploring advocacy discourse situated in 
rhetorics surrounding the negative material conditions facing contemporary unpaid 
family caregivers. My conversational text is comprised of rhetoric from pro-caregiving 
advocates, both organizations and individual rhetors, who are attempting to energize 
public policy change and support for unpaid family caregivers. For instance, some of the 
texts I analyze include, but are not limited to, pro-caregiving websites, policy statements, 
press releases, images on the advocacy websites, and promotional materials that I 
requested from organizations like The Rosalyn Carter Institute on Caregiving and Family 
Caregiver Alliance.  
Constructing a conversational text is useful in this specific study because I gather 
insights from disparate voices, all contributing to ways that unpaid family caregiving 
might be understood as a social responsibility. These disparate voices do not necessarily 
speak to each other but draw on similar frames about family, crisis, and care when 
situating their policy appeals within a context of negative material conditions facing 
unpaid family caregivers. With this approach, I have flexibility to explore how fragments 
of the larger cultural conversation create a coherent conversation about unpaid family 
caregiving. More specifically, rather than addressing only the material conditions that 
many are labeling a caregiving crisis, I interrogate the discourse surrounding pro-
caregiving advocacy that constructs unpaid family caregivers as always already 
exhibiting a set of rhetorical characteristics.  
Because many pro-caregiving rhetors utilize the terminology of “caregiving 
crisis,” for this project I developed two Google alerts titled “caregiving crisis” and 
“caregiver crisis.” A quick Google search of both terms reveals over 5.5 million results, 
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and the articles generated from the alerts have produced over 150 hits since May 2012. 
The alerts produced a wide variety of results ranging from documenting “a caregiving 
crisis” in specific geographical areas (see “Report,” 2013) to suggestions for caregivers to 
manage stress (see Caprino, 2013). I have also created a Google alert titled “caregiving 
advocacy,” and this alert has produced over 15 hits since March 2015. In addition to the 
Google alerts, I gathered textual evidence from several caregiving advocacy websites and 
looked for publications (both online and in print) whose content focuses on issues 
relevant to caregivers and/or care receivers (e.g., AARP). Articles that describe a 
caregiving crisis focus on ideas including, but not limited to, economic issues facing the 
nation, individual issues facing caregivers, and/or issues facing the care-receiver. Not all 
of the discourse explicitly uses the terminology “caregiving crisis” though each fragment 
acknowledges detrimental conditions facing real-life unpaid family caregivers. What is 
apparent in this variation of focus is that the caregiving crisis is still developing, and 
individuals, groups, and advocates are attempting to contribute to a larger conversation 
about contemporary unpaid family caregiving, and in doing so, illuminate a larger 
cultural conversation about the status of unpaid family caregiving.  
Because pro-caregiving rhetors are producing discourse that is sometimes about 
individual responsibility and other times about social responsibility, I chose to analyze 
only those texts that position unpaid family caregiving as a social responsibility. For 
instance, those organizations that focus their efforts only on social support for unpaid 
family caregivers were not included as part of this dissertation because caregiver social 
support implies caregiving is a personal responsibility to manage as opposed to a societal 
issue to solve. In this project, I wish to focus on public policy advocacy efforts because 
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these voices have set an instrumental goal to advance change through policy efforts as 
opposed to individual caregivers engaging in social support with each other. Pro-
caregiving advocates include organizations such as, but not limited to, AARP, Family 
Caregiver Alliance, and The Rosalyn Carter Institute on Family Caregiving and are 
advancing clear efforts to push for public policy change for unpaid family caregivers. By 
piecing together these texts of websites, articles, and promotional materials, it is my 
intention to create a reading of unpaid family caregiver advocacy rhetoric that makes us 
“think about our world in new ways” (Dow, 2001, p. 347). In doing so, I aim to 
illuminate aspects of pro-caregiving advocacy discourse that exposes limitations and 
opens up possibilities of social relevance, regardless of associations to “public” or 
“private.”  
The conversational text I have pieced together for the purpose of this dissertation 
is a representative anecdote of pro-caregiving advocacy discourse. Were I to focus on just 
one advocacy organization, I would lose sight of the multiple types of advocacy voices 
contributing to the rhetoric surrounding unpaid family caregiving. In A Grammar of 
Motives, Burke (1969a) asserts,  
The “most representative” character thus has a dual function: one we might call 
“adjectival” and the other “substantial”. The character is “adjectival,” as 
embodying one of the qualifications necessary to the total definition, but is 
“substantial” as embodying the conclusions of the development as a whole. (p. 
516) 
The conversational text I have constructed for this analysis embodies both the adjectival 
character and the substantial character in that each pro-caregiving advocacy effort 
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individually represents the efforts to establish unpaid family caregiving as an issue with 
social stakes and together represent a vessel carrying clues that reveal a larger grammar 
of unpaid family caregiving as well as implicit assumptions that justify what counts (and 
does not count) as social responsibility. Treated as a whole conversational text, pro-
caregiving advocacy discourse guides us to who we are and what we value because the 
text includes substance “designed to serve as motives for shaping or transforming 
behavior” (Burke, 1969a, p. 342). Because “rhetorical language is inducement to action 
(or to attitude, attitude being an incipient act)” (Burke, 1969b, p. 42), exploring pro-
caregiving advocacy rhetoric will reveal clues to how such advocates are inviting 
symbolic action through their language.  
How am I Looking at the Selected Texts?  
Broadly, close textual analysis guides the methodology in this dissertation. Within 
that broad category I am guided by the notion that the way we use language matters and 
that words use us as much as we use words (Burke, 1966). In other words, language is not 
just a tool we use to communicate but it is also a tool that uses us because it involves 
symbolic action. Symbolic action embraces the idea that “even if any given terminology 
is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of 
reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality” (Burke, 1966, p. 
45). Because word choice reveals “citable” and “observable realities” (Burke, 1969a, p. 
57) and these citable and observable realities have “real demonstrable relationships, and 
demonstrably affecting relationships” (pp. 57-58), close textual analysis offers a 
necessary peek into understanding the complexities of language that limit and expand 
possibilities for shared responsibility in pro-caregiver advocacy discourse.  
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Language can be understood as the “strategic naming of a situation” (Burke, 
1973, p. 300). Because “language” reveals “the ‘critical moment’ at which human 
motives take form” (Burke, 1969a, p. 318), the critic can look at a text’s establishment of 
a grammar that can “guide the analysis of that text” (Birdsell, 1987, p. 277). Texts use 
this vocabulary to size up a situation and ask others to act accordingly, because “in this 
foretelling category we might also include the recipes for wise living, sometimes moral, 
sometimes technical” (Burke, 1973, p. 295). In sum, critics can explore a text’s language 
as a strategic way of organizing a path to symbolic action. In this way, language can be 
understood as “equipment for living” in which we are sizing up situations, adopting an 
attitude toward them, and revealing how we should act in similar situations in the future. 
Just as we cannot avoid constructing a text, we also cannot avoid that our texts 
will always be partial reflections of reality. As critics, though, we need to have a slice of 
a text where we can see the whole. “Thus the anecdote,” argues Burke (1969a), “is in a 
sense a summation, containing implicitly what the system that is developed from it 
contains explicitly” (p. 60). Close textual analysis allows a critic ways to understand how 
a rhetor might strategically size up situations, even if that is a more or less partial, and 
better or worse account. Even when these are partial accounts, they can represent reality 
because “in reality, we are capable of but partial acts, acts that but partially represent us 
and that produce but partial transformations” (Burke, 1969a, p. 19). Although I cannot 
capture what every pro-caregiving advocate is saying about unpaid family caregiving, I 
argue that the texts I have chosen for this dissertation represent the necessary scope of 
what happens within the case of pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric.  
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In this dissertation, I demonstrate that the terms family, crisis, and care are 
deployed in ways that can reveal inherent barriers in pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric. I 
suspect that part of the reason behind public inaction is a result of unproductive family 
metaphors and definitions of crisis and care. In order to analyze this possibility and offer 
suggestions for resisting and/or reframing, I contend that there are several important 
rhetorical concepts that are instructive in looking at family, crisis, and care from a 
rhetorical perspective. In this section, I now introduce the concepts of metaphors, 
arguments by definition, values, value hierarchies, and loci, revealing these as important 
rhetorical dimensions that will help unpack the layers of meaning within pro-caregiving 
advocacy rhetoric. Additionally, these rhetorical concepts are useful rhetorical strategies 
for rhetorical leaders as they can be employed as tools to perhaps provoke a more 
productive conversation in rhetoric surrounding unpaid family caregiving.  
Metaphors. Metaphors are powerful rhetorical strategies, or rhetorical tropes, that 
allow rhetors to change the meaning of words or concepts. At the most basic level, 
metaphor can be defined, according to Jasinski (2001), as “talking about one thing in 
terms of another” (p. 550). Kittay (1987) offers a distinction to understand the first- and 
second-order meanings of metaphor. The first-order meaning refers to “what we have in 
mind when we ask about ‘the meaning’ of the word,” whereas the second-order meaning 
“is obtained when features of the utterance and its context indicate to the hearer or reader 
that the first-order meaning of the expression is either unavailable or inappropriate” 
(Kittay, 1987, p. 42). In other words, the first-order meaning derives its understanding 
from the sentence itself, and the second-order meaning draws from a speaker’s 
application of the metaphor (Kittay, 1987, p. 44). Kittay’s (1987) conceptualization of 
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first- and second-order meaning points to an important rhetorical consideration in that 
metaphor is not a simplistic literary device, but rather a complex tool with layers of 
meaning.  
Other scholars offer a conceptualization of metaphor that point to the complexity 
of this rhetorical device. For example, when elaborating on his early work with metaphor, 
Osborn (2009) explains that he “reconceived metaphor not as a literary device but as an 
event that occurs in the minds of listeners, often with important consequences for attitude 
and action” (p. 80). Osborn’s (2009) focus on the experience of metaphor is an important 
indicator of its usefulness and utility for pro-caregiving advocates and critical scholars 
analyzing advocacy rhetoric. Although in Osborn’s (1967) earlier work, he suggested that 
archetypal metaphors appear to be “immune to changes wrought by time” (p. 116), he 
later (decades later) revised that tenet of being resistant to change to say that  
“applications and functions [of metaphor] can transform and even expand across time” 
(Osborn, 2009, p. 83). Osborn’s (2009) evolution in thinking about metaphor is important 
for our purposes because, although some metaphors may be stable and resistant to 
change, they are, as Osborn (2009) suggests, “certainly…not impervious to it” (p. 83). As 
such, metaphors are rhetorically useful tools for rhetors to offer a persuasive experience 
that invites action. Burke (1969a) explains metaphor as one of the four master tropes, and 
he is concerned about their “role in the discovery and description of ‘the truth’” (p. 503). 
Burke (1969a) substitutes this trope for “perspective” and suggests: 
If we employ the word “character” as a general term for whatever can be thought 
of as distinct (any thing, pattern, situation, structure, nature, person, object, act, 
role, process, event, etc.) then we could say that metaphor tells us something 
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about one character as considered from the point of view of another character. 
(pp. 503-504) 
Given Burke’s insights, interrogating family metaphors deployed in pro-caregiving 
advocacy rhetoric can help us discover something about the namer of the family 
metaphor because, “to consider A from the point of view of B is, of course, to use B as a 
perspective upon A” (Burke, 1969a, p. 504).  
Other scholars have similarly related metaphor to experience. For example, 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue, “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which 
we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (p. 3). Here, the authors 
suggest that metaphor is a complex phenomenon beyond a literary device that can be 
used at the disposal of rhetors. In fact, they assert, “If we are right in suggesting that our 
conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think what we experience, 
and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor” (p. 3). Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) offer metaphor as a way of understanding our everyday experience, and, as such, 
provide a conceptual lens for interpreting pro-caregiving advocates’ use of metaphor for 
comprehending family and its relation to unpaid family caregiving.  
In chapter five, I argue that opportunities exist for pro-caregiving advocates to 
modify current usages of family metaphors. I am not suggesting that utilizing alternative 
metaphors will permanently change the rhetoric around unpaid family caregiving because 
“regardless of how compelling any metaphor may be…its limitations eventually are 
encountered in its application” (Ivie, 1987, p. 179). However, without effort to push the 
conversation forward, pro-caregiving advocates will continue to invoke the same frames 
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in similar ways that will result in the continued barriers that are limiting shared 
responsibility.  
Arguments by definition. Observing the definitional work of pro-caregiving 
advocates can also assist in revealing inherent barriers within the dominant frames 
utilized in unpaid family caregiving discourse. Arguments by definition might also help 
stimulate alternative ways to frame the way pro-caregiving advocates define the 
dominant frames of crisis and care. Definitions, like metaphors, can serve as a practical 
resource for rhetors because “the meanings of key concepts are subject to the pressures of 
discursive force set loose by rhetorical advocates” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 152). Critics can 
observe definitional arguments in public discourse and identify a “definitional struggle” 
(p. 152) over the terms care and crisis. For the purpose of this dissertation, I am interested 
in “charting the shifting definitions” (p. 153) of crisis and care as well as the discursive 
possibilities of scholars and practitioners to theorize about “strategies of definition and 
redefinition—by which the meanings of words are remade” (p. 153). My efforts in two of 
the analysis chapters, thus, are two-fold in that I first use principles of definition to 
analyze how pro-caregiving advocates are defining care and crisis, and second, I will use 
principles of definition to theorize about alternative definitions that may change or resist 
the ways that care and crisis are invoked in the discussion about unpaid family caregiving 
toward an alternative end.  
Definitions, like metaphors, have the opportunity to establish rhetorical control 
because “the person who is able to control the power of definition has a crucial linguistic 
resource at his or her disposal” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 152). Jasinski (2001) points out, 
“Although dictionaries create an illusion of definitional stability and permanence, one 
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need only look at dictionaries from earlier periods of history to see how the definitions of 
terms change over time” (p. 152). Some rhetors practicing definitional work might focus 
on situational definitions, where the rhetoric seeks to “establish the perspective through 
which we, and others, will look at something” (p. 155). In fact, Zarefsky (1997) argues 
that an effective frame can make a definition of a situation persuasive. He suggests, “To 
define a condition as a problem is to invoke a frame of reference within which the 
severity of the condition is assessed, causality and blame are determined, and solutions 
are considered” (p. 6). As such, interrogating definitions of crisis and care have the 
potential to reveal inherent barriers to shared responsibility in pro-caregiving advocacy 
discourse.  
There are several ways that rhetors might participate in definitional work. For 
example, transcendence is one of the primary forms of redefinition and is a rhetorical 
strategy where the rhetor sets an issue in a larger context within which the audience is not 
currently viewing it. Olson (1989) points out, “Transcendence merges what is inside and 
outside the boundaries” where “the material on opposite sides of the boundary is not 
reversed, but blended” (p. 133). Zarefsky (1997) indicates at least four more ways that a 
rhetor can invoke definitional arguments. First, arguments by association occur when the 
rhetor might link one term or idea with another. One approach to definition through 
association involves “persuasive definitions.” A persuasive definition is “one in which 
favorable or unfavorable connotations of a given term remain constant but are applied to 
a different denotation” (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 7). Second, a rhetor might use argument by 
dissociation where he or she “utilizes linkages between concepts but it works by breaking 
rather than creating the links” (p. 7). Third, Zarefsky posits that one could also argue that 
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a text is defining a situation based on ambiguities or using symbols to define an 
ambiguous situation. And finally, Zarefsky offers frame-shifting as a definitional tactic 
and describes it as occurring when a subject “is defined from a certain perspective [and] a 
different frame of reference is postulated” (p. 8). “The effect,” according to Zarefsky 
(1997), “is that people see the thing ‘in a different light’ and their attitudes about it 
therefore change” (p. 8). These are just a few options but demonstrate some specific 
strategies for a critic or rhetor to identify definitional arguments being deployed as well 
as strategies for employing alternative definitional arguments in public discourse. 
Values, Value Hierarchy, and Loci. Values, constructed by symbol use, are 
always embedded in our language choices. Values coach us and give us clues as to what 
society prefers and conversely what society does not prefer. Important for this 
dissertation, values serve an important function in public policy decision-making and 
demonstrate one of the many practical tools that the rhetorical discipline offers to 
scholars and practitioners. Scholars and practitioners can look at the rhetorical dimension 
of value in texts to uncover how those texts are constructing values to make persuasive 
discourse. We can look to public values embedded in our language choices for inherent 
barriers that might explain why public policy is lacking in an area where social 
cooperation is needed.  
Values exist in individuals and in cultures. Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989) 
point out, “The concepts of value and value systems are among the very few social 
psychological concepts that have been successfully employed across all social science 
disciplines” where researchers from various disciplines “speak meaningfully about values 
and value systems at different levels—cultural values, societal and institutional values, 
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organizational and corporate values, and individual values” (p. 775). Relatedly, Inlow 
(1972) argues that values are “inherent…in a given culture” (p. 2) and that values exist in 
culture in “written documents as well as in the intangibles of social mores and 
expectancies” (p. 2). What is most important to take away at this point is to suggest that 
values are important as individual and cultural markers of the preferred, or as indicated 
by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), “agreement with regard to a value means an 
admission that an object, a being, or an ideal must have a specific influence on action and 
on disposition toward action” (p. 74). Inlow (1972) writes about the reflexive nature 
between individuals and cultures in that values exist in individuals but they “flow into 
and help to shape the culture” (p. 2). Here, Inlow (1972) is pointing to the rhetorical 
aspect of values in being purported by, but also shaped by, the discourse that invokes the 
values. Importantly, values are rhetorically constructed and thus can be rhetorically 
deconstructed for alternative aims. 
Values are markers of the preferred in public discourse, and these markers are 
identifiable by locating value hierarchies and “loci of the preferable” (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 74). Value hierarchies are not pre-given and natural but rather 
are rhetorically constructed in discourse and thus can be rhetorically re-ordered with 
persuasive rhetoric. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) posit, “When a speaker wants 
to establish values or hierarchies or to intensify the adherence they gain, he may 
consolidate them by connecting them with other values or hierarchies’, but he may also 
resort to premises of a very general nature which we shall term loci” (p. 83).  
Loci are described as commonplaces or topoi, or the location of arguments. Like 
value hierarchies, loci are many times naturalized and/or may be implicit in discourse and 
	  	   66 
work to establish value hierarchies. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) explain, 
“loci form the most general premises, actually often merely implied, that play a part in 
the justification of most of the choices we make” (p. 84). Loci refer to a concept related 
to values and value hierarchies in that they might be understood as the interpretation or 
justification of the values. In situations where values compete, loci might reveal value 
hierarchies. In such situations, we might see loci as helping “a speaker’s inventive 
efforts” involving “the grouping of relevant material, so that it can be easily found again 
when required” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 83). Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1969) identify several loci that are common in Western culture. Those loci 
include quantity, quality, the existent, essence, and the person. For example, when a 
rhetor chooses to employ locus of quality, he or she is attempting to order a value 
hierarchy according to the quality of something rather than privileging quantity. 
Regarding locus of unique, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) indicate, “The unique 
is linked to a concrete value: what we consider as a concrete value seems to us unique, 
but it is what appears unique that becomes precious to us” (p. 89). In other words, “A 
sure way of setting value on a thing is to put it forward as something difficult or rare” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 91). In addition to locating the preferred, 
Jasinski (2001) suggests that “loci also work to subvert existing hierarchies or 
evaluations” (p. 598). Given this, loci are instructive in revealing value hierarchies in 
place (e.g., quality over quantity) but also offer a tool for reordering an existing 
hierarchy.  
Values, value hierarchies, and loci inform our behavior and communication and 
can be instructive in our decision-making processes. In fact, Inlow (1972) defines values 
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as “the determiners…that influence…choices in life and that thus decide…behavior” (p. 
2). Rhetors utilize values “in order to induce the hearer to make certain choices rather 
than others and, most of all, to justify those choices so that they may be accepted and 
approved by others” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 75). Such preferred values, 
revealed by loci that illuminate a value or a value hierarchy (or hierarchies), offer an 
inroad to unpacking meaning in discourse and offer viable tools to reassemble discourse 
toward alternative ends.  
 
Preview of Chapters 
Chapter one introduced the premise of this dissertation project demonstrating the 
significance of exploring the advocacy rhetoric surrounding unpaid family caregiving and 
its relevance to rhetorical studies. In an initial thematic analysis of pro-caregiving 
discourse, I found that the dominant frames constructed through the use of the words 
“family,” “crisis,” and “care” are prevalent throughout pro-caregiving rhetoric. By 
identifying these three dominant frames, I do not wish to simplify the rhetorical issues 
facing pro-caregiving advocates but rather I see the complexities that undergird each 
word that need necessary attention to better understand how the words are sizing up a 
situation and asking us to act accordingly. Burke (1969a) argues: 
In any term we can posit a world, in the sense that we can treat the world in terms 
of it, seeing all as emanations, near or far, of its light. Such reduction to a 
simplicity being technically reduction to a summarizing title or “God term,” when 
we confront a simplicity we must forthwith ask ourselves what complexities are 
subsumed beneath it. For a simplicity of motive being a perfection or purity of 
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motive, the paradox of the absolute would admonish us that it cannot prevail in 
the “imperfect world” of everyday experience. It can exist not actually, but only 
“in principle,” “substantially.” (p. 105) 
I argue that each of these dominant frames provides an entry point for better 
understanding inherent barriers for pro-caregiving advocates. Chapter two outlined the 
research design for this dissertation including the elements of the critical lens and the 
piecing together of the rhetorical texts for this dissertation.  
In each analysis chapter (chapters three, four, and five), I will first lay out a 
rhetorical issue facing pro-caregiving advocates. After establishing the ways in which 
crisis, care, and family pose a unique rhetorical aspect that reveals inherent barriers for 
unpaid family caregiver advocates, I will propose potential suggestions for managing the 
public conversation toward new ends. The final chapter of my dissertation will bring 
together the three rhetorical issues revealed through a rhetorical analysis of family, crisis, 
and care and make conclusions that include limitations of some of my proposed 
suggestions as well as offer transferable skills for other social advocates who are 
championing an issue that requires maneuvering with respect to attitudinal and 
philosophical barriers. Additionally, chapter six will illuminate potential future areas of 
study related to the findings in this dissertation. Below is a brief description of the 
argument I will make in each of the analysis chapters.  
Chapter 3: Definition of the Situation of Crisis in Pro-Caregiving Advocacy Policy 
Statements 
 The notion of “crisis” is deployed throughout contemporary pro-caregiving 
rhetoric. Pro-caregiving advocates’ use of “crisis” directs our attention to attempts at 
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establishing shared responsibility because the term foregrounds an understanding of the 
current conditions facing unpaid family caregivers as reaching a critical turning point. In 
chapter three, I explore definitions of the situation of crisis that are used in pro-caregiving 
advocacy policy statements6 situated within a discursive context of “crisis.” In the 
deployment of crisis, I argue that pro-caregiving advocates are attempting to motivate 
shared responsibility by developing urgency in acting on the public and private ills as 
well as offering solutions to resolve the public and private ills. I argue that pro-caregiving 
advocates are persuasively defining the situation of crisis around the public and private 
ills; however, the solutions do not directly channel citizen participation and, furthermore, 
do not clearly identify the ways in which the solution would resolve the material issues 
facing caregivers, in particular. I conclude the chapter with suggestions for re-thinking 
the way that crisis language is deployed and rhetorically constructs a role for public 
auditors in pro-caregiving advocacy policy statements.  
Chapter 4: A Dominant Definition of “Complex” Care in Pro-Caregiving Advocacy 
Rhetoric 
The word “care” is consequential and widespread in pro-caregiving advocacy. In 
chapter four, I take a focused look at definitions of “care” in pro-caregiver advocacy 
rhetoric and argue that advocates are advancing a complex definition of care that 
problematically suggests caring about someone directly leads to caring for that person. 
Additionally, I argue that pro-caregiving advocates are actively masking choice through a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Chapter three analyzes three formal policy statements offered by pro-caregiving 
organizations (The Rosalyn Carter Institute for Caregiving, AARP, and Family Caregiver 
Alliance). These three policy statements are not inclusive of all of the texts studied in this 
dissertation; however, I will make an argument in chapter three that these three texts 
function as representative anecdotes of the definition of the situation of crisis in pro-
caregiving advocacy.  
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caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor that emphasizes an individual journey as 
opposed to a social one. Together, these two rhetorical flaws in relation to choice and 
care reveal that shared responsibility is absent from pro-caregiving advocates’ dominant 
definition of “complex” care. I argue that pro-caregiving advocates need to develop 
shared responsibility in the dominant definition of care by leveraging the evidence that 
suggests unpaid family caregivers are personally suffering from private ills and by 
emphasizing a shared journey, not a personal journey.   
Chapter 5: Family Metaphors in Pro-Caregiving Advocacy Rhetoric and 
Suggestions for Resisting a Rhetoric of Domestic Responsibility 
Family is a dominant frame in the rhetoric surrounding unpaid family caregiving 
in that much of the rhetoric implies that caregiving as primarily a family concern. I 
suggest that family is invoked both explicitly and implicitly in the rhetoric surrounding 
unpaid family caregiving. Although pro-caregiving advocates might deploy such 
terminology to assign positive value to the rhetorically constructed caregiver, I argue that 
this positive frame complicates the rhetoric because it is taken up uncritically to imply 
biological family and a domestic sphere. In chapter five, I argue that a family-as-
biological metaphor and a family-as-national metaphor subtly reveal assumptions about 
the appropriate and long-term place of caregiving and the rhetorically constructed unpaid 
family caregiver as a biological family member. In doing so, I argue the two family 
metaphors conceal the gendered aspects that subtly keep the burden of responsibility in 
the domestic home and not clearly a matter of public responsibility. 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
The main objective in chapter six is to review the key arguments in the analysis 
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chapters and to demonstrate the applied and theoretical implications for rhetorical 
leadership and care theory. The goal of my work is to demonstrate that we need to “take 
language seriously” and “recognize that vocabularies are situated within cultural and 
historical contexts, [and] that words do things” (Vicaro, 2011, p. 419). Taking such 
discourse seriously stresses the complementary aspects of applied rhetoric and feminist 
scholarship on care and will provide positive lessons for pro-caregiving advocates as well 
as other social advocates attempting to negotiate the discursive complexities when 
advocating for an issue assumed to be “private” to be understood as “public.” 
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Chapter 3:  
Definition of the Situation of Crisis in Pro-Caregiving Advocacy Policy Statements 
The twenty-first century has brought many crises that range from financial events 
such as the housing bubble and student loan debt, to health concerns such as the Ebola 
outbreak of 2014 and the measles outbreak of 2015. Another contemporary situation that 
brings together both finance- and health-related implications is labeled by many social 
advocates as a “caregiving crisis.” Although much crisis scholarship is concerned with 
coaching organizations’ responses to such events, this chapter’s focus is on how public 
advocates rhetorically construct and make present a crisis situation through their change 
or advocacy rhetoric.  
In recent years, pro-caregiving advocates have deployed the terminology of a 
“caregiving crisis” in public policy platforms for unpaid family caregiver issues. The 
phrase “caregiving crisis” is utilized to describe many different aspects of unpaid family 
caregiving; however, four main topics typically surface in this discourse:  a dramatic 
aging of the baby boomer population, a trend toward smaller family sizes, a growing 
number of caregivers developing chronic illness, and mostly women taking on the 
caregiving role. Although crisis rhetoric is prolific in pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric, 
there is little evidence to suggest that these attempts are energizing shared responsibility 
about unpaid family caregiving. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA), more colloquially known as Obamacare or shortened to ACA, included 
the CLASS Act (Community Living Assistance Services and Supports) that would have 
provided “a basic lifetime benefit of at least $50 a day (indexed to inflation) in the event 
of prolonged physical illness, disability, or severe cognitive impairment” (“The Demise 
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of the CLASS Act,” 2012, para. 4). This bill represented an attempt to relieve some 
burdens, at least financial, and potentially in respite care for unpaid family caregivers. 
However, despite its inclusion in the ACA, the CLASS Act was not passed, and 
furthermore, “the issue was downplayed in Washington, D.C., and discussed minimally 
in the media” (“The Demise of the CLASS Act,” 2012, para. 1). This uneven push for 
policy change with little material payoff highlights a lack of urgency in shared support 
for unpaid family caregiver issues. In this chapter, I suggest one possible reason for this 
imbalance is due to perpetuated barriers in pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric, specifically 
in terms of effectively fomenting a sense of a shared crisis and appropriate response.  
Within public policy statements in particular, pro-caregiving advocates are 
attempting to make unpaid family caregiving issues socially shared as well as to motivate 
an urgent response by public auditors. The crisis rhetoric within policy statements 
provides a glimpse into how pro-caregiving advocates are attempting to garner a shared 
and urgent response. Language, both in substance and style, gives us access to a 
definition of a situation of crisis being rhetorically constructed by pro-caregiving 
advocates. Berger and Luckman (1966) argue, “Language, which may be defined here as 
a system of vocal signs, is the most important sign system of human society” (p. 35). 
Furthermore, they suggest, “An understanding of language is thus essential for any 
understanding of the reality of everyday life” (p. 35). Important for this chapter, language 
is also connected to experience, or “typifies experiences” as suggested by Berger and 
Luckman (1966), allowing auditors to “subsume them under broad categories in terms of 
which they have meaning not only to myself but also to…fellowmen” (p. 37).  
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Like everyday experiences, rhetors construct crisis situations through definition 
and framing. Rhetors can provoke a sense of urgency to act motivated by their depiction 
of a crisis situation where urgency has been lacking. In Zarefsky’s (1997) keynote 
address on argument by definition, he argues that an effective frame can make a 
definition of a situation persuasive and that “to define a condition as a problem is to 
invoke a frame of reference within which the severity of the condition is assessed, 
causality and blame are determined, and solutions are considered” (p. 6). “Naming a 
situation,” according to Zarefsky (2004), “provides the basis for understanding it and 
determining the appropriate response” (p. 611). In this sense, the advocacy language used 
to communicate a situation of crisis can invite a shared and urgent understanding of that 
situation. In this chapter, I suggest that pro-caregiving advocates are defining a situation 
of crisis around unpaid family caregiving, attempting to provoke urgency in a situation 
where urgency is, arguably, lacking. In particular, this chapter explores how pro-
caregiving advocates’ construction of crisis and response within their formal policy 
statements hampers their ability solve the crisis.  
In this chapter, I argue that pro-caregiving advocates are marshaling an urgent and 
shared crisis perspective in their rhetoric by rhetorically constructing persuasive public 
ills and private ills; however, I will also demonstrate that pro-caregiving advocates are 
undermining their persuasive shared and urgent crisis argument. More specifically, I 
argue that pro-caregiving advocates are perpetuating two inherent barriers in their 
rhetoric obstructing the solution to their rhetorically constructed crisis by (1) offering 
ambiguous, and thus, ineffective public steps that do not clearly channel citizen 
participation and (2) offering a partial solution to the well established public and private 
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ills. In doing so, I suggest that, in their solution to the public and private ills, pro-
caregiving advocates minimize urgency in shared citizen participation and, by 
foregrounding the location of preferred caregiving, advocates background how the 
solution will help resolve the private ills related to unpaid family caregivers. Taken 
together, these two rhetorical barriers reveal the subtle rhetorical undoing of the shared 
and urgent responsibility that is being effectively marshaled in the public and private ills 
as constructed by pro-caregiving advocates in their policy statements.  
This chapter explores how pro-caregiving advocates manifest a crisis perspective 
in public policy statements about unpaid family caregiving. These formal policy 
statements are part of the larger set of texts studied in this dissertation that comprise pro-
caregiving advocacy efforts. This chapter is particularly interested in the policy 
statements as rhetorical resources for pro-caregiving advocates to establish shared and 
urgent responsibility for the ills of unpaid family caregiving issues. Though the literal 
terminology of crisis is important in these formal policy statements, this chapter is more 
broadly interested in how the words used by pro-caregiving advocates construct symbolic 
reality and coach a coherent attitude about urgency for a shared response to help resolve 
unpaid family caregiving issues. For this chapter’s analysis, I looked for pro-caregiving 
advocacy efforts that are explicitly situating policy platforms within a context of what is 
being labeled as a “caregiving crisis.” I observe the policy statements of three different 
advocacy organizations--Family Caregiver Alliance (FCA), American Association of 
Retired Persons (AARP)7, and Rosalyn Carter Institute for Caregiving (RCI), because 
each of these organizations situate their formal policy statements within a notion of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Policy statement sponsored by AARP New York, the Council of Senior Centers and 
Services of New York City, Inc., and the NYS Caregiving and Respite Coalition.  
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caregiving crisis: a crisis that is constructed and characterized by the rhetoric of the 
statement itself. In each document, a rhetorically constructed caregiving crisis is being 
advanced as well as a larger grammar that reveals how the situation is being framed and 
coaches attitudes to respond accordingly to that framing.  
Together these texts function as a representative anecdote in that it represents a 
“summation” that contains “implicitly what the system that it is developed from contains 
explicitly” (Burke, 1969a, p. 60). In the case of pro-caregiving advocacy, the policy 
platforms situated within a framing of crisis contain the logic behind the usage of a 
notion of crisis in interpreting the policy needs and shared responsibility for unpaid 
family caregivers. By focusing on the policy statements within each of these pro-
caregiving advocacy texts, I am interested in how the advocates themselves are talking 
about a caregiving crisis in ways that might interfere with effecting their policy platform 
goals, specifically regarding their symbolic construction of unpaid family caregiving as a 
crisis. Ling (1970), informed by Burke, suggests that when “man speaks he indicates how 
he perceives the world around him” (p. 81). The notion of crisis is instructive in these 
policy statements because rhetorical analysis offers a glimpse into how pro-caregiving 
advocates perceive the conditions around the issue in which they are advocating. This 
chapter is specifically concerned with the extent to which pro-caregiving advocates’ 
rhetorical choices might effectively move others, including public auditors, toward that 
crisis perspective in these policy statements and why.  
In what follows, I first outline the overall rhetorical construction of the public and 
private ills within the definition of “crisis,” demonstrating how pro-caregiving advocates 
make the public and private ills present by relying on loci of duration, urgency, 
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proximity, and magnitude, among other effective rhetorical strategies. Second, I 
demonstrate how pro-caregiving advocates create ambiguous public steps that do not 
effectively channel citizen participation. And, finally, I show that pro-caregiving 
advocates insist on location of caregiving within their public solution, which pulls public 
auditors away from focusing on the solution of the private ills facing unpaid family 
caregivers. Taken together, I argue that the persuasively constructed public and private 
aspects of the ills get thwarted by an ambiguous and partial solution for unpaid family 
caregiving. I conclude the chapter with takeaway lessons for navigating and resisting 
these inherent barriers that suggest pro-caregiving advocates should focus on making a 
clear solution that effectively channels citizen participation and one that focuses on 
solving the private ills for unpaid family caregivers, in addition to solving the public ills 
that address taxpayers and businesses and the private ills for care-receivers.  
 
Making the “Public” Ills Present and Urgent 
 Although pro-caregiving advocates are deploying the term “crisis,” they are using 
it in different ways. For example, crisis is used to describe the “nation’s long-term care 
crisis,” “caregivers in crisis,” and “the caregiving crisis.” Although there is variation in 
the usage of the term “crisis,” there is consistency in how crisis is rhetorically constructed 
across these policy efforts for unpaid family caregivers. Pro-caregiving advocates 
rhetorically construct crisis as a situation that will occur in the future when caregivers can 
no longer care for care-receivers and care-receivers get pushed into institutional care, all 
overburdening the U.S. healthcare system. In other words, when caregiver health and 
caregiver production fails, there is an economic cost to taxpayers and businesses. Within 
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this definition of the situation of crisis are two well-developed ills, or a “felt difficulty” 
with the present system (Ziegelmueller & Kay, 1997, p. 173). Pro-caregiving advocates 
are attempting to construct public ills and private ills in making a caregiving crisis one 
that is shared and urgent among all individual citizens, not just families and unpaid 
family caregivers themselves. This section argues that pro-caregiving advocates 
successfully make publicly shared and urgent ills by deploying an investment metaphor, 
utilizing economic-based statistics that rely heavily on logos, framing action as a moral 
choice, and emphasizing the timeliness of shared responsibility.   
Within the pro-caregiver definition of the situation of crisis, an investment 
metaphor is utilized in all three texts as a way to define a public ill as shared. The 
investment metaphor offers an economic model for supporting unpaid family caregivers, 
which further supports the “future” aspect of the crisis as the metaphor suggests that 
investing in care, or support, for our unpaid family caregivers now, will avert a crisis that 
includes negative consequences for the economy in the future. For example, FCA 
explains, “A federal investment in family caregiver support is needed now more than 
ever” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 2, emphasis added). In this statement, 
FCA is pointing to the public aspects of the issue of unpaid family caregiving by 
suggesting that federal investment is necessary at this moment in time. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on “now more than ever” suggests that the public’s participation is needed now, 
implying that it was not needed prior to this moment in time. AARP also utilizes an 
investment metaphor to motivate support for unpaid family caregiving. AARP states, 
“Little discussion has occurred on how to slow the growth of Medicaid by investing in 
nonmedical community-based programs, particularly those assisting caregivers” 
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(“Report,” 2013, p. 4). In both of these examples, investment metaphors are used to 
foreground the public framing of a caregiving crisis.  
The notion of investment itself raises powerful associations with the public 
market and the economy, and these common associations help pro-caregiving advocates 
establish a caregiver crisis as one that is shared as opposed to one that is only relevant 
within the private family. For instance, AARP concludes its introduction with the 
following statement: “AARP New York, the Council of Senior Centers and Services of 
New York City, Inc., and the New York State Caregiving and Respite Coalition stand 
ready to work with the Governor and Legislature to develop and implement sound 
policies to help those caregivers in need” (“Report,” 2013, p. 2). In this example, the 
economic terminology of “sound policies” is associated with support for caregivers to 
resolve a caregiving crisis. When the “conventional view of wealth is money, 
possessions, and property” (“Real Wealth Is…” 2011, para. 1) and “we are not 
accustomed to seeing economy and caring in the same sentence” (“The Caring Economy 
Campaign,” 2011, para. 1), then the rhetorical choice to frame unpaid family caregiving 
issues with investment terminology is important in that it suggests pro-caregiving 
advocates are attempting to substantiate the public and shared aspects of this issue that is 
assumed to be private.  
In addition to the deployment of an investment metaphor and an economic 
framing of a caregiving crisis, pro-caregiving advocates construct a shared public ill by 
emphasizing economic-based statistics that rely heavily on the proof of logos. AARP 
states, “A 2006 MetLife study found businesses lose as much as $33.6 billion annually in 
worker productivity because of employees’ caregiving obligations” (“Report,” 2013, p. 
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1). In this example, pro-caregiving advocates attempt to quantify an aspect of a public ill. 
Additionally, the stylistic word choices of “productivity” and “obligations” invoke an 
economic tone implying a public framing of an ill relevant to businesses, not just to 
families. Pro-caregiving advocates also quantify caregiver contributions. For example, 
FCA reports, “In 2007, the estimated economic value of caregivers’ unpaid contributions 
was approximately $375 billion,” and “lost productivity due to informal caregiving costs 
businesses $17.1 billion annually” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 17). In this 
example, FCA quantifies unpaid contributions of caregivers and points to a public aspect 
of the crisis by quantifying monetary loss experienced by businesses and even how a 
caregiving crisis might be relevant to taxpayers who are also caregivers. RCI similarly 
addresses several sizable costs that should be public which are communicated by reliance 
on logos:  
Experts have estimated that the economic value of services provided by family 
caregivers is in excess of $375 billion annually. This figure is (1) as much as the 
total expenditures for the Medicare program ($342 billion in 2005); (2) more than 
total spending for Medicaid, including both federal and state contributions for 
medical and long-term care ($300 billion in 2005); (3) far more than the total 
spending (public and private funds) for nursing home and home healthcare in the 
U.S. ($206.6 billion in 2005); and (4) more than four times the total amount spent 
on formal (paid) home care services ($76.8 billion in 2005). (“Averting the 
Caregiving Crisis,” 2010, p. 5) 
The beginning of this paragraph suggests that “experts” are those individuals who are 
producing the numbers being reported. These rhetorically constructed “experts” help to 
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communicate the value of unpaid family caregiving, a practice that benefits the public not 
just the care-recipient already. In all of the examples, it is apparent that pro-caregiving 
advocates are attempting to make a caregiving crisis shared by emphasizing the 
unremunerated public value with statistics and terminology that associates an economic 
tone with unpaid family caregiving issues.  
Pro-caregiving advocates establish shared aspects of a caregiving crisis, beyond 
the economic value, by emphasizing the locus of proximity, indicating that a caregiving 
crisis impacts those individuals outside a family and threatens the value currently being 
provided for the public though with little recognition or reciprocal support. Jasinski 
(2001) asserts that proximity is the ability of the advocate to “establish that the effects of 
the problem will ‘hit close to home’ or touch the lives of people who members of the 
audience know” (p. 457). AARP mentions other individuals, outside family members, 
who care for elders in the following passage: “[T]he number of New York families and 
neighbors providing help to frail individuals has been growing. The current percentage of 
New Yorkers providing such support is now 32%, up from around 25% throughout the 
1990s” (“Report,” 2013, p. 3, emphasis added). FCA frames its section on “Who are 
Informal Caregivers?” with the statement, “Most Americans have provided care to an ill 
or disabled loved one or know someone who has” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, 
para. 15). In this example, unpaid family caregivers include “most Americans,” and 
importantly it implies that unpaid family caregiving experience has touched the lives of 
most Americans, directly or indirectly. In such statements, pro-caregiving advocates 
work to establish unpaid family caregiving as a shared crisis by relying on locus of 
proximity outside of the family.  
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Beyond making unpaid family caregiving and its fragility shared, pro-caregiving 
advocates invoke urgency by framing action as a moral choice. Urgency is a means by 
which rhetors can make an issue present. Jasinski (2001) describes locus of urgency as 
the extent to which “the advocate [can] show that the problem or exigence will have an 
immediate impact on the audience” (p. 457). By labeling an issue as “moral,” pro-
caregiving advocates are implying there is an inherently right, and, by implication also 
wrong, position to take regarding unpaid family caregiving. The right, or morally correct, 
position is to act urgently in support of the policy platform. For example, RCI suggests, 
“It is imperative that we recognize that the confluence of our overburdened healthcare 
system with an aging population has created both a moral and economic imperative to fix 
the broken pipeline between caregiving research and practice in this country” 
(“Averting,” 2010, p. 6, emphasis added). Later, in the same report, RCI repeats and 
expands on the same appeal: “It is imperative that we recognize that the confluence of 
our overburdened healthcare system with an aging population has created both a moral 
and economic imperative to translate caregiving research into effective community 
programming in our country. Should we fail to act now, the consequences will be multi-
fold for care recipients, family caregivers, and our nation’s formal healthcare system” 
(“Averting,” 2010, p. 13, emphasis added). The stylistic choice of repetition, only seven 
pages separated from each other, reinforces the emphasis on the moral framing of unpaid 
family caregiving issues. The substantive and stylistic choices communicating a public ill 
become a rhetorical means for pro-caregiving advocates to command shared and urgent 
support through a morally justified framing, which reminds the public auditor of the 
urgency of participation.  
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In attempts to establish presence for the public ill, pro-caregiving advocates call 
attention to the timeliness of shared responsibility, which helps to motivate urgency. For 
example, RCI reports, “A growing body of evidence strongly suggests that the window of 
opportunity to effectively address the emerging caregiving crisis in our nation is closing 
quickly. Therefore, business as usual is no longer a viable option” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 
16, emphasis added). In this example, a window of opportunity suggests citizens have 
limited time to act and closing quickly invokes a sense of urgency. Accentuation in this 
passage is on the timeliness of action and risk if we fail to act now. In another example, 
AARP exclaims, “As described in the Council of Senior Centers & Services of NYC’s 
No Time to Wait: The Case for Long-Term Care Reform, with the state’s aging 
population growing rapidly and the proportional balance between older and younger 
populations shifting, it is apparent that a coherent strategy is needed to assist caregivers” 
(“Report,” 2013, p. 5). In this example, emphasis is on the timeliness of acting, urging 
public auditors that there is “no time to wait.” By positioning unpaid family caregiving as 
a timely situation that requires public intervention now, pro-caregiving advocates are 
making the urgency of the crisis present as an issue that requires action now, as opposed 
to invoking only acceptance from public auditors that unpaid family caregiving is a 
relevant issue beyond the family.  
In sum, the declaration of the public ills in pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric is 
emphasized using an investment metaphor that works to make the issue shared and 
public, relying on logos to communicate the economic framing of the public benefit and 
ill of that being at risk of collapsing, framing public action as moral which invites 
urgency, and emphasizing the timeliness of acting on this shared responsibility. As such, 
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it is clear that pro-caregiving advocates are declaring the existence of public ills in unpaid 
family caregiving relevant to taxpayers and businesses and that these ills are made shared 
and urgent as a public crisis. In the next section, I argue that pro-caregiving advocates 
similarly declare the existence of private ills and persuasively make the crisis present as 
both shared and urgent.   
 
Making the “Private” Ills Present and Urgent 
Pro-caregiving advocates provide cogent arguments regarding the negative 
material conditions facing unpaid family caregivers and care-receivers, and, in doing so, 
pro-caregiving advocates illuminate rhetorical strategies deployed to make private ills 
rhetorically present or “vivid, tangible, and…proximate to an audience” (Jasinski, 2001, 
p. 456). This section argues that, within pro-caregiving policy statements, pro-caregiving 
advocates construct persuasive private ills by relying on loci of duration, magnitude, and 
severity. The declaration of the private ills, then, helps to motivate an urgent response to 
a caregiving crisis that is relevant to both families and a general public.  
Pro-caregiving advocates rely on locus of duration when they point to statistics 
that indicate caregiving is frequently a long-term role and that this long-term role often 
leads to negative financial consequences for unpaid family caregivers. One part of 
establishing presence for an issue is demonstrating duration. Duration, according to 
Jasinski (2001), refers to the extent to which the advocate shows “the problem and/or its 
effects will persist for a long period of time” (p. 457). In each pro-caregiving policy 
statement, the organization relies on locus of duration in its discussions about individual 
costs facing unpaid family caregivers and their care-receivers. RCI quantifies the typical 
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tenure of a family caregiver by directly stating, “Today’s care is of longer duration, often 
lasting five or more years” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 12, emphasis added). Pro-caregiving 
advocates also indicate that the extended role can lead to negative financial consequences 
for unpaid family caregivers. For instance, FCA reports, “The long-term effects of 
caregiving on women’s economic well-being are profound: One study found that 
caregiving for a parent substantially increased women’s risks of living in poverty and 
receiving public assistance later in life” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 16, 
emphasis added). In these examples, pro-caregiving advocates emphasize the duration of 
the role for caregivers and serious consequences of such duration.  
The phrase “long-term” is frequently associated with unpaid family caregivers in 
all three policy statements and works to establish the duration of the private ill. That 
unpaid family caregiving is often associated with “long-term” suggests that pro-
caregiving advocates are relying on locus of duration to emphasize how long the nature 
of the crisis will persist for unpaid family caregivers. FCA reports, “We strongly 
encourage the new Obama Administration and Congress to initiate and support policies 
that take family caregivers into account and sustain them in their role as the primary 
providers of long-term care in this country” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 2, 
emphasis added). The unpaid family caregivers’ role is emphasized by FCA when they 
push for “a national caregiving policy agenda [that] would contribute to a more 
coordinated, systematic effort to recognize and strengthen the central role of families 
within the context of long-term care reform” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 
21, emphasis added). In another example, RCI explains that we need to “recognize the 
invaluable contributions of family caregivers as the true backbone of our nation’s long-
	  	   86 
term care system” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 21, emphasis added). The association of unpaid 
family caregiving with “long-term” in these examples functions as a rhetorical strategy 
by pro-caregiving advocates demonstrating the ways in which a private ill will endure for 
a long-term period of time for unpaid family caregivers. By associating families with the 
long-term, pro-caregiving advocates are tying private aspects of an ill to the public 
benefit of long-term care. In doing so, pro-caregiving advocates assign a “long-term” 
label to their role as family caregiver that is “central” and “primary” thus emphasizing the 
presence of a private ill for unpaid family caregivers.  
Duration is not only constructed as duration of caregiver in the caregiving role but 
also can be seen in the number of caregivers who, collectively, will not offer enough 
services to serve the growing number of care-receivers who will need assistance. AARP 
reports on the growing lop-sidedness that will worsen in coming years:  
Already, the number of caregivers in New York has grown to 32% from 25% in 
the 1990s. And a recent AARP report found that while there were 6.6 potential 
caregivers aged 45 to 64 for every person in the high-risk years of 80+ in New 
York in 2010, there will be only 4.8 in 2030 and 3.5 in 2050. (“Report,” 2013, pp. 
1-2) 
RCI also uses quantitative reporting to communicate the growing lop-sidedness of the 
caregiver to care-receiver ratio, which works to emphasize the duration of a private ill 
with public implications: 
Not only are more Americans living longer but the proportion of older adults in 
the U.S. population (i.e., 65 years or older) is growing rapidly. There are 35 
million older adults in the U.S. today. By 2030, when all of the baby boomers 
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have reached age 65, the projected number of older Americans is expected to 
reach 71 million, or roughly 20 percent (1 in 5) of the U.S. population. 
Approximately 6,000,000 adults over age 65 need daily assistance to live and that 
number is expected to double by 2030. (“Averting,” 2010, p. 5) 
In these examples, pro-caregiving advocates define a significant private ill by 
incorporating evidence that demonstrates the duration of the problem. In other words, 
pro-caregiving advocates make a caregiving crisis a problem that persists as a long-term 
role in the family, a problem that impacts a growing number of families and a crisis that 
is expected to persist in the coming years.  
Similar to the rhetorical construction of the public ills, pro-caregiving advocates 
declare a private ill by emphasizing urgency through magnitude as a means for 
establishing presence for unpaid family caregiver issues. In addition to emphasizing locus 
of duration, pro-caregiving advocates communicate negative consequences facing 
caregivers and care-receivers, infused with pathos, which reveals reliance on a locus of 
magnitude. Jasinski (2001) explains that magnitude refers to the extent to which the 
advocate can “show that the effects of the exigence are, or will be, felt by a large number 
of people or that there has been, or will be, substantial property damage (or other 
quantifiable signs of the exigence’s impact)” (p. 457). Within the framework of 
magnitude as a means for establishing presence, the rhetor must work to demonstrate that 
the ill will have a substantial impact. The rhetorical construction of a private ill includes 
both health- and finance-related negative consequences. RCI indicates several health-
related negative consequences for unpaid family caregivers:  
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Although we know that many caregivers experience no adverse health effects 
related to caregiving, 20% to 30% fare very poorly. These caregivers are often 
more prone to depression, grief, fatigue, and physical health problems, all of 
which may have roots in stress, exhaustion, and self-neglect. (“Averting,” 2010, 
p. 5) 
In this example, RCI emphasizes the magnitude of the private ills by highlighting the 
negative health ramifications of being an unpaid family caregiver. FCA similarly reports 
several individual costs related to family caregiving, including:  
…a range of health risks and serious illnesses themselves; family caregivers 
experience high rates of depression, stress and other mental health problems; 
elderly spousal caregivers experiencing mental or emotional strain have a 63% 
higher risk of dying than non-caregivers; the long-term effects of caregiving on 
women’s economic well-being are profound: one study found that caregiving for 
a parent substantially increased women’s risks of living in poverty and receiving 
public assistance in later life. (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 17) 
Negative health consequences are not limited to caregivers but are also associated with 
care-receivers. For example, RCI laments, “Should we fail to act now, the consequences 
for care recipients will include increased rates of institutionalization, higher risks of 
abuse and neglect, and decreased quality of life” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 6). In these 
examples, pro-caregiving advocates establish urgency of private ills by highlighting the 
magnitude of the negative health consequences for unpaid family caregivers and their 
care-receivers.  
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In addition to communicating the negative health consequences for caregivers and 
care-receivers, pro-caregiving advocates point to finance-related hardships that will 
impact both populations: “For family caregivers the consequences will involve declining 
health and quality of life as well as reduced financial security” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 6, 
emphasis added). In this example, unpaid family caregivers are not just suffering from 
physical ailments, but also financial hardships. Magnifying the financial considerations, 
FCA indicates, “Informal caregivers personally lose about $659,139 over a lifetime: 
$25,494 in Social Security benefits; $67,202 in pension benefits; and $566,443 in 
foregone wages” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 17). In detailing these 
consequences, pro-caregiving advocates are inviting a framing of negative consequences 
that suggest priority in understanding the negative aftermath as being substantial to a 
family. In these examples, the magnitude of a caregiving crisis is conveyed as one where 
quantifiable evidence is accumulating and telling a story of individual finance-related 
consequences for caregivers and care-receivers. 
Pro-caregiving advocates also use shocking statistics to communicate hardships 
for caregivers and care-receivers, which works to emphasize the magnitude of impact on 
the family. For example, FCA quantitatively paints a picture of our nation’s “typical” 
informal caregiver. According to FCA, “70% of people with Alzheimer’s disease live at 
home, where families provide at least 75% of their care,” and “[i]nformal caregivers 
provide 37.1 billion hours of care each year in the United States” (“National Policy 
Statement,” 2015, para. 16). Pro-caregiving advocates rely on quantitative reporting to 
convey the magnitude of hardships embedded in the private ills for caregivers and care-
receivers. Although these shocking numbers convey neutrality in “just reporting the 
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statistics,” the statistics are simultaneously infused with pathos because they highlight the 
extreme financial and health considerations of caregivers. The pathos-infused statistics 
encourage an urgent understanding of a private ill facing caregivers.  
Pro-caregiving advocates establish the severity of a private ill for caregivers by 
privileging locus of quantity. For instance,  
Family caregivers spend an average of $5,531 a year on caregiving expenses, 
including household goods, food, transportation, medical co-payments, 
prescription drugs, and medical equipment and supplies. (“National Policy 
Statement,” 2015, para. 5) 
Using such statistics emphasize that severity of a caregiving crisis negatively impacts 
caregivers and families, and this severity is quantifiable. 
A final way that pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct a private ill is by 
emphasizing locus of severity in the idea that women are disproportionately impacted 
over other populations. Severity refers to the extent to which the advocate, according to 
Jasinski (2001), can “show that, even if the exigence is lacking in terms of magnitude, 
those affected by the problem have suffered great hardship or had their lives disrupted in 
an extreme way” (p. 457). RCI describes, “In general, women caregivers report more 
stress and suffer from greater morbidity as a result of caregiving than men caregivers” 
(“Averting,” 2010, p. 12). In this example, the family caregivers who are women report 
greater health problems than the male caregivers. RCI states that “although the majority 
of family caregivers are women (66%), the proportion of men serving as caregivers is 
growing” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 9). Although here RCI attempts to demonstrate that there 
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are different types of caregivers, not just female, the inclusion of the 66% indicates that 
the majority of unpaid family caregivers are female.  
Other pro-caregiving advocates outline the ways in which women are 
disproportionately impacted by unpaid family caregiving. AARP reports that “the typical 
caregiver in the New York aging services system is a 64-year-old female who has either 
high school or some college education and spends more than 40 hours a week providing 
care to her mother” (“Report,” 2013, p. 1). FCA details the severity being experienced by 
women caregivers by identifying research studies that measure the “impact of caregiving 
on daily life”: “One study found that caregiving for a parent substantially increased 
women’s risks of living in poverty and receiving public assistance in later life” (“national 
Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 17). Later in the report, FCA points to financial 
considerations and states that providing “working ‘credits’ in the Social Security 
system….would also strengthen caregivers’ future retirement benefits and keep them out 
of poverty later in life—a common risk for middle-aged caregivers, particularly women, 
who take time out of the workforce to care for a parent” (“National Policy Statement,” 
2015, para. 14, emphasis added). These passages layer in multiple levels of severity 
based on gender (being female), family (being a daughter), and education (having limited 
education). By citing such circumstances, pro-caregiving advocates invite an 
understanding of a caregiving crisis that is most severe for female family caregivers. 
In sum, the declaration of the private ills with indirect public costs in pro-
caregiving public policy statements is made present by emphasizing the duration of the 
long-term role that leads to personal financial hardships for caregivers, constructing 
magnitude of the caregiving crisis within the family, and emphasizing severity of 
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hardships for female caregivers in particular. In doing so, pro-caregiving advocates 
recognize crisis-level private ills for caregivers and care-receivers.  
Although I argue that that pro-caregiving advocates are effectively making the 
caregiver ills urgent, the way in which severity is stressed reveals a complication in 
securing sufficient and prompt policy change for women in particular. Stressing the 
severity that women caregivers experience in unpaid family caregiving is necessary in 
pro-caregiving advocacy; however, one part of making unpaid family caregiving matter 
socially involves emphasizing that this is a larger issue and expands beyond the confines 
of the home and women. Because the social ills must get promoted, pro-caregiving 
advocates, perhaps unintentionally, trivialize the caregiver ills and lessen the opportunity 
to create swift policy action for female caregivers. This double-edge sword has gendered 
implications because it reveals that the gender of those who are disproportionately 
impacted (i.e., women) might work against securing effective and prompt policy change 
for that population.  
 The previous two sections reveal that pro-caregiving advocates are rhetorically 
constructing public and private ills that constitute a crisis by relying on rhetorical 
strategies infused with urgency, duration, magnitude, and severity. Although I will argue 
later that some parts of the analysis reveal disproportionate effects depending on the 
associations with the public ills or the private ills, pro-caregiving advocates are 
successful in making a caregiving crisis present both publicly and privately. In other 
words, I argue that the above rhetorical strategies reveal that pro-caregiving advocates are 
providing persuasive claims in establishing a crisis that the public should care about and 
react by responding to unpaid family caregiving issues. However, in spite of, and private 
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ills salient, pro-caregiving advocates, as I will argue in the next section, construct an 
ambiguous and partial solution to solve these public and private ills.  
In spite of the persuasive construction of crisis, pro-caregiving advocates have not 
yielded widespread participation or a satisfactory public response to a solution. The next 
half of this chapter will offer one possible explanation as to why there has not been a 
satisfactory public response to a caregiving crisis. First, I argue that pro-caregiving 
advocates invite ambiguous public action for a shared crisis that quietly deters acting on a 
persuasive construction of crisis. Second, I argue that pro-caregiving advocates present 
only a partial solution to resolve a caregiving crisis by presenting solutions that would 
benefit the public and care-receivers, but do not address all of the private ills facing 
caregivers. I argue that these two deficiencies lessen the persuasiveness of a definition of 
the situation of a caregiving crisis. This chapter now moves to demonstrate how pro-
caregiving advocates are attempting to channel effective solutions to solve the public and 
private ills within their policy statements. The next section will argue that pro-caregiving 
advocates are enacting ambiguousness in their public solution intended to solve the 
public and private ills.  
 
A Weak Solution: Ineffective Spur to Action 
Although pro-caregiving advocates are constructing two persuasive ills that the 
economy and healthcare system are being negatively impacted and that unpaid family 
caregivers and care-receivers are experiencing many negative consequences due to their 
role in the family, I argue pro-caregiving advocates present ambiguous action steps that 
do not effectively channel citizen any aroused impulse toward participation. Each 
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advocacy organization presents a particular policy platform including recommendations, 
or solutions, for resolving the public and private ills. For example, RCI proposes a 
National Caregiving Initiative, FCA proposes a national agenda that includes a National 
Resource Center on Caregiving, and AARP advocates several policy recommendations 
including public funding to provide training and skills-building for caregivers. Within 
these policy recommendations, there are no clear action steps for public action of any 
consequence or equal to the crisis other than the implication that they can encourage 
policymakers to vote for these policy changes. In what follows, I outline the specific 
policy recommendations or solutions proposed to resolve a caregiving crisis in each of 
the organization’s policy platforms. I then compare the public action steps in the policy 
statements with those offered on the organizations’ websites and to the contours of the 
larger crisis that they have persuasively declared to show their persuasive inadequacies in 
motivating a public response to the significant ills. In doing so, I highlight the missed 
opportunities in the policy statements for making the solutions to the ills shared and 
urgent to the public. 
FCA does not offer public action steps in its policy statement or on its website, 
which limits a shared understanding of its solution. FCA outlines a federal investment in 
unpaid family caregiving that would give unpaid family caregivers more resources to 
support their long-term role as family caregiver. FCA’s national policy statement calls for 
a “federal investment in family caregiver support” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, 
para. 2) without specifying the nature or level of such an investment, particularly if it is to 
be adequate to the needs of the ills. They call on the Obama Administration and Congress 
“to initiate and support policies that take family caregivers into account and sustain them 
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in their role as the primary providers of long-term care in this country” (“National Policy 
Statement,” 2015, para. 2). More specifically, FCA requests that policymakers “authorize 
and fund a national resource center on caregiving,” “modernize Medicare and Medicaid,” 
“commission an Institute of Medicine (IOM) study on family caregiving,” “provide 
adequate funding for programs that assist family caregivers,” “expand the Family and 
Medical Leave ACT (FMLA) and other paid leave policies,” and “strengthen social 
security by recognizing the work of family caregivers.” For FCA, policy support for 
unpaid family caregivers includes federal funding that would work to decrease the 
likelihood of overburdening the healthcare system. On its website, similar to its policy 
statement, FCA does not offer action steps for actualizing these policy suggestions or 
“how to get involved steps” for potential citizen participants. For example, FCA 
highlights its own advocacy efforts and resources for caregivers to assist them in their 
role, but there is no evidence of getting citizens to participate in effective advocacy for 
broader policies adequate to alleviate the crisis of unpaid family caregiving.  
RCI offers some solutions to a caregiving crisis, though, similar to FCA, it does 
not effectively channel citizen participation. RCI advocates for a National Caregiving 
Initiative to “avert the caregiving crisis” and spark a “national dialogue” (“Averting,” 
2010, p. 4). The National Caregiving Initiative includes suggestions for research and 
development, system design, and public and tax policy. Essentially, these appeals are 
aimed toward policymakers to request funding for the National Caregiving Initiative thus 
offering only an indirect answer to a caregiving crisis that runs through an intermediary. 
Additionally, the proposals only ameliorate the negative effects of, rather than solve the 
basis of the proposed crisis. The National Caregiving Initiative includes efforts to train 
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caregivers, keeping them in the home as long-term care providers, thus preventing the 
overburdening of the healthcare system. On RCI’s website, there are no action steps for 
citizens to get involved in advocacy; however, RCI does have an easily accessible 
“support RCI” tab where citizens can deposit a monetary donation. In short, RCI misses 
an opportunity to effectively channel direct citizen participation in a broader shared 
solution.  
AARP also offers several solutions to a caregiving crisis that its policy 
recommendations are meant to resolve yet, similar to RCI and FCA, fails to effectively 
channel citizen participation for a systemic solution. AARP outlines eight policy 
recommendations “based on the testimonies of caregivers from the 12 listening sessions 
and the online surveys” (“Report,” 2013, p. 2). AARP’s policy recommendations include 
a request for funding “that will help caregivers keep seniors living at home” and “provide 
training and skill-building for caregivers” (“Report,” 2013, p. 2). In AARP’s policy 
recommendations, it advocates for “provid[ing] adequate funding to SOFA [New York 
State Office for the Aging] for non-Medicaid-funded caregiver assistance programs that 
will help caregivers keep seniors living at home, thereby reducing Medicaid expenditures 
on institutional care” (“Report,” 2013, p. 2). Unlike FCA or RCI, AARP offers on its 
website, not on its policy statement, a clear step to become an “AARP Activist.” The 
invitation encourages the public auditor to “Sign up below to become an AARP Activist, 
and you’ll receive the AARP Advocate, a free monthly e-newsletter; e-mail action alerts 
on the issues you care about; and the latest news on Congress and the White House” 
(“AARP Action,” para. 2). Unlike FCA and RCI, AARP’s website offers a clearer 
channel to citizen participation via becoming an AARP Activist. It is important to point 
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out here, however, that this does not appear in the policy statement and that the policy 
suggestion only remedies part of the problem. As such, AARP misses an opportunity to 
invite participation in effecting a comprehensive solution to a caregiving crisis, one equal 
to its severity and scope.  
I suggest pro-caregiving policy statements represent rhetorical opportunities to 
broaden shared responsibility by expanding solutions to more fully address both the 
public and private aspects of unpaid family caregiver issues as well as to invite citizen 
participation in effecting a comprehensive solution, not just appreciating the ills. I 
suggest that, within these policy statements, citizen power needs to be harnessed more 
efficiently and the solution drawn more broadly to match the whole of the ills advanced. I 
am not suggesting that if citizens were given clear action steps, they would unequivocally 
participate in advocacy; however, offering opportunities for citizen participation is 
certainly more inviting to public auditors than not having an invitation to participate and 
is necessary, though not sufficient, to comprehensively solve the systemic problems 
elaborated in the ill statements.  
In these policy statements, pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically build ambiguous 
and partial solutions, or cures, to the broader, public crisis level ill that they show should 
command shared responsibility outside the family. In other words, I argue that motivating 
the public audience toward shared responsibility gets partially undone in these solutions 
because, although it is clear what policymakers can do to resolve the public and private 
ills, it is unclear what public citizens can do to resolve the public and private ills and even 
the actions suggested for policymakers are limited and sometimes reactive rather than 
equal to the crisis as elaborated. It is important to note that the texts I am analyzing for 
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this chapter are self-identified by the organizations as policy statements with the likely 
intent to appeal to policymakers. However, the policy statements are readily available on 
the website of each organization offering the general public an understanding of the 
policy goals situated within their rhetorically constructed context of a caregiving crisis. 
Given that public citizens who want to support unpaid family caregiving not only read 
but may potentially support each of the policy platforms, these texts offer a crucial 
understanding of the rhetorically constructed caregiving crisis, as that is the clearest 
invitation for understanding the constructed ill and what solutions are being offered by 
pro-caregiving advocates to potentially solve the public and private ills.  
In the case of policy attention for unpaid family caregiver issues there are direct 
(e.g., policymakers) and indirect (e.g., individual citizens) stakeholders, and these various 
stakeholders can participate in different capacities. I suggest, as Olson (2009) does, that  
internal and external stakeholders (e.g., customers, employees, shareholders, 
neighbors, watchdog agencies) often do not participate directly or extensively in 
deciding that course of action, whether it is to pursue or to resist major change, 
yet their cooperation, buy in, and coordinated activity are vital to its ultimate 
success. (pp. 29-30) 
It is my contention that pro-caregiving advocates are missing an opportunity to broaden 
shared responsibility by not offering a clear channel for an army of citizens to support 
and push their policymakers to adopt an adequately ambitious policy platform. Bardach 
(2000) asserts that policy solutions, or what he describes as “designing policy 
alternatives” (pp. 16-19), should be designed to persuade “[i]nterested stakeholders, and 
perhaps the general public, who have previously been unaware of the design work going 
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on” (p. 18). In these policy statements, pro-caregiving advocates suggest what the 
solution would do in resolving the public and private ills, but they do not provide clear 
action steps for interested stakeholders to achieve those goals, and the proposed solutions 
seem far short of the extent and nature of the crisis these same documents define. There 
are potential citizen appeals within the policy statements such as “re-envisioning support 
for family caregivers” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 6) and “providing support for family 
caregivers through publicly-funded programs” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 
18), but these appeals reinforce an ambiguous framework for citizen participation in 
solving the bulk of the crisis of unpaid family caregiving.  
Therefore, I argue that within these policy statements there should be efforts to 
clearly channel citizen participation for sufficiently broad solutions to the crisis as 
defined and that these need to be easily found within these documents in particular. Pro-
caregiving advocates do a nice job of rhetorically constructing the public ills and the 
private ills, thus making the ills shared and urgent; however, there are missed 
opportunities in proposing an adequately comprehensive solution that matches the 
described crisis and there are no clearly channeled action steps for public individuals to 
support the policy plan that is intended to alleviate both the public ills and the private ills. 
Additionally, I argue that if no action steps are present for public auditors, there exists an 
assumption that no citizen participation is needed to resolve the public and private ills 
that make up the rhetorically constructed caregiving crisis. As such, the shared aspects, 
severity, and urgency of a caregiving crisis get partially undone in a solution that is not 
adequate or accessible.  
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Delaying, Not Solving, the Crisis through the Advancement of a Partial Solution  
In defining the situation of crisis, pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically imply two 
types of caring situations that work to generate support for their solution. In their 
attempts to merge public and private ills by revealing both individual and social costs to 
convey the definition of the situation of crisis, pro-caregiving advocates present public 
auditors with only two types of caregiving situations and reject one of those out-of-hand: 
a preferred caregiving location that is central to the solution of a caregiving crisis and an 
undesirable caregiving location that will further perpetuate a caregiving crisis. In 
revealing a preferred place for caregiving (the home) and an undesirable place for 
caregiving (any public institution), pro-caregiving advocates make place, or location of 
care, a central aspect to the solution. Yet, this constraint severely limits the possibilities 
for creative publicly supported solutions to the complex crisis. In making care location 
central to the solution, pro-caregiving advocates produce a partial solution to the 
persuasive public and private ills and delay the impact of, but do not solve, a caregiving 
crisis.  
In each of the policy statements, it is clear that a home location for caregiving is 
preferred and vital to motivating support for the solution to the public ills and the private 
care-receiver ills. The public solutions are in place to (1) decrease the likelihood of 
overburdening our healthcare system and (2) prepare unpaid family caregivers to 
maintain their role in the home as one that is long-term. To accept that the public 
solutions will address the public and private ills, the public auditor is asked to assume 
that home caregiving is the preferred place and that there is no place for public, 
institutional care.  
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Through the emphasis on location of care, pro-caregiving advocates begin to 
reveal the partiality of the solution toward shared responsibility in solving the public and 
private ills. The rhetorically constructed preferred care location is in the home and is the 
desirable place where caregivers will be more confident, where care-receivers need to be, 
where caregivers desire care-receivers to be, and is a safe place for care-receivers to be, 
even if that limits what the auditor convinced of a crisis can do to help solve a crisis. Pro-
caregiving advocates rhetorically emphasize location by asserting the home is where 
caregivers will be more confident. AARP concludes its report by reinforcing the 
preferred scene by supporting the policy plan: “As a result of these supports, caregivers 
become more confident and are able to provide care for a longer period of time, delaying 
or preventing institutionalization of a loved one” (“Report,” 2013, p. 13, emphasis 
added). In this example, caregivers are firmly situated within the confines of the 
domestic, and it is implied that this is where they will be more confident in their ability to 
give care. In this appeal, AARP implies the idea that not only will the public benefit (i.e., 
saving taxpayer money), but caregivers will also benefit because they will be more 
confident in their role within the domestic sphere; in this scenario, unpaid family 
caregivers have no real “role” once institutionalization happens. RCI offers a variation on 
the benefit of increased confidence and asks public auditors to understand that, with the 
skills and training that are part of their policy platform, unpaid family caregivers will 
have a better attitude and ability to endure hardship. For example,  
When caregivers become skilled in their responsibilities, they are able to 
acknowledge and accept the changes in their lives and transform their attitudes 
and experiences into something more positive, even if they do not necessarily like 
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those changes. Although skilled caregivers are still often stressed, they are also 
able to better balance their personal, family, and caregiving responsibilities. (RCI, 
p. 14) 
In this extended example, RCI frames caregivers as having a better attitude and being 
better equipped to handle stress but within their long-term private sphere role. In each of 
these examples, pro-caregiving advocates emphasize that location of preferred care is in 
the home and that the solution would maintain that preferred, long-term place. This 
evidence points to part of the partiality mismatch of the solution in that the crisis-
establishing rhetoric never mentions lack of caregiver confidence as a linchpin, so the 
logical train of thought is broken when higher caregiver confidence is part of the solution. 
Furthermore, this training that is said to increase caregiver confidence does not prevent 
the early death or financial impact on caregivers but rather only makes caregivers better 
able to accept their role and remain in the preferred home care longer, thus benefitting the 
person receiving care and the taxpayer more than the caregiver.  
Pro-caregiving advocates construct the preferred location of caregiving as a place 
that is where care-recipients need to be and where caregivers desire care-receivers to be. 
For example, AARP offers a policy plan that “provides older New Yorkers what they 
need and what their families want—to live independently in their communities—and that 
saves taxpayers money on expenditures for institutional care is well worth pursuing” 
(“Report,” 2013, p. 5, emphasis added). In this example, AARP assumes that care-
receivers and unpaid family caregivers agree about home care as being best for the care-
receiver and most desirable for the caregiver, not only for the taxpayer. This rhetorical 
construction of desire is also less directly implied in FCA’s policy statement when it 
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contends, “Family caregiving is typically at the core of what sustains frail elders and 
adults with disabilities, yet caregivers often make major sacrifices to help loved ones 
remain in their homes” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 1). In this example, it is 
implied that care-receivers desire to be in the home, and unpaid family caregivers are 
highlighted as making “major sacrifices” so that they can help fulfill that desire. In such 
instances, partiality is again revealed as caregiver sacrifices made in the home will 
continue to perpetuate negative health- and finance-related issues for unpaid family 
caregivers, though with appropriate training, caregivers could theoretically be better 
equipped to endure these sacrifices for longer, thus, delaying a crisis for taxpayers, 
businesses, and even care-receivers, but not resolving the negative impacts on caregivers.  
Pro-caregiving advocates construct the preferred place for caregiving to be in the 
home and reinforce it as a safe place for care-receivers. For example, AARP suggests that 
it wants to “find ways to help family caregivers working to keep older adults living 
independently and safely in their homes and communities” (“Report,” 2013, p. 1). In this 
example, not only does the location of home help keep care-receivers independent, but 
also safe. RCI suggests that if public auditors fail to support the policy platform, “the 
consequences for care recipients will include increased rates of institutionalization, 
higher risks of abuse and neglect, and decreased quality of life” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 6). 
Although in this example, the terminology of “safe” is not utilized, RCI is making a 
rhetorical connection between institutional care and “higher risks of abuse,” which would 
compromise the care recipients’ safety. Thus, partiality is again present when the 
suggested solutions would delay a crisis in care for care-receivers and negative financial 
ramifications for taxpayers and businesses. What is absent is how unpaid family 
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caregiver ills, such as personal health and finances, get resolved by the location-
dependent, albeit safe, home care.  
In contrast to the preferred home care situation, institutional (public) care is 
rhetorically constructed as an undesirable caregiving situation. First, institutional care is 
established as public and always contrasted with preferred home care. AARP states, 
“[M]any caregivers reported that without the services of state programs supporting family 
caregivers, they would be forced to place their loved ones in institutional settings like 
nursing homes that are funded largely by taxpayers through the Medicaid program” 
(“Report,” 2013, p. 1, emphasis added). In this example, “institutional” is defined as 
“nursing home care” that is funded by Medicaid. Additionally, the use of “forced” 
implies that this is not the preferred situation for caregiving or is a last resort option. In 
another example, AARP indicates its policy recommendations are meant to keep “loved 
ones at home rather than in institutional settings” (“Report,” 2013, p. 2). And, later, it 
states “without the support of these unpaid caregivers, over 50% of older residents would 
likely be placed in institutional settings, like nursing homes, that are funded largely by 
taxpayers through the Medicaid program” (“Report,” 2013, p. 3). On most occasions, 
pro-caregiving advocates emphasize the preferred location as being in the home by 
indicating that such a situation is better compared to “institutional care settings such as 
nursing homes” (“Report,” 2013, p. 4). In doing so, they position the location of home 
care as non-negotiable in the outcome of the solutions. Doing so further reveals inability 
of the solution to resolve the private ills facing caregivers who are the individuals who 
will be expected to maintain this home care.  
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Another way that pro-caregiving advocates emphasize care location is by 
eliminating institutional care as a viable solution to either the public or private ill. 
According to pro-caregiving advocates, institutional caregiving negatively impacts 
everyone involved (caregivers, care receivers, and the economy). RCI proclaims, “The 
stresses and demands of caregiving can adversely affect the caregiver’s health and lead to 
nursing home placement for the care recipient” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 14). Here, RCI 
creates a cause-effect relationship suggesting that something negative, the stresses of 
caregiving, lead to loved ones’ nursing home placement. The language of “nursing home 
placement” suggests a lack of agency for care-receivers and invites a negative judgment. 
Furthermore, institutional care is often discussed as something that needs to be delayed or 
even prevented. For instance, revisiting an AARP quotation from above, “As a result of 
these supports, caregivers become more confident and are able to provide care for a 
longer period of time, delaying or preventing institutionalization of a loved one” 
(“Report,” 2013, p. 13, emphasis added). In a similar example, FCA suggests, “As long 
as caregivers are able to provide care, they are often able to delay costly nursing home 
placements and reduce reliance on programs like Medicaid” (“National Policy 
Statement,” 2015, para. 3). Avoiding institutional care, according to pro-caregiving 
advocates, helps care-receivers and the American public evade catastrophic financial and 
health-related hardships. Unpaid family caregivers are asked to accept and hold on to 
their role longer as part of that solution. Constructing institutional care as undesirable is 
to mark institutional care as not a viable crisis solution. The preferred care is the viable 
solution to a rhetorically constructed caregiving crisis; however, pro-caregiving 
advocates leave a supporting public role unclear as to how public auditors can help the 
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caregivers (other than support a training program that makes unpaid family caregivers 
usable for longer) rather than solving the bulk of their health and financial burdens.  
Important for this chapter’s argument is that institutional care is artificially 
constructed as an undesirable place for care-receivers. For example, RCI asserts, “The 
inability to successfully support family caregivers will likely have disastrous 
consequences. The consequences for care recipients will be increased rates of 
institutionalization, higher risks of abuse and neglect, and decreased quality of life” 
(“Averting,” 2010, p. 13). Although in other places institutional care is marked as more 
expensive and thus less desirable, here RCI spikes out institutional care as a desirable 
alternative, and in fact, even names it as a threatening place for the health and well-being 
of care-receivers. The term “institutionalization” conjures up negative images of care-
receivers unable to have a voice in their own care and implies care-receivers might be 
placed in undesirable institutional care against their will. Even more damning than being 
placed in this undesirable situation, is the suggestion that doing so will lead to “abuse and 
neglect” for care-receivers. The converse of this statement also reinforces the preferred 
location of care in the home because it implies that the location of care in the home will 
not lead to abuse and neglect for care-receivers. Institutional care is constructed as 
negative for care-recipients and taxpayers, but not shown to give relief to caregivers. 
Thus, only some of the persuasive ills are addressed by this location-dependent solution.  
I argue that efforts to resolve the crisis made persuasively shared get hampered by 
insisting on a home location of preferred care for the care-receiver and taxpayer as central 
to the solution. Although this location (the home) carries positive associations within pro-
caregiving advocacy efforts, and it is central to the taxpayer and care-receiver solution, it 
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deflects how the solutions will resolve some of the private ills of caregiving, including 
the negative health and financial impacts facing unpaid family caregivers. Symbolic 
tension is illuminated when pro-caregiving advocates point out ills in the private (health- 
and finance-related consequences for caregivers and care-receivers), but then 
simultaneously present that space as preferred and central to the solution without 
addressing how maintaining that preferred space, long-term, will resolve the caregivers’ 
problems. As such, the partiality of the solution reveals a philosophical barrier in pro-
caregiving advocacy rhetoric that suggests a solution that would directly benefit the 
caregiver experience is ordered as less important as the other stakeholders. This implicit 
hierarchy points to one way that pro-caregiving rhetoric problematically genders unpaid 
family caregiving, by implying in their solutions that there are higher- and lower-order 
priorities, and unpaid family caregivers are ordered lowest.  
Part of the advocate’s obligation in creating a cure in a stock policy case, 
according to Ziegelmeuller and Kay (1997), is to “demonstrate how it will solve the 
problem of the ill” (p. 172). By foregrounding the preferred location in the solution, I 
suggest pro-caregiving advocates are creating an obstacle to how the proposed solutions 
will solve the private ills of caregivers, even if it forestalls ills for care-recipients and 
taxpayers. Bardach (2000) describes a common pitfall in defining the problem in policy 
analysis as “defining the solution into the ‘problem’” (p. 5). In other words, the “problem 
definition should not include an implicit solution introduced by semantic carelessness” 
(p. 5). I argue that pro-caregiving advocates are building location into their solution in 
problematic ways. Pro-caregiving advocates are preventing a new ill rather than solving 
some of the crisis ills. If home is preferred for care-receivers as it is safer and in the 
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community and is ideal for taxpayers, as it is not their money funding the preferred home 
care, the only aspect changing is training for unpaid family caregivers so that they can 
tolerate the situation longer, even as they lose money and continue to be stressed with 
balancing the unexpectedness and work/life balance issues in unpaid family caregiving. 
Unpaid family caregiver stress may be delayed with further training, but emphasizing 
home, as the preferred location of care, does not directly solve their most pressing ills.  
 
Maneuvering Disproportionate Effects, Ambiguousness, and Partiality in Solution  
Pro-caregiving advocates are constructing a stock policy issue case and, in doing 
so, successfully construct ills relevant to both the public (economic) and the private 
(individual financial and personal health-related for care-receivers and caregivers). 
However, when proposing their solutions, pro-caregiving advocates partially undo the 
likelihood of public action to effectively address those persuasive ills by creating 
ambiguity in channeling a public solution that will solve both the public and private 
crises. Further solidifying this barrier is the emphasis on the home location of proper 
care. Most of the solutions offered by pro-caregiving advocates make present the location 
of the care, which backgrounds the ways in which the solutions will solve the caregivers’ 
ills (personal finance and health-related). As such, given the root of the private ill and the 
solution of the private ill are dependent on the location of preferred home care, I maintain 
that emphasis on shared understandings of a caregiving crisis for all parties, including 
caregivers, should be both present in the ills as well as the solutions. This section offers a 
few practical steps in maneuvering disproportionate effects, ambiguity in public action 
steps, and resisting dependence on the home as a requirement in the preferred solution. 
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Eliminate disproportionate effects in public/private ills. This analysis reveals that, 
although pro-caregiving advocates are constructing persuasive public and private ills, 
some disproportionate effects exist that tip the magnitude and severity of the private ills 
as more severe than the public ills. Stated more directly, pro-caregiving advocates are 
constructing a caregiving crisis as more severe to the private participants (care-recipients 
and caregivers) than to the public parties (taxpayers and businesses). For example, within 
the rhetorical construction of the private caregiving crisis, logos and pathos were used in 
making the ills urgent for unpaid family caregivers. In contrast, within the rhetorical 
construction of the public ills, pro-caregiving advocates rely mostly only on logos and not 
as much on pathos. I first suggest, then, that pro-caregiving advocates even out the 
proportion of effects felt within both the publicly constructed ills and the privately 
constructed ills. Doing so might invite more appreciation for public ills as this type of 
emotional appreciation is invited in communicating the private ills.  
One way to accomplish deeper appreciation for the public ills would be to infuse 
the publicly constructed ills with pathos. For instance, instead of only using neutral 
statistics to convey the publicly constructed ills, pro-caregiving advocates could include 
more emotion-filled language to complement the reporting of the statistics. Similarly, in 
addition to quantifying the public ills including the economic aspects of a caregiving 
crisis, pro-caregiving advocates could provide more concrete understandings of what that 
economic impact feels like to individual citizens. Doing so would add more magnitude 
and severity felt in the public ills. I am not suggesting that, as public citizens, we should 
love our money or economy as much as our family members; however, I do believe there 
	  	   110 
are rhetorical opportunities to make the public aspects more vivid, and so felt, by 
individual citizens. 
Introducing clear action steps for citizens. This chapter reveals that careful attention 
must be paid to the rhetorical construction of how to achieve solvency, or participation in 
effecting the solution offered to resolve the rhetorically constructed caregiving crisis. 
Because pro-caregiving advocates are doing a very good job of rhetorically constructing 
shared and urgent public ills and private ills within their definition of the situation of 
crisis, I suggest that the same kind of careful attention be paid to rhetorical strategies 
regarding the proposed cure(s). Bardach (2000) offers suggestions for proposing policy 
solutions, or what Bardach calls “alternatives.” In Bardach’s (2000) suggestions for 
practitioners of public policy development, he suggests that the advocate “conceptualize 
and simplify alternatives” and that “the key to conceptualization is to try to sum up the 
basic strategic thrust of an alternative in a simple sentence or even a phrase” (p. 16). RCI, 
in particular, is accomplishing this conceptual simplification by summarizing its policy 
solutions under the broad heading of advancing its National Caregiving Initiative that 
includes the specific lists of alternatives. FCA and AARP, and other pro-caregiving 
advocates, could follow suit in conceptually summarizing their lists of policy alternatives. 
More important than this organizational strategy, I suggest, that pro-caregiving advocates 
conceptualize alternatives, or solutions, in ways that are more clear and accessible to 
public auditors.  
This analysis argued that ambiguity exists in the solution for motivating public 
citizens to take action. I suggest that, within the policy statements in particular, improved 
efforts must be made to direct public auditors to steps for advancing effective policy 
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support for unpaid family caregivers. Ziegelmeuller and Kay (1997) point out that the 
advocate has an “obligation to outline a specific plan of action and to demonstrate how 
the plan will solve the specific ills and deal with the specific causal factors under 
consideration” (p. 176). The specificity of the plan, according to Ziegelmeuller and Kay 
(1997), is dependent on “the forum in which the proposition is being debated” (p. 176). 
Given this consideration, I suggest that, within the formal policy platforms that have 
broad reach beyond just policymakers, these platforms include not just an outline of the 
policy platforms but also a recognition that a broader audience exists than just 
policymakers. This assertion is supported in practitioner sources for developing public 
policy. Bardach (2000) explains that the advocate should seek approval from multiple 
audiences. He explains:  
Next, think about the larger political environment. Who do you think will “use” 
the analysis and for what purpose(s)? Will anyone pick up your results for use in 
an advocacy context? Would you regard this use of your results as desirable? 
Desirable if certain advocates use your work and undesirable if others do so? Do 
you want to do anything to “segregate” your policy advice by the type of audience 
you might want it to reach—or not reach? Are you, perhaps inadvertently, using 
scare words that will alienate certain audiences? (p. 42) 
In this passage, Bardach is encouraging practitioners to carefully consider the various 
stakeholders within the context of the proposal. My contention is that pro-caregiving 
advocates need to show public citizens that they are already built in to the solution of the 
definition of the situation of crisis. Doing so will avoid “alienation” of this audience as 
well as motivate “buy in” by both direct and indirect stakeholders. Building in public 
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citizens to the solution will also address the issue that pro-caregiving advocates are 
making the “at home” solution difficult for citizens to see how they can help and 
advocate for a governmental policy to alleviate the caregiver ills.  
Pro-caregiving advocates could accomplish approval from multiple audiences by 
creating clear action steps for citizen supporters. For example, instead of outlining the 
specifics of the policy plans which contain code words, or jargon, pro-caregiving 
advocates could create simplistic steps, such as (1) who to contact to support such a 
policy and/or (2) what steps public citizens could take to participate in policy advocacy 
for unpaid family caregivers, including the name and number of a bill if one has been 
introduced to use when contacting legislators. Additionally, I pointed out earlier that 
AARP offers an easily accessible “Become an AARP Activist” on its website. Inclusion 
of the “AARP Activist” appeal would also invite shared understandings within the 
solution of the caregiving crisis. RCI offers a tip on being a caregiver advocate in its tip 
sheet that was made available to me upon formal request. The tip sheet states, “Group 
efforts, such as support groups, can be a strong voice for caregiver needs in the 
community, the state, and the nation. Reach out to your community leaders and 
legislators to keep them informed about your concerns” (“10 Tips for Caregivers,” n.d., p. 
20). Although this concrete step does not encourage caregivers to voice their preferences 
on solution or policy answers to those ills that one is concerned about, it is a good model 
for a concrete step in advocacy that could also be utilized in its policy statement.   
Make solution dependent on solving caregiver private crisis rather than on location 
of care. As pro-caregiving advocates are demonstrating, policy attention for unpaid 
family caregivers is a wide and far-reaching issue, both publicly and privately. By 
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making location of caregiving key in the solution to the public and private ills, pro-
caregiving advocates are watering down their ability to demonstrate how their solution 
will solve all parties’ problems in the caregiving crisis, especially the caregiver private 
ills. Ziegelmeuller and Kay (1997) point out about solvency, 
Even if it can be demonstrated that a significant ill exists and is causally related to 
inherent features of the existing policies, a course of action that fails to guarantee 
a solution to the problem is not likely to be adopted. (p. 176)  
My contention is that one inherent barrier within the definition of the situation of crisis is 
that in their insistence on making location of care key within the solutions to the ills, pro-
caregiving advocates are taking away a clearer connection to how their solutions will 
solve the caregiver private ills rather than just prolong their labor in forestalling crisis for 
the other two featured parties (care-receivers and taxpayers). Pro-caregiving advocates 
are perpetuating crisis for unpaid family caregivers very well because they experience 
much financial, physical, and emotional hardship when care is relegated exclusively to 
the home. I suggest that pro-caregiving advocates either (1) directly address the tension 
that is created when the location that is the source of the ills is also expected to be 
maintained and resolve the ills for care-receivers and taxpayers or (2) look for alternative 
ways to frame the solution that does not idealize the home nor create other care locations 
as lesser and their use of a reason for caregivers’ concern, guilt, and shame. Doing so 
would make the solutions more complete at solving the ills for all parties at risk of crisis 
as opposed to maintaining a dominant and preferred place of care. Additionally, pro-
caregiving advocates might avoid gendering unpaid family caregiving by resisting the 
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philosophical barrier that implies solving caregiver ills is ordered as a lower priority to 
care-receiver and taxpayer ills.  
 I have argued elsewhere in this dissertation that my proposed suggestions are 
necessary, but not sufficient for changing the material conditions facing contemporary 
unpaid family caregivers, and this chapter is consistent with that proposition. My 
suggestions for changes or additions in no way imply that doing so will solve the material 
conditions that make up a caregiving crisis. However, I contend that without the proposed 
changes this conversation will be left unchanged and efforts to make a crisis shared and 
urgent will come undone within the solutions designed to resolve the public and private 
ills. 
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Chapter 4: A Dominant Definition of “Complex” Care in Pro-Caregiving Advocacy 
Rhetoric  
Academic scholars have theorized about definitions of care including the practices 
and attitudes of those who perform care (Tronto, 1993; Rummery & Fine, 2012). Some 
scholars conceptualize care as either a disposition or a practice (Tronto, 1993), and others 
offer an understanding of care as either caring about or caring for (Rummery & Fine, 
2012). Most important for this chapter is the notion of agency or choice that is revealed 
through each of these definitions and how that contributes to a lack of shared 
responsibility. Both Tronto (1993) and Rummery and Fine (2012) argue that a lack of 
choice, or agency, in deciding whether or not to practice caregiving is what perpetuates 
the gender disparity in care that aligns women with caring as a disposition, or caring 
about, instead of with the practices of caring, or caring for care-recipients. This chapter is 
concerned with how the dominant definition of care in pro-caregiving advocacy reveals a 
rhetorically constructed notion that inhibits choice in unpaid family caregiving and thus 
perpetuates a gendered disparity in care. The dominant definition of care in pro-
caregiving advocacy is instructive for this dissertation because it provides an in-road into 
understanding how pro-caregiving advocates themselves are rhetorically constructing 
choice in relation to their change rhetoric for unpaid family caregivers and how that 
rhetorical construction encourages public auditors to understand unpaid family caregiving 
as either a shared responsibility or a family and woman’s obligation.  
Pro-caregiving advocates are rhetorically constructing a dominant definition of 
the care being given by unpaid family caregivers to care-receivers, including both the 
activities of care and the preferred attitudes about care. In this chapter, I reveal the ways 
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in which pro-caregiving advocates are defining care as both a disposition and a practice. 
By doing so, pro-caregiving advocates are advancing a dominant definition of “complex 
care” and perpetuating two rhetorical flaws related to choice that de-emphasize unpaid 
family caregiving as a shared responsibility. First, pro-caregiving advocates talk about 
complex care in a way that assumes caring about leads to caring for. Second, pro-
caregiving advocates actively mask choice by deploying and encouraging a caregiving-
as-personal-journey metaphor. The caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor embedded 
in the definition of the situation of complex care emphasizes personal journey and reward 
for unpaid family caregivers which reinforces that one might voluntarily choose this path 
for self-gain and reveals a second barrier to shared responsibility. Together, these two 
rhetorical flaws in relation to choice and care reveal that shared responsibility is absent 
from pro-caregiving advocates’ dominant definition of complex care.  
Potential citizen advocates may be less motivated to understand unpaid family 
caregiving as a shared responsibility because unpaid family caregivers are being 
discursively constructed as having willingly chosen this path and furthermore as being 
personally rewarded for their hard work. A problematic relationship between caring 
about and caring for and an active masking of choice, as revealed through the pro-
caregiving advocates’ own dominant definition of care, undermines pro-caregiving 
advocacy efforts to invite shared responsibility for unpaid family caregiving. In doing so, 
I argue that public auditors may be less motivated to understand unpaid family caregiving 
as a shared responsibility because the dominant definition of complex care de-emphasizes 
the necessity for public auditors to intervene in the unpaid family caregivers’ choice.  
	  	   117 
This chapter begins with the question of how pro-caregiving advocates 
discursively construct a dominant definition of care in change rhetoric about unpaid 
family caregiving. The dominant definition is important because, as suggested by 
scholars, the notion of agency, or choice, undergirds such definitional work and 
potentially maintains what Tronto might call a public/private boundary and what 
Rummery and Fine (2012) might describe as maintaining “care as the unrecognized and 
unpaid domestic duties imposed on women as a result of the sexual division of household 
and familial labour” (p. 322). “To think of care solely in dispositional terms,” according 
to Tronto (1993), “allows us to think of care as the possession and province of an 
individual” and “makes any individual’s ideals of care fit into the world view that the 
individual already possesses” (p. 118). Tronto (1993) asserts:  
as a disposition or an emotion, care is easy to sentimentalize and to privatize. 
When we retreat to the traditional gendered division, we support the ideological 
construction that women are more emotional than men, and men are more rational 
women. Since women are more emotional than men, then, women are more 
caring. (pp. 118-119)  
The dominant definition of care, then, depending on its association with a disposition or a 
practice, can undermine individual agency because embedded in that definition is an 
assumption that some individuals (i.e., women) are intuitively equipped with this capacity 
and others are not.  
Tronto’s (1993) definition of care as a disposition points to the ways in which 
choice can get undermined because it reinforces that women are obligated to care about 
and care for their care recipients. In this conceptualization, caring about seems to 
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predispose people to conform behavior to caring for. Rummery and Fine’s (2012) 
conceptualization of caring about similarly reveals how choice, or agency, gets 
discursively constructed within a definition of care. Informed by British feminists, 
Rummery and Fine (2012) suggest that caring about “denotes the disposition towards the 
dependent” while caring for “is concerned with the physical work of caregiving” (p. 
324). Important for this chapter, the authors suggest these notions of care reveal 
undergirding notions of choice and/or obligation. Given that pro-caregiving advocates are 
attempting to expand shared responsibility for unpaid family caregiving, it is imperative 
for advocates to define a notion of care that is not limiting shared responsibility due to 
assumptions about caregiver agency (or lack thereof).  
In what follows, I will first outline the “complex” care notion that is revealed by 
comingling caring about and caring for and argue that pro-caregiving advocates are 
actively masking choice by implying that caring about and caring for must go together. 
Following this, I chart the caring metaphors in this dominant definition that are used to 
convey caregiving-as-personal-journey which suggests that unpaid family caregiving is a 
personal problem, not a social issue, and caregiving-as-gift, which implies that caregivers 
will be rewarded for their choice to participate in this personal journey. Finally, I argue 
that public auditors are less likely to see their participation as essential because, through 
the dominant definition of complex care, it is revealed that caring for flows directly from 
caring about. Additionally, I argue that public auditors become less inclined to 
understand unpaid family caregiving as a shared responsibility because the persuasive 
metaphors insist that caregiving is a personal journey. I will conclude the chapter with 
practical lessons in advocacy strategies used to define an issue assumed to be private.    
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A Dominant Definition of “Complex” Care: Revealing an Assumption that Caring 
About Leads to Caring For 
 This section argues that pro-caregiving advocates define the situation of care as 
complex by rhetorically constructing the work being done by unpaid family caregivers. 
Complex care is rhetorically constructed as both caring for, including the practices of 
caregiving for an aging or disabled family member, and caring about, including the 
preferred attitude toward the care recipient and care work. Caring for includes medical, 
domestic, and managerial tasks, and together these practices of care make caregiving a 
complex challenge for unpaid family caregivers. Caring about gets rhetorically 
constructed by emphasizing the caregivers’ good attitude that will result from caregiver 
training and education and will lead to positive results for caregivers and care-receivers. 
Although pro-caregiving advocates are talking about two different aspects within the 
dominant definition of care that Tronto (1993), for example, indicates are traditionally 
rhetorically separated by a public/private boundary, I argue that pro-caregiving advocates 
create a problematic relationship that genders care by implying that caring for must flow 
from caring about in the complex care being done by unpaid family caregivers.  
Caring for reveals challenges and implications for those caring about. This section 
will demonstrate the ways in which pro-caregiving advocates define caring for, or the 
practices of caregiving, and argues that pro-caregiving advocates create implications for 
those caring about by identifying complex care as challenging, yet inevitable for unpaid 
family caregivers. In doing so, pro-caregiving advocates are creating an illusion that there 
is choice in unpaid family caregiving (by focusing on the practices of care), even though 
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unpaid family caregivers are frequently obligated to care out of necessity and a lack of 
alternatives.  
Pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct the care being done by unpaid 
family caregivers as complex by highlighting the practices of caregiving that include 
many different types of tasks including medical, domestic, and managerial tasks. Through 
the varied associations with caring for, pro-caregiving advocates highlight the 
challenging and multi-faceted practices of unpaid family caregivers that often are done 
out of necessity. This gets accomplished by first utilizing the terminology of “complex” 
to describe the work being done by unpaid family caregivers. For example, Family 
Caregiver Alliance (FCA) claims, “Family caregivers are being asked to shoulder greater 
burdens for longer periods of time. In addition to more complex care, conflicting 
demands of jobs and family, increasing economic pressure, and the physical and 
emotional demands of long-term caregiving can result in major health impacts on 
caregivers” (“Caregiving: Introduction,” 2014, para. 27, emphasis added). In this 
example, the complexity of care involves various aspects of caregiving including the 
physical activities of the job and the emotional demands and burdens expected of unpaid 
family caregivers.  
The term “complex” is not always present when defining care, though caregiving 
gets associated with complex ideas. For example, caring for includes efficiency, 
productiveness, and requires training and skill. AARP suggests, “Better-informed 
caregivers will allow for better and more efficient care, reduced hospital admissions and, 
ultimately, a more productive caregiver” (“CARE Act,” 2014, para. 14). In this example, 
caregiver training is linked to efficiency and productiveness, and these associations are 
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framed in a positive light for both caregivers and care recipients. Similarly, in a story 
profiled on AARP, a family indicates how the lack of training had a negative impact on 
the care-receiver. AARP explains:  
As a family caregiver for her father, Alphus, Kristin Mitchem—and her mother, 
Cheryl—perform complicated medical/nursing tasks to help him remain at home. 
They have no training for these tasks, such as medication management and 
cleaning his feeding tube. Sadly, this has led to setbacks in Alphus’ health, 
causing him to be readmitted to the hospital on at least one occasion. (“Kristen 
Mitchem,” 2014, para. 72, emphasis added) 
In this situation, caring for requires complicated competence including medical skills, 
and, further, if caregivers are improperly trained for these complicated tasks, can result in 
hospitalization for the care recipient. In these two examples, caring for is activity-based 
and encompasses the practices of caregiving and encourages an understanding that 
caregiving is associated with the practices of caregiving as opposed to the disposition of 
the caregiver. However, because there are not good alternatives for care for loved ones, 
complex caring for appears to flow from caring about.  
Unpaid family caregiving is revealed to be complex care that includes caregiving 
practices that encompasses both medical care (e.g., nursing skills) and domestic care 
(e.g., housework, emotional support). AARP asserts that part of its policy plan includes 
providing high-quality care in the home. It suggests, “Workforce challenges, including 
how to best ensure the skills needed to provide high-quality care, abound and need to be 
addressed for New York State to meet the growing need for high-quality care” (“Report,” 
2013, p. 12). In this context, high-quality care is referring to affordable direct care 
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workers to relieve unpaid family caregivers. Here, although those who are doing the care 
are paid care workers, high-quality care, according to AARP, includes a skill-set. Ryan 
(2014) laments, “For many, family caregiving is more than help with household chores or 
providing transportation” because “it includes complex care responsibilities that were 
once provided only by medical professionals” (para. 2). In this example, care is complex 
because of the medical aspects of caregiving. This example indicates a lack of choice in 
the dominant definition of care because the complex care is done out of necessity of the 
current material conditions that make medical care necessary in the home. RCI also 
defines care practices by making associations with health care:  
Caregiving is more technically and physically demanding, requiring performance 
of tasks that only skilled nurses performed just a decade ago. Care recipients are 
often released from hospitals “quicker and sicker”, resulting in family members 
being responsible for skilled nursing care with minimal preparation or training. 
Thus, the “home hospital” has become a reality. (“Averting,” 2013, p. 12) 
In this example, RCI emphasizes the practices of caregiving are complex because of the 
necessity of being trained in nursing skills. The emphasis here on necessity reinforces the 
assumption that caring about leads directly to caring for.  
Complex care also gets described by pro-caregiving advocates as the medical 
skills mentioned earlier in combination with domestic-related tasks. RCI insists, “Family 
caregivers often need to perform complex medical tasks such as wound care and 
coordinate patient care, make decisions and solve problems while they prepare meals, 
provide assistance with toileting and bathing, and run the household” (“Averting,” 2010, 
p. 13, emphasis added). Here, RCI points to the various types of care, including both 
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medical and domestic tasks that comprise complex care. FCA similarly points out that 
complex care includes both medical and domestic tasks when they elaborate that 
caregivers assist care-receivers with daily activities such as “bathing, managing 
medications or preparing meals” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 16). In Diane 
Schuster’s Caregiver Corps proposal, she points to the various types of complex skills 
being done by unpaid family caregivers in her appeal to potential volunteers. She 
elaborates: “[T]hey [volunteers] could also learn the kinds of skills required to care for an 
older adult and his or her family….they could acquire medical and nursing skills—the 
kind of skills family caregivers use routinely in their daily routine” (Schuster, 2013, para. 
12, emphasis added). In this example, Schuster emphasizes that unpaid family caregiving 
is associated with a skill set and not the caregiver. In all of these examples, it is clear that 
pro-caregiving advocates are inviting complex understandings of care that include 
medical and domestic care. Such associations encourage public auditors to begin seeing 
the relationship between caring about and caring for—that family caregivers who 
already care about will eventually care for, even though this is sometimes out of 
necessity.  
In addition to medical tasks, caring for also includes the special skill of 
maintaining another’s finances and being prepared to handle legal issues. For example, 
FCA points out about the legal issues related to caregiving, “Typical concerns include 
who will manage the confused person’s money, who will make important health care 
decisions and how to plan for long-term care” (“Caregiving: Introduction,” 2014, p. 2). In 
this example, FCA emphasizes that unpaid family caregiving includes the task of 
managing another’s personal finances indicating that complex care also includes this 
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aspect. AARP suggests that caregivers “have become de facto case managers for their 
older relatives, making certain that services are available and dependable, organizing and 
managing aides, and arranging for transportation to medical appointments” (“Report,” 
2013, p. 8). Similarly, RCI’s Tip #9 tells caregivers to “plan ahead” and to “consult a 
local attorney or available legal aid to explain your legal options” so that “you understand 
your rights and those of your loved one” (p. 19). In this tip, part of caring for includes 
unpaid family caregivers being educated on the legal and financial issues facing their care 
receiver. Because personal finance and legal issues are typically managed by a person 
within the family, such emphases on unpaid family caregivers being informed of these 
managerial tasks indicates that caring about leads to caring for in this particular way.  
Relatedly, many pro-caregiving advocates push for policy change to fund training 
and education for unpaid family caregivers, and this aspect of the policy platforms gets 
rhetorically constructed as a vehicle to the complexity of caring for. Many pro-caregiving 
advocates assert that caregivers will have many benefits from such training and 
education, including a better attitude. RCI offers in Tip #2 to “Be informed, get 
educated” that includes suggestions such as  
…knowledge is power. Seek out information on your loved one’s condition. Ask 
questions of doctors and other health care providers that will help you understand 
the illness and what to expect. Be ready for these appointments with a written list 
of your top three or four most important questions. Take a notepad so you can 
write down important information that is shared with you. Accurate information 
can help you be a better caregiver. (p. 4)  
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In this extended example, RCI points out various ways for caregivers to become educated 
about their care-receiver’s medical needs, and most importantly, states that being 
equipped with this information will lead to being a “better caregiver.” Being an informed 
caregiver who cares about the care receiver includes caring for the loved one in this way.  
In sum, care is complex because it draws from many different practices including 
medical tasks, domestic chores, and managing finances. By emphasizing the practices of 
care, pro-caregiving advocates present the many challenges of unpaid family caregiving. 
For example, AARP asserts the challenging aspects of medical skills when it describes, 
“Once home and frequently alone with their relatives, caregivers are often overwhelmed 
when required to give injection[s], change catheters, or perform other medical tasks” 
(“Report,” 2013, p. 8). As pro-caregiving advocates allude, this complexity in the 
practices of care make caregiving a challenge. It is not only that the pro-caregiving 
advocates’ dominant definition of care is constructed as complex, but that it is assumed 
that family members will do this complex care. In other words, pro-caregiving advocates 
acknowledge that the work is challenging and complex, but it is also unquestioned that it 
is the caregiver’s responsibility to do this complex care. As such, there is no shared 
responsibility built into the dominant definition of care because there is an implicit 
assumption that caring about someone will directly lead to caring for that person. The 
next section will argue that shared responsibility is further deflected by assuming that the 
way to manage the challenging practices of complex care is the caregiver’s responsibility 
via having a good attitude.  
Complex care includes caring about (with a positive attitude). Caring about is 
revealed within the dominant definition of complex care by rhetorically constructing a 
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preferred attitude for unpaid family caregivers. Pro-caregiving advocates suggest that 
unpaid family caregivers have a good attitude about the care being given to the care 
recipient in spite of the many personal challenges revealed when describing the practices 
of caregiving. Furthermore, having a good attitude is a future result of caregiver training 
and education and is assumed to lead to positive outcomes for both the caregiver and the 
care-receiver. Caring about reveals that the appropriate attitude is a positive one that can 
combat the challenging aspects of care work and masks the lack of realistic choice in 
unpaid family caregiving.  
Pro-caregiving advocates suggest that a good attitude toward caregiving can help 
combat the stressors experienced by unpaid family caregivers. For example, on the RCI 
tip sheet that addresses “taking care of yourself,” RCI suggests that caregivers,  
Get enough sleep and eat a healthy, nutritious diet. Engage in activities that help 
you get rid of stress. The time you take out of your busy day to exercise, garden, 
or to take a long, hot bath may make you feel better and improve your overall 
attitude. (p. 3) 
In this example, pro-caregiving advocates imply that caregiving is challenging but 
reinforces that unpaid family caregivers have the time, agency, and responsibility to take 
care of themselves so that they can have a good attitude in their care for their loved ones. 
This quotation highlights that caregiving is busy and hard work as well as implies that 
caregiving is the individual caregiver’s burden. The caregiver is implied to have chosen 
this way of life, but more importantly, that they have decided to carry on this burden 
alone. To suggest that caregivers recharge, the quotation implies that the unpaid family 
caregiver go and do activities that are more individual and private. In this quotation also 
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lies the assumption that caring about will lead to caring for because the better attitude is 
needed to meet the challenges of caring for the loved one.  
 In the definition of complex care, pro-caregiving advocates reinforce the 
challenging aspects of caring about care receivers. More specifically, caregiving as a 
challenge is based on personal challenges facing unpaid family caregivers. For example, 
FCA explains, “Having to juggle competing caregiving demands with the demands of 
your own life on an ongoing basis can be quite a challenge” (“Caregiving: Introduction,” 
2014, para. 6). In this example, caregiving is challenging because of meeting the 
demands of others in addition to the caregiver personal needs. AARP says about family 
caregivers: they “have a huge responsibility—that gets even more difficult when their 
loved ones go into the hospital and the transition back home” (“CARE Act,” 2014, para. 
1). These examples demonstrate how complex care involves caring about a care recipient 
and that assuming the challenges are obligatory in addition to the practices of caregiving. 
In the latter example, pro-caregiving advocates suggest that the “huge responsibility” is 
aligned with the caregivers’ emotional disposition toward the care-receiver. In doing so, 
pro-caregiving advocates are implying that the caring attitude is already part of unpaid 
family caregiving, thus indicating that unpaid family caregivers already care about their 
care recipient. These passages also suggest that if someone else cares for their loved one, 
caregivers should not trust them. Thus, the caregiver’s job is more difficult because they 
are coached to be afraid someone else will not care for the person in the right way. The 
rhetorical issue occurs when it is assumed that caring about must lead to caring for, 
which effectively masks a lack of choice for unpaid family caregivers.  
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In addition to the challenging aspects of caring about, pro-caregiving advocates 
emphasize that a positive attitude can result from the training provided by the advocacy 
organizations. For instance, Operation Family Caregiver offers evidence, in the form of 
testimony about direct caregiver experience that a positive attitude will lead to being a 
better caregiver. In the section titled “We Serve,” Operation Family Caregiver highlights 
a quotation from Crystal, a Navy Spouse,  
Operation Family Caregiver provides me the tools to identify stress, create 
options for solutions, and provides support which allows me to solve problems. 
With the constant moves and frequent deployments that come with the military 
lifestyle, these tools allow me to maintain a positive attitude while caregiving. 
(2014, para. 4, emphasis added).  
In this example, the unpaid family caregiver voice is cited as evidence that tools learned 
from the advocacy organization had a direct impact on the caregiver’s positive attitude 
about caregiving. Additionally, the above example assumes that the caregiver should be 
charged with solving the challenges of complex care and be cheery about it. In a similar 
example, Ryan (2015) describes the positive outcomes of being a caregiver who takes 
advantage of respite programs when she indicates, “These programs allow family 
caregivers to take some time off to recharge, so they have the strength, energy and spirit 
to carry on” (para. 5). In this example, although the terminology of “attitude” is not used, 
the “spirit to carry on” reinforces the idea that a positive attitude is the result of having 
the knowledge to overcome some caregiver challenges. The positive attitude becomes 
problematic in the definition of complex care because it does not challenge the notion 
that this is being reinforced as an appropriate expectation for caregivers and the private 
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problem/solution—that unpaid family caregivers will be charged with responsibility to 
care for if they care about their loved one, and will have a good attitude while doing that 
care work.  
 In addition to positioning a positive attitude as a result of caregiving advocacy 
efforts, pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct a positive attitude into caring 
about by offering suggestions for relieving caregiver tension. For example, RCI’s Tip #7 
suggests to “believe that laughter is the best medicine” because  
laughter eases tension and stress, allows you to get rid of negative emotions, and 
actually boosts your immune system. Humor and laughter can take negative 
feelings and turn them into positive feelings. Caregiving can be difficult, but 
learning to laugh can help ease the pressure. Seek out ways to improve your sense 
of humor. Laugh at unexpected mix-ups, read the comics, watch funny movies, 
tell jokes, send funny cards or emails. Allow yourself and your loved one to be 
silly! (p. 15) 
In this passage, RCI acknowledges that caregiving is a challenge and “can be difficult” 
but asserts that a positive attitude, via laughter, can “help ease the pressure.” In doing so, 
a positive attitude is revealed to be the preferred attitude in the dominant definition of 
complex care. This reinforces the assumption that caring about leads to caring for 
because the challenges lie in caring for the loved one. Additionally, the onus of 
responsibility for managing those challenges lies individually with the caregiver.  
Further compounding that complex care, which includes caring about, is that 
unpaid family caregivers are implied to create safety for care-recipients by enacting this 
complex care. For example, Ryan (2014) asserts, “By providing this care, family 
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caregivers play a critical role in helping to keep their loved ones from being readmitted to 
the hospital, out of costly institutions and safe at home” (para. 4). In a related example, 
Eskenazi (2015) suggests about the caregiver’s job, “Your job is to help the person you 
care for feel comfortable and safe, see that he or she gets good medical and health care, 
and try to provide emotional, social and physical support as much as you are able” (para. 
15). In these examples, pro-caregiving advocates suggest that not only does complex care 
include the practices of caregiving but also a caring attitude for the care-recipient, thus 
reinforcing that caring about leads directly to caring for and furthermore that it is the 
individual caregiver’s responsibility to do both.  
To summarize, pro-caregiving advocates emphasize both the practices of care and 
the attitudes toward care. The practices of care include medical and managerial tasks and, 
by emphasizing such practices, pro-caregiving advocates point to the challenging aspects 
of unpaid family caregiving. Pro-caregiving advocates also associate the definition of 
complex care with a caring attitude or caring for the care recipient. This is accomplished 
by advancing a preferred positive attitude as well as emphasizing the emotional aspects 
of caring about an aging or disabled loved one. Although pro-caregiving advocates are 
defining care as complex and all-encompassing of various practices as well as attitudes of 
care, I argue that they rhetorically construct caring about and caring for as intricately 
connected. For example, Area Agency on Aging, a non-profit organization that advocates 
for caregivers and care-receivers, reveals on their website that if you care about you must 
care for. The section titled “I care for someone” also reads “Are you caring for 
someone?” The former statement implies caring about but then the latter question posed 
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implies the practice of caring for. In another example, pro-caregiving advocates also 
connect complex care with “skilled” care workers. For example, RCI suggests,  
When caregivers become skilled in their responsibilities, they are able to 
acknowledge and accept the changes in their lives and transform their attitudes 
and experiences into something more positive, even if they do not necessarily like 
those changes. Although skilled caregivers are still often stressed, they are also 
able to better balance their personal, family, and caregiving responsibilities. 
(“Averting,” 2010, p. 14) 
In this example, being “skilled” invokes an association with a trade. As such, in the 
definition of complex care, pro-caregiving advocates associate the definition of care with 
the practice of caregiving. However, by connecting that skill with the attitude about 
caregiving, pro-caregiving advocates imply that caring about leads to caring for in 
unpaid family caregiving.  
The examples highlighted in this section exemplify the interweaving of caring 
about and caring for in such a way that pro-caregiving advocates’ rhetoric develops a 
problematic relationship between the two. What is implied in this relationship is that if 
you care about you will go forward to make home caregiving happen from necessity 
even if you lack the skills because there are no realistic alternatives, and the advocates do 
not present any larger choices than helping the unpaid family caregiver endure. The 
relationship reinforces the privacy of the problem and the locus of responsibility (that 
caring for someone is a family issue), even if not a choice. Although pro-caregiving 
advocates associate unpaid family caregiving with the practices of care, they make caring 
about part of the definition of care because the emotional aspects of complex care 
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demonstrate how the challenges of caregiving, revealed through caring for, can be 
overcome by caring about. In doing so, pro-caregiving advocates emphasize the idea that 
public auditors only need to support unpaid family caregivers’ already-made choice, as 
opposed to supporting unpaid family caregivers’ right to choose. As such, pro-caregiving 
advocates limit shared responsibility in unpaid family caregiving by creating a definition 
of complex care that reinforces the burden of caring for as directly flowing from caring 
about. The next section will argue that if caregivers are rewarded for the complex care in 
the home, they might willingly choose this role.  
 
Caring Metaphors Actively Mask Choice by Implying Personal Journey, Sacrifice, 
and Reward 
 This section argues that the definition of complex care, which includes caring for 
and caring about, is framed within a caring metaphor that implies caregiving is a 
personal journey for unpaid family caregivers. The caregiving-as-personal journey 
metaphor suggests that caregiving is a challenge; however, caregivers will have a 
personal payoff for venturing on this challenging journey. More specifically, the 
caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor rhetorically constructs caregivers as willingly 
self-sacrificing, which suggests that unpaid family caregivers have willingly chosen to be 
in this situation. Furthermore, a second metaphor, caregiving-as-gift-to-self, suggests that 
the individual challenges associated with the caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor 
can be lessened because it implies that unpaid family caregivers will be individually 
rewarded for their willing sacrifices made on their personal journey. I argue that the 
personal journey metaphor de-emphasizes shared responsibility because public auditors 
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are encouraged to understand the caregiver journey as a personal and personally 
rewarding one and not a shared journey. Additionally, because the personal journey 
metaphor is associated with willing caregiver sacrifice, it is implied that unpaid family 
caregivers have willingly chosen to be on this journey. Public auditors, then, are less 
likely to be motivated to interfere with this personal journey, even if they are moved by 
the caregiver’s situation.  
 First, pro-caregiving advocates use a caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor 
that emphasizes the fulfillment of meeting the challenges of unpaid family caregiving. 
The terminology of “caregiving journey” is utilized throughout pro-caregiving advocacy 
efforts. The RCI tip sheet includes a headnote that states, “This booklet is a compilation 
of our best advice, and we hope it will be useful to you on your caregiving journey” (p. 1, 
n.d., emphasis added). Before the first tip, RCI asserts: “The caregiving journey is not a 
sprint, but a marathon!” (p. 2, n.d., emphasis added). In both of these statements, not only 
is the caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor used, but it communicates a positive 
association, emphasized with an exclamation point!  
In addition to utilizing the language of journey, pro-caregiving advocates 
associate the caregiving journey with challenges. For example, tip #8 asserts, 
“Unexpected problems and challenges are part of the caregiving journey” (p. 16, 
emphasis added). Here, the caregiving journey includes challenges and problems, and 
these difficult tasks should be expected as part of the journey. The caregiving-as-
personal-journey metaphor is also employed to motivate caregivers themselves to be 
personal mentors for other caregivers. For example, tip #10 states, “When you become a 
caregiver for another, you quickly learn what is and what is not available in your local 
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community to help you. You can share with others on the caregiving journey who may 
have these same needs” (p. 20, n.d., emphasis added). In this example, the caregiving-as-
personal-journey metaphor implies a personal journey and part of that journey is to share 
some of the challenges (e.g., lack of local resources), personal solutions, tips, and work-
around directions to existing resources with other unpaid family caregivers.  
The Alzheimer’s Care Resource Center, an organization that empowers 
“caregivers to relax, renew & reach out,” also employs a caregiving-as-personal-journey 
metaphor. For instance, in a section titled “When the Road Gets Rough,” it indicates that 
it “will help you create a new caregiving plan. One that will get you back on track, while 
helping you stay healthy and empowered, so you can continue to best navigate your 
journey as an Alzheimer’s caregiver” (“When the Road Gets Rough,” 2015, para. 3, 
emphasis added). Here, the caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor is used to convey 
potential hardships or that things will inevitably “get rough” for unpaid family caregivers. 
National Alliance for Caregiving similarly points out the challenges in its introductory 
comments on Care for the Family Caregiver: A Place to Start: “Whatever the 
circumstances, the road ahead on your caregiving journey may seem long and uncertain” 
(EmblemHealth, 2010, p. 1, emphasis added). Such examples work to emphasize that part 
of the caregiver journey will be challenging, and furthermore, that these challenges are 
personal challenges, not social ones.  
In addition to the caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor conveying the 
challenges that unpaid family caregivers will face in this journey, the metaphor also 
reveals that pro-caregiving advocates place a high value on unpaid family caregivers’ 
sacrifice. For example, RCI rewards “outstanding family, paraprofessional and volunteer 
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caregivers of Georgia” by recognizing “the courage, dedication, and sacrifice of 
caregivers” (“Building Support,” n.d., p. 4, emphasis added). Here, RCI builds sacrifice 
as part of the caregiver experience and, furthermore, rewards outstanding caregivers for 
their sacrifice. In the RAND report on military caregivers, Ramchand et al. (2014) 
suggest, “Caring for a loved one is a demanding and difficult task, often doubly so for 
caregivers who are juggling care duties with family life and work. The result is often that 
caregivers pay a price for their devotion” (p. xviii). In this example from the RAND 
Report, “price” remains ambiguous, but it is apparent that the report is indicating some 
kind of sacrifice that unpaid family caregivers must undoubtedly make. In another 
example, Elaine Ryan (2015), Vice President of State Advocacy and Strategy Integration 
(SASI) for AARP, explains about her friend Audrey, who is an unpaid family caregiver: 
“What makes Audrey’s story remarkable to me is the number of times in her life that she 
has given of herself to care for others” (para. 2). Here, Audrey’s sacrifice is 
“remarkable.” Such examples reveal that personal sacrifice is highly valued and admired 
in pro-caregiving advocacy.8   
Pro-caregiving advocates associate many forms of sacrifices with unpaid family 
caregiving. For instance, Ziettlow (2014) explains, “In addition to making monetary 
sacrifices, caregivers can incur physical, emotional, and professional costs as well” (para. 
3). Ziettlow’s (2014) reflection suggests that the sacrifice is not always emotional, but 
can be financial and work-related. On the first page of the 2011 FCA year in review 
report is a quotation written by an anonymous unpaid family caregiver that states, “You 
will need the patience of a saint, the mind of a doctor, and the strength of Hercules to take 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Chapter five will deal more directly with admiration for caregivers.  
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care of your loved one” (“Through the Eyes of the Caregiver,” 2012, p. 1). Here, sacrifice 
of the caregiver is highlighted as the caregiving journey will test patience and will call on 
both emotional and physical strength, which indicates that caregiving is internalized and 
does not signal to public auditors that others should help.  
The notion of sacrifice is taken up in print documenting unpaid family caregiver 
stories. For example, in an AARP Bulletin, author and caregiver Amy Goyer (2013) wrote 
about her personal experience caring for her elderly parents and offered suggestions to 
other caregivers about managing similar work/life balance issues. She elaborates: 
I’ve been a caregiver my entire adult life. First I helped support my grandparents. 
Then I helped with my mom, when she had a stroke at age 63, some 20 years ago, 
making frequent cross-country trips from Washington, D. C., to Arizona. But 
when Dad first showed signs of Alzheimer’s disease in 2008, that wasn’t enough. 
So I adapted my work, choosing jobs that let me telecommute, and began working 
from Arizona a week or two a month. Eventually, that wasn’t enough, and I 
moved into my parents’ home. (para. 2) 
What is readily apparent in Goyer’s reflection is her unquestioned sacrifice for her 
parents. The subsequent effect is a privileging of the association between unpaid family 
caregivers and sacrifice. This example is in line with the other instances that reveal pro-
caregiving advocates rhetorically constructing caregiver challenges as a personal sacrifice 
and this sacrifice as highly valued. Furthermore, that there are big sacrifices is made 
clear, but the way that this gets rhetorically constructed makes public auditors not want to 
interfere or treat unpaid family caregiving as a shared responsibility.  
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Pro-caregiving advocates, perhaps unintentionally, foreground choice with the 
caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor by emphasizing that unpaid family caregivers 
willingly choose the journey in spite of the challenges that they know will be faced. For 
example, Ziettlow (2014) tells a story of male caregiver Kyle who cared for his mother in 
the final year of her life. She explains, “A year after his mom’s death, Kyle admitted 
while that balancing all the cumulative, unexpected costs of caring for his mom was 
challenging, he would make the choice all over again” (para. 11). In this example, Kyle is 
not only talking about the challenging sacrifices he made in caring for his mother, but 
also that he was willing to do so and would willingly choose to do so again.  
 Within the emphasis on willing and chosen sacrifice is the notion of personal 
reward or payoff for participating in caregiving-as-personal-journey. The tone in pro-
caregiving advocacy visual discourse is generally positive and suggests a rewarding 
experience for the caregiver as well as the care-receiver. For example, in RCI’s tip 
brochure there are several pictures of caregivers with their care recipients. In one image, 
a young female caregiver is pushing an elderly care-recipient in a wheelchair. They 
appear to be standing atop a small hill under a blooming tree overlooking a pond or a 
small body of water. It is daylight, the sun appears to be shining directly on the caregiver 
and care-receiver, and they are both smiling. In fact, in seven of thirteen photos within 
RCI’s tip brochure, caregivers and their care-receivers are smiling together and in some 
instances appear to be laughing together. In these images it is apparent that pro-
caregiving advocates are sending the message that unpaid family caregiving is, in some 
ways, a gratifying experience. In these examples caring about gets naturalized into 
caring for. It is possible that a caregiver could do the former without necessarily the 
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latter; however, by constructing caring for as a personally rewarding experience, pro-
caregiving advocates actively mask a lack of choice in unpaid family caregiving. FCA 
similarly constructs care as a personally rewarding experience. In an introduction to the 
caregiving section, FCA (2013) claims,  
Caregiving takes many forms. Many of us help older, sick, or disabled family 
members and friends every day. We know we are helping, but we don’t think of 
ourselves as caregivers. We are glad to do this and feel rewarded by it, but if the 
demands are heavy, over time we can also become exhausted and stressed. 
(“National Policy Statement,” para. 1, emphasis added) 
Two important things occur in this passage including care as something that is 
challenging yet is also something we do because we are personally rewarded for our 
efforts. In this way, the challenging aspects, or practices of caring for, and our caring 
about positive attitudes are rewarded. The rhetorical implication is that unpaid family 
caregiving involves personal challenges that will reap personal gains and, as such, 
justifies a lack of shared responsibility for unpaid family caregiver issues.  
 The caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor also conveys notions of personal 
reward based on the sacrifice of unpaid family caregivers. In the “Messages to Live By” 
(2012) section on FCA, a theme of personal reward is highlighted: 
We all have lessons to learn throughout our lifetimes. Life evolves and sometimes 
our journey takes us through turbulent waters and other times the waters remain 
still. These journeys become a part of us and make us who we are. We are here to 
learn from one another and through these lessons we can heal our relationships 
and sometimes ourselves. (para. 1)  
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This passage infers the sacrifice endured by caregivers will in some way strengthen the 
relationships with those being cared for or strengthen the caregiver’s own state of mind. 
In other words, this statement implies that unpaid family caregivers should be gratified by 
their role because they are doing the “right” thing. Furthermore, unpaid family caregivers 
should take comfort in knowing that their self-sacrificing behavior will benefit them by 
either being cared for in the future or learning a life lesson that only caregiving can bring 
them. Additionally, the personal reward that is emphasized also discourages those who 
are not caregivers from seeing unpaid family caregiving as a shared responsibility.  
Personal reward is also emphasized on AARP’s initiative titled, I “Heart” 
Caregivers. In “Heart-ing” Family Caregivers, AARP encourages caregivers to share 
their stories, and different anecdotes are profiled on the webpage. Gwen’s story is 
profiled on the main page, and she says, “When I hear her say…‘I love you’ and ‘Thank 
you for taking care of me,’ it makes it all worth it. I’d do it a million times over” 
(“Everyday you give your heart,” n.d., n. pag.). She later writes, “No one prepares you 
for this job but it is a job that some of us are required to do. The only reward is knowing 
that at the end of the day I have done everything I can to care for my mother and to make 
her remaining days as comfortable as possible” (“Gwen from DC,” n.d., para. 5). In 
Gwen’s reflections, she emphasizes and re-emphasizes that caregiving is a willing 
sacrifice and is also a personally rewarding experience. Personal reward is also 
emphasized in RCI’s Operation Family Caregiver. Tina, a caregiver from Buffalo, NY, 
has a quotation highlighted on the website that states, “I honestly didn’t realize after his 
wounds were healed that our lives would change. Neither of us knew the great joys, 
terrible sorrows and life lessons that were in our future together” (“They Served,” 2014, 
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para. 7). Here, RCI frames caregiving as challenging, yet rewarding, and the reward 
comes in “life lessons.” Life lessons are a personal benefit, not a social benefit.  
Another way that personal reward gets rhetorically constructed is by deploying a 
caregiving-as-gift metaphor. The caregiving-as-gift metaphor is not a gift to the care-
receiver, but rather a gift that the caregiver is receiving. For instance, AARP suggests that 
“[i]n some ways, caregiving is a wonderful gift” because “it affords us the opportunity to: 
Give back to the ones who gave so much to us. Spend quality time with the people we 
love. Step back and put things in perspective” (LeaMond, 2014, para. 4-5). In this 
example, AARP suggests that unpaid family caregivers will reap a benefit in their 
caregiving efforts, and that benefit is implied to be in personal growth (e.g., having 
perspective). In a similar example on the last page of the 2011 FCA year-end report is a 
quotation provided by Ms. Crystal M., “What you give…will come back to you. It will be 
me one day” (“Through the eyes of the caregiver,” 2012, p. 103). On the same page, 
Flora Edwards states, “In helping others, we shall help ourselves, for whatever good we 
give out completes the circle and comes back to us” ((“Through the eyes of the 
caregiver,” 2012, p. 103). In each of these examples, unpaid family caregiving is 
rhetorically constructed as a gift that unpaid family caregivers will receive. In these 
examples, the difficulty in caregiving is still signaled but backgrounded to the personal 
gift and is unhelpful in advocating for systemic change.  
In summary, this section argued that the definition of care is framed with two 
persuasive metaphors: (1) a caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor that associates 
unpaid family caregiving with individual challenges and individual sacrifice, which are 
necessary to a fulfilling journey, and (2) a caregiving-as-gift metaphor that suggests a 
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personal reward for meeting the demands of the challenge. I argue that these two 
metaphors indicate a lack of choice because together they infer that unpaid family 
caregivers have willingly chosen to be in this situation and, furthermore, that they will be 
rewarded for this willing and individual choice. As such, pro-caregiving advocates are 
actively masking choice by indicating that caregiving is a gift and suggesting that, 
although challenges are inevitable in the journey, there will be personal benefits along the 
way. I suggest, then, that public auditors are less likely to (1) interpret unpaid family 
caregiving as a shared responsibility because the persuasive metaphors suggest 
caregiving is an individual issue with individual reward, and (2) interfere with the 
rhetorically constructed choice since unpaid family caregivers have willingly chosen this 
role and will be personally rewarded.  
 
Teachable Lessons 
In the dominant definition of complex care, pro-caregiving advocates use 
arguments of association and caring metaphors that emphasize the practices of and 
attitudes that unpaid family caregivers should have about caregiving. Within this 
dominant definition of the situation of care, pro-caregiving advocates comingle caring 
about and caring for. Pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct care as both a 
disposition (caring about) and a practice (caring for). This can be seen through the 
definition of complex care being advanced by pro-caregiving advocates. By rhetorically 
defining the work unpaid family caregivers are doing as inclusive of both the practices 
and attitudes of care, pro-caregiving advocates are implying that these two aspects of care 
go together which has implications for public auditors understanding unpaid family 
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caregiving as shared responsibility and the extent to which they should interfere with the 
rhetorically constructed “choice” of unpaid family caregivers. In their rhetorical 
construction of care, pro-caregiving advocates stress that care is an individual 
responsibility and not a social one.  
Given the findings of this chapter, I suggest that pro-caregiving advocates need to 
illuminate the social benefit(s) for engaging in unpaid family caregiving. In other words, 
pro-caregiving advocates need to develop shared responsibility in the dominant definition 
of care. This could be accomplished by (1) disrupting the obligatory rhetorics in unpaid 
family caregiving that imply caring about leads to caring for; (2) leveraging the evidence 
that suggests unpaid family caregivers are personally suffering from private ills (financial 
and health-related); and (3) emphasizing a shared journey, not a personal journey.  
First, my analysis revealed that pro-caregiving advocates are backgrounding and 
actively masking a lack of choice in unpaid family caregiving, thus reinforcing an 
unstated rhetoric of obligation. Pro-caregiving advocates should look closely at the 
problematic relationship being inferred that caring for directly flows from caring about. 
If pro-caregiving advocates were to disrupt or confront the assumption that caring about 
leads to caring for (e.g., acknowledge that caring about is not a prerequisite for caring 
for), public auditors might also begin to question their own assumptions about who is 
(and is not) expected to care for and might be more inclined to see other possibilities in 
unpaid family caregiving. By doing so, pro-caregiving advocates have an opportunity to 
challenge instead of reinforce the gendered assumption that caregiving is women’s work 
in the private sphere.  
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Second, since choice (or a lack of choice) is assumed within a definition of care, 
pro-caregiving advocates could emphasize that shared responsibility is desperately 
needed by leveraging the evidence that highlights caregiver ills. As chapter three 
indicated, pro-caregiving advocates are adequately developing the private caregiver ills in 
policy statements, albeit not offering adequate solutions to those ills. That type of 
evidence would be useful in highlighting the personal challenges of caregivers that cast 
doubt on whether this involves a free choice or an unstated obligation. Additionally, by 
emphasizing the severity of the ills facing women in particular, pro-caregiving advocates 
have another rhetorical opportunity to call attention to the gendered assumptions in 
caregiving that limit shared responsibility as opposed to expanding it. Furthermore, 
chapter three established that pro-caregiving advocates are also developing persuasive 
public ills. If the dominant definition of care encompassed public challenges in addition 
to personal challenges, public auditors might be more inclined to see unpaid family 
caregiving as a social problem.  
Third, and relatedly, a personal journey is emphasized throughout pro-caregiving 
advocacy efforts that reinforces to public auditors, who may even be sympathetic to 
caregiver concerns, that the problem to be solved is individual and that the benefits to be 
gained from caregiving are individual. I suggest that reworking the journey metaphor to 
encompass a shared journey as opposed to a personal one might demonstrate that the 
journey is shared and the benefits can be shared. One possible way that this might be 
accomplished is replacing the caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor with a 
caregiving-as-pilgrimage metaphor. A shared journey metaphor, like a pilgrimage 
metaphor, might invite a shared understanding of unpaid family caregiving. For example, 
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McGee (2003) argued that AIDS activist Mary Fisher shifted from a family metaphor to a 
pilgrimage metaphor because the family metaphor lessened “the rhetorical possibilities 
for public action” (p. 206). The pilgrimage metaphor, in contrast, signified a “public 
event” where various participants, not just those personally impacted, “join the public 
march” (p. 205). This type of shift in metaphor might benefit pro-caregiving advocates in 
particular because it would encourage a framing of unpaid family caregiving as a 
“public” matter, as opposed to a personal issue.  
There is much rhetorical power that lies in understanding the dominant definition 
of care being advanced by pro-caregiving advocates. Zarefsky (1997) insists, “[T]he 
power to persuade is, in large measure, the power to define” (p. 1). I suggest that pro-
caregiving advocates have great rhetorical opportunities to harness a dominant definition 
of care that might invite more shared responsibility for unpaid family caregiving as well 
as challenge deeply rooted attitudinal barriers that suggest unpaid family caregiving is an 
issue most relevant to women in the private sphere. There are numerous ways that shared 
responsibility can be encouraged within the dominant definition of care, and the 
suggestions above might begin to stimulate this sort of change. However, such changes 
are not sufficient in making unpaid family caregiving a shared responsibility. Regardless, 
there are opportunities to make adjustments to resist and maneuver inherent barriers and, 
as revealed in this chapter, one necessary definitional adjustment is generating more 
shared responsibility within the dominant definition of care.  
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Chapter 5: Family Metaphors in Pro-Caregiving Advocacy Rhetoric and 
Suggestions for Resisting a Rhetoric of Domestic Responsibility 
Historically, most societies have placed the burden of dependency squarely on the 
shoulders of families—and most notably the women within those families. 
(Harrington Meyer, Herd, & Michel, 2000, p. 1)  
 
In the United States in particular, families were, and continue to be, seen as the 
primary source of care, regardless of the consequences for either the care provider 
or care receiver. (Harrington Meyer, Herd, & Michel, 2000, pp. 1-2)  
 
 The previous two chapters are about how pro-caregiving advocacy for policy 
might develop urgency for and solutions to a rhetorically constructed crisis in the 
practices of care and attitudes about care. The current chapter is concerned with pro-
caregiving rhetoric about who does the caregiving and where that caregiving occurs. This 
chapter focuses on metaphors used to convey a rhetorical understanding of “family” in 
unpaid family caregiving. Tracing the family metaphors utilized in pro-caregiving 
advocacy reveals; (1) the discursively constructed place or location of caregiving asserted 
in the family metaphors and (2) the rhetorically constructed characters built into the 
family metaphors, including how pro-caregiving advocates encourage assumptions and 
attitudes that public auditors should adopt toward those characters. These two aspects, 
revealed through two different family metaphors in pro-caregiving advocacy efforts, 
illuminate subtle attitudinal barriers assuming that unpaid family caregiving is most 
appropriate and admired within the private sphere and often when done by biologically-
related female family members, which makes successful public advocacy for shared 
responsibility of unpaid family caregiver issues difficult.   
I argue in this chapter that pro-caregiving advocates comingle public and private 
understandings of family that rhetorically construct two family metaphors: family-as-
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biological and family-as-national. I argue these two family metaphors subtly reveal 
assumptions about the appropriate and long-term place of caregiving and the rhetorically 
constructed unpaid family caregiver as a biological family member. Metaphors are a 
matter of rhetorical invention and can function as arguments that reveal and conceal 
(Jasinski, 2001, p. 486). In addition to revealing the appropriate and long-term place of 
caregiving, I argue that the two family metaphors conceal the gendered aspects that 
subtly keep the burden of responsibility in the domestic home and out of public hands. I 
will show that the family-as-biological metaphor reinforces the domestic home as the 
appropriate place of care and the biological family member as the ideal caregiver. In 
contrast, I will demonstrate how the family-as-national metaphor reveals that pro-
caregiving advocates are deploying a public understanding of family because, in this 
metaphor, unpaid family caregivers are part of a national team; however, I argue that this 
metaphor invokes an attitude of admiration toward unpaid family caregivers that 
encourages public auditors to revere and salute without necessarily assisting unpaid 
family caregivers for the complex and challenging work they do in the home.  
I suggest that together the metaphors interact to deter assuming shared 
responsibility for unpaid family caregiving because the former reinforces the appropriate 
place of caregiving as home and the latter foregrounds public admiration for caregivers, 
while backgrounding shared responsibility because unpaid family caregivers are charged 
with the sole responsibility to maintain the appropriate and long-term place of caregiving. 
Stated more directly, I will show that these family metaphors imply that the domestic 
home offers the ideal space for unpaid family caregiving and, although admirable, the 
characters within that place (biological family members) bear the sole responsibility for 
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maintaining that long-term place. In what follows I will outline the rhetorically 
constructed metaphors of family-as-biological and family-as-national. Each section will 
be divided as follows: metaphor reveals place and metaphor reveals character. These 
sections will be followed with a discussion about how the metaphors, then, conceal a 
rhetoric of domestic responsibility. I will conclude this chapter with suggestions about 
navigating the inherent gender barriers revealed through the analysis of the family 
metaphors in ways that might open up the possibility of more shared responsibility for 
unpaid family caregiving.  
 
Family-as-Biological 
Pro-caregiving advocates deploy a family-as-biological metaphor that conveys a 
private or domestic understanding of unpaid family caregiving. In this domestic 
understanding of family, pro-caregiving advocates locate the appropriate and long-term 
place for unpaid family caregiving in the domestic home. This association does not invite 
shared responsibility for unpaid family caregiving, but rather suggests that unpaid family 
caregiving is an issue where the burden of responsibility is confined to the domestic 
home. This section first demonstrates that the family-as-biological metaphor indicates the 
domestic home as the desired place for care-receivers and domestic home care gets 
associated with long-term care. I then argue that the private associations with family, 
revealed through the family-as-biological metaphor, get woven together to create one 
sensible perspective that reinforces unpaid family caregiving as an issue assumed to be 
private and not social.  
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Home as Appropriate Place for Unpaid Family Caregiving 
In pro-caregiving advocacy, the scene in the family-as-biological metaphor is 
constructed with the domestic home as the appropriate place for unpaid family 
caregiving. According to Burke (1969a), scene is an instructive rhetorical element of 
drama because “the scene is a fit ‘container’ for the act, expressing in fixed properties the 
same quality that the action expresses in terms of development” (p. 3). In pro-caregiving 
advocacy, the scene is the domestic home, and this domestic home gets equipped with the 
element of suitability by emphasizing that this is where care is needed and where care-
receivers desire to be. Additionally, the family-as-biological metaphor reveals that a 
primary character in this scene, the unpaid family caregiver, is an important aspect of 
maintaining the scenic backdrop. In other words, the unpaid family caregiver maintains 
the dominant scene by fulfilling her role as a primary, and long-term, caregiver to the 
care-receiver in the home.  
Pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct caregiving as being needed in the 
home. This idea gets constructed in the advocacy rhetoric by first emphasizing the 
medical care that many unpaid family caregivers are being asked to do in the home. For 
example, Oregon House Bill 3378, or the AARP Care Act, states as part of the provision, 
“The hospital provides an explanation and live instruction of the medical tasks--such as 
medication management, injections, wound care, and transfers—that the family caregiver 
will perform at home” (“AARP: Survey,” 2015, para. 12). In this example, similar to my 
argument in chapter four, pro-caregiving advocates are constructing complex care, 
including medical and domestic tasks, as being practiced by unpaid family caregivers, out 
of necessity, in the home. Complex care, as described by pro-caregiving advocates, is 
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needed in the home. In another example, AARP discusses the CARE Act and indicates 
that “[t]he CARE Act’s focus on involving patients and their designated caregivers in 
discharge planning, and providing training for necessary after-care tasks such as 
managing medication, will help ensure that caregivers can help patients receive the care 
they need at home” (“What Caregiving Experts are Saying,” 2014, para. 5, emphasis 
added). Here, pro-caregiving advocates are suggesting that care-recipients receive 
healthcare at home, even if the care is necessary. In another example, Gray (2015) cites, 
AARP proposed the Care Act because a growing number of in-home caregivers 
for the elderly do more than the traditional responsibilities like bathing or feeding. 
Bartholomew told the House Health Committee earlier this month that a study 
showed that three-quarters of caregivers assist with medication management, 
often administering injections and intravenous drugs. (para. 14) 
In this example, the complex care is necessary and being constructed as needed in the 
home. The complexity of the medical care at home is emphasized with the inclusion of 
words such as “injections and intravenous drugs,” which convey a medical tone that 
previously was not typically associated with home caregiving. The AARP Care Act is 
being proposed to ensure that this complex care remains in the home and that unpaid 
family caregivers are properly trained to give this complex care.  
The rhetorically constructed need for care in the home is also revealed when pro-
caregiving advocates highlight individual caregiver voices. For example, Peggy 
Hernandez, who cares for her husband with Alzheimer’s, was quoted in an AARP press 
release when the CARE Act passed in New York. She asserts,  
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We are not medical professionals, yet we need to perform medical tasks. We need 
to be instructed and we need to be told and shown how to take care of wounds, 
administer medicines in the right dosages, combinations and times, and do all the 
things we need to do to make sure the person we love is well-cared for. (Kriss, 
2015, para. 11) 
In this example, the caregiver directly states that she desires the type of training that the 
pro-caregiving advocates are advocating for because this type of complex care is needed 
in the home. In Gail Gibson Hunt’s blog A Moment of Gratitude for Caregivers, the 
President and CEO of the National Alliance for Caregiving discusses the necessity of 
home care and points out several tools that unpaid family caregivers rely on including 
Medicare Home Health Benefit and the Veterans Administration’s Home-Based Primary 
Care. She suggests that “these are critical tools that help aging and medically complex 
patients live with dignity and independence in their homes” (LillyPad, 2014, para. 4). In 
this example, care-receivers are described as “medically complex patients” and are 
described as independent only if they can stay in the home. Furthermore, there is an 
implication here that if care-receivers, who are dependent on medical care, cannot remain 
in the home, they will lose their individual dignity. By associating medically complex 
care with care-receivers in the home and loss of home care as an assault on their dignity, 
pro-caregiving advocates are tying medical and home together in ways that imply 
complex care is required in the home.  
In addition to rhetorically constructing care as needed in the home, pro-caregiving 
advocates indicate that this appropriate place will bring desired independence to care-
receivers and is made possible through unpaid family caregiver assistance, yet without 
	  	   151 
mention of shared responsibility. In chapter three, I argued that the preferred location of 
care was located in the home by rhetorically constructing the idea in policy statements 
that this is where caregivers desire care-receivers to be. The desirability of home care 
carries past policy statements and into other pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric. For 
example, AARP suggests that care-receivers prefer home care: “It’s [the issue of 
caregiving] one shared by more than 42 million Americans who are helping their older 
loved ones live independently at home, where they want to be” (LeaMond, 2014, para. 3, 
emphasis added). Not only does this statement situate appropriate care in the home, but it 
also suggests that this is the place where care-receivers will be independent and that this 
is where they desire to be. Furthermore, unpaid family caregivers are assisting care-
receivers to be independent and to keep them in a desired place. In this way, the 
rhetorically constructed unpaid family caregiver is created to be the source of care-
receiver independence, which rests on remaining in the home.  
In an article reporting an AARP survey in Oregon, home as the desired place for 
caregiving is reinforced: “A recent AARP survey of Oregon registered voters[,] age 45 
and older, found that 85 percent of Oregonians want to live independently, at home as 
long as possible, as long as they have the help of a family caregiver” (“AARP: Survey,” 
2015, para. 1, emphasis added). In this example, pro-caregiving advocates cite individual 
voices, who likely anticipate being care-receivers in the future, if they are not already, via 
the AARP survey, claiming that home is where they want to be “as long as possible.” By 
adding the statement “as long as possible,” pro-caregiving advocates imply a sense of 
desirability in care-receivers or soon-to-be care-receivers wishing to stay in the home. 
Additionally, care in the home is also framed in this quotation as fostering independence 
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for the care-receivers. Part of the rhetorically constructed desirability, then, is that being 
home will allow care-receivers to feel independent, which is also desired. The 
rhetorically constructed caregiver, on whom the responsibility to provide such 
“independence” rests, is again called into existence in this example by including the 
phrase “as long as they have the help of a family caregiver”—suggesting that unpaid 
family caregivers have a primary role in fostering care-receiver independence by helping 
care-receivers stay in the home.   
In some instances, a “family caregiving” label gets used even when referring to 
non-family caregivers which reinforces that the appropriate place of care is in the home. 
For example, in Care for the Family Caregiver: A Place to Start, the introduction begins 
by defining “family caregiver”:  
The term “family caregiver” applies here to a person who cares for relatives and 
loved ones. The care recipient might be a member of the caregiver’s family of 
origin, or his or her family of choice, such as a special friend, neighbor, support 
group member or life partner. In either instance, the term “family caregiver” in 
this booklet refers to a non-professional who provides unpaid care for others in 
the home. (p. 1) 
In this explicit framing of caregiving as “family caregiving,” the advocates imply that 
whether or not one is a biological relative, one is a “family” caregiver if the care occurs 
“non-professionally” in the home. “Family” and “non-professional” in this passage 
reaffirm that family caregiving should be associated with home and deflects a shared 
understanding of unpaid family caregiving.  
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To conclude this section, intentionally or not, pro-caregiving advocates are 
building a foundation for the family-as-biological metaphor by characterizing home as 
the appropriate place of care. Home as the appropriate place of care is illuminated by (1) 
emphasizing that caregiving is needed in the home and (2) highlighting the desire of care-
receivers to remain in the home. Additionally, caregiving in the domestic home fosters 
independence in care-receivers, and this desired independence begins to reveal the 
rhetorically constructed caregiver role because, only the help of caregivers in the home 
can facilitate care-receiver independence. Caregiver agency in fostering care-receiver 
independence plants a seed about the role of the rhetorically constructed caregiver, and, 
as the next section will argue, the unpaid family caregiver gets further constructed as a 
biological family member responsible for the task of caregiving in the home.  
Rhetorically Constructed Characters as Biological Family Members 
Pro-caregiving advocates frame unpaid family caregiving explicitly as a family 
issue and, in doing so, rhetorically construct the characters in the family-as-biological 
metaphor as biological family members. In addition to explicitly using the label of 
“family,” pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct the idea of biological family 
visually and textually in pro-caregiving advocacy. In such efforts, pro-caregiving 
advocates invite a private understanding of unpaid family caregiving, in which the 
characters in the metaphor are biological family members, and many times are female 
family members.  
Pro-caregiving advocates use “family” as a label to imply interpersonal biological 
family relationships. In the Caregiver Corps proposal, for example, Diane Schuster 
(2013) uses language to suggest that caregiving is a “family” responsibility as opposed to 
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a public responsibility. The first way she accomplishes this is by labeling “unpaid” 
caregivers explicitly as family caregivers, perhaps unintentionally. In the first sentence of 
her proposal she declares the proposal’s purpose as improving the “lives of the nation’s 
60 million family caregivers” and further to “recruit new graduates to serve family 
caregivers” (para. 1, emphasis added). Although Schuster never labels the Caregiving 
Corps as a proposal to only assist unpaid family caregivers, she implies that unpaid 
caregivers are family members. In another example, AARP asserts regarding unpaid 
family caregiving, “This isn’t a Democratic issue. It’s not a Republican issue. It’s a 
family issue” (LeaMond, 2014, para. 3). In this example, AARP reveals that unpaid 
family caregiving is apart from politics and is an issue about family. By distinguishing 
Democrat/Republican from family, AARP suggests that biological family is the 
appropriate context as opposed to a public association of family with government. In both 
of these instances, the framing of unpaid family caregiving issues is explicitly as a family 
issue.  
Biological family connectedness is another way that pro-caregiving advocates 
frame unpaid family caregiving as a biological family issue. Visual and textual discourse 
on pro-caregiving advocacy websites express a shared value of family connectedness. On 
FCA’s website appear diverse pictures of family members depicted in physical contact 
with each other. In one picture on the “Factsheets and Other Publications” section, 
photographed individuals are positioned generationally, adult children standing up in the 
back and an ambiguous elder person (i.e., could be a parent or grandparent) is seated in a 
wheelchair in the front. A second image on the section titled “Caregiver Connect” depicts 
a female caregiver whose face remains unseen to the viewer. This caregiver is shown 
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kissing the head of the person seated in front of her. The caregiver’s arms are wrapped 
around the female care-receiver’s body as if she is comforting her. The female patient’s 
eyes are closed, and her head is positioned in the center of the picture, inviting the viewer 
to focus on her appreciative expression. In a third picture on the section titled “About 
FCA,” another female caregiver is assisting an elder person by helping him take a drink 
from a cup. In each of these pictures, the caregivers and the care-receivers are in close 
contact with each other, and sometimes the caregiver is expressing affection toward the 
care-receiver. The rhetorical choice to include visual images of caregivers and care-
receivers in close proximity and expressing affection is important in that the images 
imply that these are not just hired, paid caregivers, but family members caring for the 
care-receivers.  
The visual images in pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric also imply that the 
biological family member is most likely a female family member. Most images on pro-
caregiving advocacy websites and other promotional materials depict the majority of 
caregivers as female. Male caregivers are not absent, however, they equally represented 
nor do they maintain a primary feature in the visual discourse. Consequently, the visual 
images work to feminize caregiving by relying heavily on images of female caregivers, 
many times in close proximity to and expressing affection toward their care-receiver.  
Pro-caregiving advocates reinforce biological family connectedness by 
constructing nonverbal intimacy between caregiver and care-receiver in the visual 
discourse in pro-caregiving advocacy efforts. The intimacy is conveyed nonverbally 
through touch. In one image on the RCI tip sheet, a young, female caregiver is gently 
embracing a care-recipient from behind. She is standing behind her female care-receiver, 
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her right hand resting comfortably on the right shoulder of the care-recipient with the rest 
of the caregiver’s right arm situated on top of the care-receiver’s right arm. In addition to 
the arm touching, the caregiver and care-receiver’s foreheads are touching each other, 
and they are both smiling. On the front cover of RCI’s tip sheet is what appears to be a 
care-recipient sitting down surrounded by two young female caregivers. They are 
smiling; one caregiver has her arms wrapped around the care-recipient, and the care-
recipient is embracing the upper bicep of this same caregiver. In this image, touching 
between caregivers and care-receivers is close and intimate. In the only image of a male 
caregiver on the RCI tip sheet, the caregiver and care-receiver look as though they are 
laughing together, and the male caregiver has his hand resting on the left shoulder of the 
care-receiver. One of the only images in the tip sheet where the caregiver and care-
receivers are not smiling is a picture associated with the tip: “Let go of situations beyond 
your control” (p. 16). The image is of a caregiver and care-receiver who are embracing 
each other and both appear to have tears in their eyes. The caregiver is closing her eyes 
tightly and embracing the care-receiver around the chest.  
In National Alliance for Caregiving’s brochure, Care for the Family Caregiver: A 
Place to Start, the first two pictures that readers encounter are female caregivers with 
their care-recipients. In both pictures, different female caregivers and care-receivers are 
embracing each other. In the first picture, the pair is laughing, and the caregiver has her 
left cheek resting on the forehead of the care-recipient. The caregiver also has her right 
handing resting comfortably on the right shoulder of the care-recipient. The care-recipient 
appears to be accepting these nonverbal gestures as she has her head tucked into the left 
shoulder of the caregiver and is smiling. In the second image in the brochure, a female 
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caregiver is looking directly at the camera, and her head is resting comfortably on the 
care-recipient who is looking away from the camera, smiling into the sunlight. The 
caregiver’s arms are also wrapped around the neck and shoulders of the care-recipient. 
Through all of these visual examples, pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct 
intimacy because the caregiver and care-recipients are engaged in intimate touching. The 
intimacy is conveyed nonverbally through the tactile channel and the touch occurs on 
heads, hands, and arms, which suggests a close familial relationship. Additionally, 
intimacy is conveyed through posture, expressing a sense of accepted nonverbal 
immediacy, or platonic attraction, between the mostly female caregivers and care-
receivers.  
Pro-caregiving advocates also present images of caregivers and care-receivers of 
the same apparent skin color, which, together with conveying nonverbal intimacy, leads 
the viewer to go to the idea that the caregiver and care-receiver are biologically related.9 
For example, in the RCI tip sheet, viewers are presented with seven images that depict 
the caregiver with the care-receiver. In five of these seven images, the caregivers and the 
care-receivers appear to be of the same skin color, though there is diversity in the 
apparent ethnicities depicted in the brochure including four non-White caregiver and 
care-receiver relationships. In the images where the caregiver and care-receiver pair 
appear to be of the same ethnicity, three of the five are communicating nonverbal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I acknowledge that accepted interpersonal definitions of families indicate that “family 
members may share genetic material” (McCornack, 2013, p. 325, emphasis added), but 
not always.  My inclusion of similar apparent skin color, based on the visual rhetoric 
portrayed by	  pro-caregiving advocates, is included to emphasize that pro-caregiving 
advocates make rhetorical choices to draw the viewer to the idea of a biological familial 
relationship between the caregiver and care-recipient. Additionally, my choice to use 
“apparent ethnicity” is based on the rhetorical choice to display caregivers and care-
receivers of the same skin color, which suggests ethnicity.  	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intimacy with each other, and all five are nonverbally depicted as in close proximity of 
the other, even when not physically touching (e.g., one female caregiver is looking over 
her care-recipient's financial paperwork with a 3rd party financial consultant).  
Some of the pictures are also shot in domestic locations with generational family 
members. For instance, one image in the RCI tip sheet displays what appears to be a 
mother and daughter, sharing the same apparent skin color, and the daughter is leaning in 
on someone who appears to be her mother as the mother is chopping food on a cutting 
board. The images represent condensation symbols, “which designate no clear referent 
but ‘condense’ a host of different meanings and connotations that otherwise might 
diverge” and are “particularly useful in defining an ambiguous situation because people 
can highlight different aspects of the symbol yet reach the same conclusion” (Zarefsky, 
1997, p. 8). Similar skin color, alone, does not convey biological family; however, when 
similar skin color is combined with other compositional aspects of the images, such as 
the representation of different generations in a domestic setting, the images build a set of 
associations that, in the context of contemporary American culture, suggest biological 
family. No one single observation indicates biological relationship, but together the 
images build a set of associations that indicate to the viewer that the participants in the 
images are biological family members. Combined with the nonverbal intimacy, the 
rhetorical choice to make caregivers and care-receivers appear to be of the same ethnicity 
leads the viewer to uncritically label the pair as part of the same biological family. 
In pro-caregiving advocacy, the family-as-biological metaphor gets further 
reinforced through images that suggest traditional biological family ties. For example, 
Operation Family Caregiver, accentuates its website with various pictures. On the “You 
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Serve” page, there is a large picture positioned prior to the content material on the section 
titled “You Serving.” The picture appears to be a biological family, including a husband 
who is dressed in a military camouflage uniform. He is holding a young daughter who 
has her arms wrapped around her father’s neck. The military father is looking down 
admiringly toward an infant baby who is being held by a mother. The mother is looking 
admiringly at her husband. Behind the family stands an older woman who is smiling 
approvingly toward the military father. In this visual image, Operation Family Caregiver 
is rhetorically building family in a traditional, nuclear family sense, which helps to 
construct the family-as-biological metaphor. It is not clear, based on this picture who is 
the caregiver and who is the care-receiver. However, based on the content of this page, 
the reader gets the sense that “You Serve” is referring to a caregiver caring for a returning 
military person. Since the only character in this image who is in military camouflage is 
the father, the reader is encouraged to understand that he is the care-recipient. Regardless, 
the nuclear family image helps to reinforce the family-as-biological metaphor and the 
primary character is a caregiver who is a biological family member, in this image either 
the soldier’s mother or wife. 
The rhetorical construction of marriage and motherhood are also substantial 
aspects of conveying the family-as-biological metaphor in pro-caregiving advocacy 
efforts. The high value of traditional marriage becomes especially apparent when 
observing the visual images on pro-caregiving advocacy websites like Operation Family 
Caregiver. In one image within the “Find Support” section, visitors first encounter an 
image of a woman who appears to be comforting a military serviceman. He is wearing his 
camouflage uniform, and she is reaching out to him and has a hand resting on his 
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shoulder. What is most noticeable is her ring set on the traditional ring finger. It is a gold 
band accompanied by another ring with a diamond. On another section of the website, 
titled “They Served,” Operation Family Caregiver begins the section with a picture of a 
military man’s hands. The auditor knows this is a military person because of the 
camouflage uniform. The fact that this person is married is also revealed because of the 
gold band on the left hand ring finger of the service man, whose face remains unseen to 
viewers. Pro-caregiving advocates also make direct connections to motherhood. For 
example, Stettinius (2014) asserts, “Just as working mothers demanded affordable day 
care 40 years ago, family caregivers need to demand affordable caregiver support” (para. 
23). In this direct comparison, pro-caregiving advocates uncritically present a biological 
family, connecting the family-as-biological metaphor to the trope of motherhood. Both 
marriage and motherhood are used in pro-caregiving advocacy efforts to signify an 
understanding of a biological family framing for unpaid family caregiver issues.  
In sum, this section argues that a biological family framing illuminates family 
connectedness, intimacy between caregiver and care-receiver, and assumptions about 
family relationships and female family caregivers that begin to reveal the family-as-
biological metaphor in pro-caregiving advocacy. In pro-caregiving advocacy efforts, 
advocates frame and, sometimes, explicitly label unpaid family caregiving as a biological 
family issue. In doing so, they reveal a persuasive biological family metaphor that is 
reinforced in the visual images on much pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric. The 
biological-as-family metaphor also reveals, as the next section will argue, unpaid family 
caregivers as the long-term provider for caregiving in the home.  
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Unpaid Family Caregivers as Long-Term Caregivers 
Pro-caregiving advocates build on notions of family connectedness and family 
obligation and further begin to associate unpaid family caregivers with responsibility for 
long-term caregiving. In other words, unpaid family caregivers are constructed as the 
expected answer for long-term care support for care-receivers. The unpaid family 
caregivers’ long-term role is emphasized by Family Caregiver Alliance (FCA) when it 
pushes for “a national caregiving policy agenda [that] would contribute to a more 
coordinated, systematic effort to recognize and strengthen the central role of families 
within the context of long-term care reform” (“National Policy Statement,” 2015, para. 
21, emphasis added). In another example, RCI explains that we need to “recognize the 
invaluable contributions of family caregivers as the true backbone of our nation’s long-
term care system” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 21, emphasis added). In these examples, it is 
apparent that the unpaid family caregivers’ role is in the home and unpaid family 
caregivers are positioned as “the expected answer” to our nation’s long-term care 
challenge.  
The family-as-biological metaphor reveals that the family caregiver’s role is a 
long-term one at home with the care-receiver. For example, RCI explains, “Simply put, 
the enormous and valuable contributions of family caregivers is unquestionably helping 
to sustain our nation’s long-term care system” (“Averting,” 2010, p. 10). FCA suggests, 
“These are tough economic times, but supporting family caregivers is one of the most 
cost-effective long-term care investments we can make” (“National Policy Statement,” 
2015, para. 3). In another example, AARP reports, “Unpaid caregivers provide the 
majority of all long-term care services to older adults and individuals with disabilities. 
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SOFA estimates that without the support of these unpaid caregivers, over 50% of older 
residents would likely be placed in institutional settings, like nursing homes, that are 
funded largely by taxpayers through the Medicaid program” (“Report,” 2013, p. 3). The 
strong associations between unpaid family caregiving and long-term care reinforce the 
idea that unpaid family caregiving is the only cost-effective long-term care alternative 
and is situated in the home with biological family members.  
As I argued in chapter three, pro-caregiving advocates do their best to present 
solutions that would maintain the location of care in the home. The emphasis on home 
care is also present outside the policy statements and is further reinforced as the ideal 
long-term answer for unpaid family caregiving issues. For example, Stettinius (2014) 
suggests that “[a]ccording to studies, caregivers report needing 3 types of free or 
affordable community support: respite services, counseling about available resources and 
services, and help coordinating care” (para. 12). In this example, the three types of 
community support are meant to maintain the care-recipient at home implying that it is 
the appropriate and viable long-term scene. Additionally, the way these suggestions are 
framed indicates that family caregivers themselves wish to have services to help maintain 
their care-receiver within the home.  
Many times, family caregiving is referred to as the main support system for our 
nation’s long-term care system. For example, FCA states, “Family caregiving is the 
backbone of the United States’ long term care system as well as the core of what sustains 
frail elders and adults with disabilities” (“Caregiving: Introduction,” 2014, p. 2). “Family 
caregivers,” according to Jon Bartholomew of AARP Oregon Director for Advocacy, 
“are the backbone of providing long-term supports and services in Oregon” (“AARP: 
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Survey,” 2015, para. 3). In both of these examples, unpaid family caregivers are 
unquestionably associated with long-term caregiving, which implies home is the expected 
long-term scene for supporting care recipients and biological family members are 
expected to maintain that scene.  
In revealing the home as scene and biological family members as characters, pro-
caregiving advocates conceal gender--that the family, and most likely women in the 
family, are charged with the responsibility to maintain the home scene. In the family-as-
biological metaphor, the appropriate place for unpaid family caregiving is revealed to be 
intimate, mutually desired, and long-term. Within each of these associations, the family-
as-biological metaphor reinforces home as the appropriate scene within which unpaid 
family caregiving occurs. In this metaphor, biological family members are charged with 
the long-term burden of maintaining this idyllic place. It is not just that “family” 
terminology is used in pro-caregiving advocacy but more so that family gets rhetorically 
constructed in certain ways that emphasize unpaid family caregiving as a private, 
biological family issue, as opposed to a social one. The associations between unpaid 
family caregiving and home reaffirm that the burden, or responsibility, of caregiving 
belongs in the home with women. The family-as-biological metaphor reveals a domestic 
scene that is intimate, mutually desired by caregivers, care-receivers, and the public, as 
well as long-term (not to mention cost-advantageous to society). The next section will 
argue that pro-caregiving advocates also rhetorically construct a public family metaphor 
simultaneously to advance a social understanding of unpaid family caregiving issues. 
However, as my analysis will demonstrate, while the family-as-national metaphor alters 
the framing of unpaid family caregiver issues, the appropriate place for unpaid family 
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caregiving does not change nor do the characters charged with maintaining the home as 
appropriate caregiving place.   
 
Family-as-National Metaphor  
Pro-caregiving advocates also employ a family-as-national metaphor in their 
advocacy efforts to garner a limited version of shared responsibility for unpaid family 
caregiver issues. Public understandings of unpaid family caregiving reveal the family-as-
national metaphor. In the family-as-national metaphor, pro-caregiving advocates invite a 
framing of unpaid family caregiving issues as caregivers being part of a larger team. 
Sometimes unpaid family caregivers are part of a healthcare team and other times they 
are part of a military team. Although the family-as-national metaphor reveals pro-
caregiving advocacy attempts to encourage assistance for unpaid family caregivers as a 
collective effort, the rhetorically constructed characters in this family metaphor are still 
biological family members charged with the primary burden to maintain the appropriate 
scene in the long-term. In fact, the primary aspect of the metaphor used in the family-as-
national metaphor is to “serve.” For example, Operation Family Caregiver organizes its 
main website within the broader categories of “They Served”—referring to service 
people serving the country, “You Serve”—referring to family members serving military 
personnel who return from active duty, and “We Serve”—referring to the organization 
itself supporting families during the transition from active duty to home care. Although 
“serve” is used in different contexts, the notion of service in this example invokes a 
feeling of obligation to serve the family in the home. Additionally, the public auditor role 
in the family-as-national metaphor is to honor these unsung heroes, which I argue does 
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not invite shared action or responsibility, because, although admiration reveals a positive 
attitude toward unpaid family caregiving, this admiration suggests that public auditors are 
to endorse unpaid family caregivers’ long-term role in the home as opposed to 
envisioning other possible scenes of care. In other words, I argue that although the 
metaphor changes to embrace a public understanding of family, the appropriate scene of 
and responsibility for providing caregiving in the domestic home remains unchanged; the 
only aspect in the metaphor that changes is the encouraged honorific attitude toward the 
work being done by unpaid family caregivers and the implication that the appropriate 
place or scene needs to be maintained in the long-term by unpaid family caregivers. The 
family-as-national metaphor might change how public auditors are encouraged to feel 
about unpaid family caregivers, but it does not change the dominant scene or the 
responsibility distribution. The resulting inherent gender barrier is that unpaid family 
caregiving is rendered an issue relevant to the private sphere, and the only role for the 
public is to admire caregiving but keep the issue relegated to the home.  
Family-as-National Metaphor Reveals Domestic Home as Place of Caregiving 
Pro-caregiving advocates use the family-as-national metaphor to again locate the 
appropriate place for caregiving as the home. The appropriate location does not change 
even as the understanding of unpaid family caregivers as part of a team has been picked 
up in advocacy frames such as personal testimonies in support of pro-caregiving 
legislation. For example, Janet Martines, “a Portland resident caring for her 93-year-old 
mother, said in a testimony Monday on Oregon House Bill 3378…As someone who has 
seen my fair share of caregiving for family, this legislation is a welcome proposal. It goes 
without saying that treating family caregivers as part of the care team is something all 
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hospitals should be doing” (“AARP: Survey,” 2015, para. 7, emphasis added). Gail 
Gibson Hunt suggests that policymakers understand caregivers as part of a healthcare 
team. Part of this is to “develop better technologies to support patient health at home” 
(Lillypad, 2014, para. 7, emphasis added). In this example, family members are part of a 
healthcare team, but the location of care is still in the home. Hunt goes on to say, 
“Teaching them [caregivers] how to use the tools and communicate with clinicians will 
be key to making telehealth programs more successful” (Lillypad, 2014, para. 7). In this 
example, caregivers are intricately part of the success of the healthcare team, yet their 
role is to be equipped with the tools to remotely maintain primary care in the home. In 
each of these examples, pro-caregiving advocates are attempting to create a framing of 
family that is collective and not biological. However, I argue that this team framing of 
family only reinforces as appropriate, albeit difficult, that unpaid family caregiving take 
place in the home. In other words, when unpaid family caregivers are constructed as part 
of a healthcare team, it is because pro-caregiving advocates are asserting that complex 
care is needed in the home and needs to be retained in the home. In this way, pro-
caregiving advocates are advancing an understanding that unpaid family caregivers are 
the primary characters needed to maintain caregiving in the home, even if part of a larger 
team.  
In pro-caregiving advocacy efforts, many pro-caregiving advocates deploy a 
military metaphor to describe the activities of family caregivers. These activities of 
family caregivers locate the scene, or place, within the family-as-national metaphor. This 
family-as-national metaphor is explicitly used in RCI’s Operation Family Caregiver, a 
program within RCI that “coaches the families of newly returning service members and 
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veterans to manage the difficulties they face when they come home” (“About Us,” para. 
1). First, beginning the program name with term “operation” implies military action. 
Additionally, the difficulties caregivers face are explicitly labeled as occurring in the 
home. On the website, the program promotes the phrase, “they served, you serve, we 
serve.” By doing so, Operation Family Caregiver directly frames caregivers and care-
receivers as service people, which confirms the military framing. Additionally, with the 
inclusion of “We Serve,” RCI is suggesting that their organizational support of both 
parties is an act of service to our nation. A military framing is sometimes explicitly used 
to associate caregiving with the family. For example, Operation Family Caregiver asserts, 
“The strength of our military is legendary, but at the heart of our military is a strong 
family structure” (“We Serve,” 2014, para. 1). Here, although a military framing is 
utilized, a “strong family structure” invites an association with the home. In this sense, 
the family-as-national metaphor is beginning to confirm the appropriate place for unpaid 
family caregiving is the same as the family-as-biological metaphor—the domestic home.  
Family Caregivers as Members of a Larger Team 
The family-as-national metaphor rhetorically constructs family caregivers as 
members of a larger team but still encourages public auditors to situate this metaphor 
within a domestic family scene. One way this gets accomplished is by associating unpaid 
family caregivers with service people. Pro-caregiving advocates use the language of 
“serve” and “service” when discussing the work being done by unpaid family caregivers. 
For example, The National Alliance for Caregiving explains, “More than 30% of U.S. 
households include at least one person who has served as an unpaid family caregiver 
within the last year” (“The National Alliance for Caregiving Supports the CARE ACT,” 
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n.d., para. 3, emphasis added). And in the National Alliance for Caregiving Care for the 
Family Caregiver brochure, the organization begins with, “This booklet serves family 
caregivers” (EmblemHealth, 2010, p. 1, emphasis added). In this example, although the 
context suggests the booklet serves family caregivers, using the terminology of “served” 
invites an association of unpaid family caregivers with service. Amy Ziettlow (2014), 
writer for Family Studies, The Blog of the Institute for Family Studies, suggests, “On 
average, caregivers serve 20.4 hours per week, thus many must stop working or shift to 
part-time work, producing long-term effects on their Social Security payments and 
lifetime wage earnings, personal savings, professional advancement and earning 
potential” (para. 3). Ryan (2015) points to AARP’s motto when she describes the service 
of a family caregiver, “To serve, not to be served” (para. 8). “To serve” invites 
associations with service people serving in a military capacity. In another example, 
Ziettlow (2014) begins her remarks with “having served for many years as a hospice 
chaplain and COO, I have seen first hand the power of home-based, family-centered 
caregiving” (para. 1). Although this example points to the author’s service in a public 
setting, in this instance, just as the other examples in this paragraph, “serving” implies 
service to the care-receiver. The Ziettlow example brings together a specific framing of 
the family-as-national metaphor within the home indicating that “home-based” and 
“family-centered” caregiving construct the appropriate scene and that the unpaid family 
caregiver role within that scene is to serve a care-receiver.  
Pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct the family-as-national metaphor 
by naming unpaid family caregivers as part of a healthcare team. For example, AARP 
constructs family caregivers as part of a healthcare team when they state, “Whether by 
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regulation or legislation, the Alliance supports the action to acknowledge and include 
family caregivers as trusted members of the healthcare team” (“CARE Act,” 2014, para. 
13). The National Alliance for Caregiving also frames family caregivers as part of a 
healthcare team. For instance, in their statement of support for the CARE Act, The 
National Alliance for Caregiving “identifies the family caregiver as an essential member 
of the healthcare team” because  
including the family caregiver in healthcare decisions is an important step towards 
recognizing the contribution of the more than 65 million family caregivers who 
support patients managing chronic disease, Alzheimer’s and dementia, war-
related injuries (such as PTSD and Traumatic Brian Injury), and disabilities. 
(“The National Alliance for Caregiving Supports the CARE ACT,” n.d., para. 1) 
In this example, not only does the National Alliance for Caregiving rhetorically construct 
family caregivers as part of a healthcare team, but they also construct care-receivers as 
“patients,” which works to solidify this healthcare team association. Gail Gibson Hunt 
asserts “several high-impact solutions for policy makers to consider” in arguing for 
policy support for unpaid family caregivers. One of those solutions to consider is to 
“include family caregivers as part of the healthcare team” (Lillypad, 2014, para. 7). The 
attempts to associate unpaid family caregivers within this health context demonstrates 
one possible public understanding of family. However, I argue that the association does 
not alter the dominant scene of the home or substantially increase shared public 
responsibility, although it adds legitimacy to the character role of unpaid family 
caregiver. In other words, the healthcare team association asks public auditors to 
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understand the responsibility of unpaid family caregivers as inclusive of important 
medical-related tasks in the home.  
Pro-caregiving advocates suggest that we should be grateful for caregivers who 
keep healthcare costs down, which can only happen if the basic caregiving system does 
not fundamentally change. For instance, Gail Gibson Hunt ends her LillyPad blog post 
with, “Let’s show our thanks by recognizing both the contributions that caregivers make 
to our society and how these contributions can enable better healthcare at lower costs” 
(LillyPad, 2014, para. 8). In this example, the “contribution” that unpaid family 
caregivers make in their role in the healthcare team is to keep caregiving in the home so 
that healthcare costs are lower.  
In the family-as-national metaphor pro-caregiving advocates frame unpaid family 
caregivers as heroes which invites public auditors to admire the work they do in the 
home. Sometimes, Operation Family Caregiver combines both military and biological 
family frames, as demonstrated in the previous section describing the family images 
featuring a military person. Pro-caregiving advocates also use other associations to imply 
a military framing. The military metaphor is used when pro-caregiving advocates 
describe what caregivers do everyday. For example, Operation Family Caregiver 
suggests, “Caring family members perform acts of heroism everyday” (“You Serve,” 
2014, para. 1). In this example, associating caregivers with “heroism” provides a military 
frame for understanding the work that caregivers of returning military personnel and 
veterans are doing. Heroism carries through as a theme within the Operation Family 
Caregiver website. In the section under “we serve” Operation Family Caregiver asserts, 
“Operation Family Caregiver helps create strong and healthy families by supporting the 
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unsung heroes behind our heroes; the loving families and friends that care for them when 
they come home” (“We Serve,” 2014, para. 1). In each of these examples, the rhetorically 
constructed characters in the family-as-national metaphor are “heroes.” The choice to 
associate unpaid family caregivers with heroism suggests that public auditors should 
salute unpaid family caregivers for their heroic acts.  
Caregivers-as-heroes on behalf of the community gets deployed frequently in pro-
caregiving advocacy and reveals the rhetorically constructed characters within the family-
as-national metaphor. The association to the unsung hero is also conveyed when 
advocates frame aspects of the caregiving work as difficult and thankless responsibilities. 
For example, Stettinius (2014), a blogger for Care Givers, asserts, “The day-to-day 
responsibilities of family caregivers often remain invisible (even to other family members 
and coworkers), and we don’t realize, as a community, how much family caregivers are 
suffering” (para. 7). In this example, Stettinius points out the suffering of unpaid family 
caregivers because of the day-to-day responsibilities. That “we don’t realize” their efforts 
implies unpaid family caregivers are unsung heroes doing a thankless job. Such a framing 
suggests that pro-caregiving advocates are framing collective understandings of family as 
one that is centered on service, and, in doing so, invites public auditors to salute the work 
they do in the home.  
 In all of these examples where unpaid family caregiving gets taken up under a 
military frame, pro-caregiving advocates are asking public auditors to honor and admire 
unpaid family caregivers as heroes for their service within the home. In the family-as-
national metaphor, the rhetorically constructed characters are heroic, and the appropriate 
and long-term place is still in a domestic home. I argue that the military framing in 
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particular invokes admiration for unpaid family caregivers in maintaining that appropriate 
place. Additionally, the healthcare framing reminds public auditors of the complex work 
being done by unpaid family caregivers. By doing so, public auditors are encouraged to 
interpret the complex healthcare and domestic care being done in the home as community 
service, and, paired with the military framing, are asked to simply admire the difficult 
work being done by unpaid family caregivers without altering it.  
 
Concealing a Rhetoric of Domestic Responsibility 
 Pro-caregiving advocates are constructing two primary metaphors in their 
advocacy efforts. The family-as-biological metaphor reinforces the domestic aspects of 
unpaid family caregiving because of the emphasis on home as the location that contains 
familial intimacy, desirability, and long-term care by characters in the home. The public 
metaphor, family-as-national, does not alter the scene (the biological family home), but 
asks public auditors to recognize caregivers as part of a collective team that does 
challenging medical work in the home and, as such, deserves our admiration but without 
further shared accommodation. I argue that both metaphors reveal concern for unpaid 
family caregivers but conceal the gendered aspects of the labor—that caregiving is a 
woman’s responsibility in the home. The family-as-national metaphor asks public 
auditors to honor unpaid family caregivers for the hard and sacrificing work they do to 
maintain the intimate, desired, and needed scene. However, this metaphor does not ask 
public auditors to share the responsibilities and actively works against changing the scene 
or primary characters involved.  
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I argue that pro-caregiving advocates are invoking admiration for unpaid family 
caregivers through an implied separateness in public and private metaphors of caregiving. 
In these public and private understandings of caregiving, family caregiving is rhetorically 
constructed as long-term care in the home whereas a public understanding of caregiving 
reinforces the idea that public auditors should admire caregivers for maintaining this 
work in the home but not try to change the situation substantially. As such, admiration is 
invoked for all of the difficult work that unpaid family caregivers are doing in the home. 
Although admiration is a positive attitude, this implied separateness between public and 
private caregiving ultimately reaffirms the gendered associations with caregiving that 
suggest caregiving occurs in the home, and biological female family members have the 
sole responsibility for maintaining that burden and keeping the burden out of the public 
hands. In advancing a family-as-national metaphor, pro-caregiving advocates imply that 
unpaid family caregivers are charged with the responsibility to maintain the long-term 
family space and further ask us to honor them for the work they do in maintaining that 
place and keeping down healthcare costs. Asking public auditors to honor unpaid family 
caregivers invites admiration but does not encourage shared action.  
Jasinski (2001) asserts about representational acts, “whatever the specific medium 
that is employed (words, visual images, or a combination of both), [will] reveal as well as 
conceal” (p. 486). I argue that the family-as-biological metaphor reveals the dominant 
scene as the domestic home and the family-as-national metaphor reveals that public 
auditors should admire and see caregivers as heroic. These metaphors are compatible 
because they both conceal the gendered aspects that reinforce a rhetoric of domestic 
responsibility charged to biological female family members. Doing so naturalizes 
	  	   174 
separateness between public and private and contributes to the feminization of care. 
Furthermore, the implicit separateness makes public advocacy for substantial change on 
this issue that is assumed to be private difficult.   
 
Teachable Lessons 
I argue that pro-caregiving advocates are limiting the circumference of shared 
understanding of and responsibility for unpaid family caregiving issues by building a 
scene of the caregiver and care-receiver coexisting long-term in the home. Not only does 
this limit the scene, but it also limits understandings of where unpaid family caregiving 
should be occurring (the home) and who should be responsible (female family members), 
thereby restricting opportunities for discussing the gendered aspects of this discourse. In 
other words, by implying the appropriate and long-term place for unpaid family 
caregiving is in the home, unpaid family caregiving, as a subject, continues to be 
uncritically assumed to be private and women’s work. Similarly, pro-caregiving 
advocates are implicating unpaid female family caregivers as bearing the primary burden 
of maintaining the dependency relationships (and even heroic because they are bearing 
the sole burden of caregiving in the home) to keep care-receivers “independent” and 
living with individual “dignity”, which limits opportunities for non-caregivers to 
visualize their more substantial roles or responsibilities in the drama. Promisingly, 
though, Burke (1966) suggests that “the ‘same’ act can be defined ‘differently,’ 
depending upon the circumference’ of the scene or overall situation in terms of which we 
choose to locate it” (pp. 359-360). Stated another way, critics and practitioners have 
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opportunities to change the ways in which we define the circumference around the family 
metaphors in pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric.  
I suggest a change in the scope of the scene in the family metaphors. The 
controlling element of scene reveals an attitudinal barrier that this discourse is gendered 
and relegated as a private sphere issue and further that this is the desired place for care 
work, caregivers, and even care-receivers. The gendered aspect of the discourse, though 
difficult to resolve, is still a crucial piece of the puzzle that needs to be addressed. By 
talking about unpaid family caregiving in ways that assume the home is the appropriate 
and long-term scene only further perpetuates unpaid family caregiving as a “woman’s 
problem.” Although this attitudinal barrier is difficult to change, I believe that one way to 
resist this inherent barrier is to disrupt the scene that maintains gendered assumptions 
about where caregiving occurs and who does that care.  
I suggest one way to resist the attitudinal barrier that caregiving should happen in 
the home is to build a wider, more encompassing scene for unpaid family caregiving. I 
suggest that other acceptable care situations, outside of the home, would help pro-
caregiving advocates advance caregiving as a social responsibility. Doing so would 
benefit unpaid family caregivers, and especially female family caregivers, because they 
would not carry the only burden of responsibility for caring for a loved one in the home.  
Disrupting the gendered assumptions could also be accomplished by altering the 
rhetorically constructed characters within the scene. I argue the scene needs to be 
populated with people who are caregivers now, soon-to-be caregivers, as well as current 
and future care-receivers. The characters, then, will be more encompassing, which would 
invite a drama where unpaid family caregiving is discussed more expansively, beyond the 
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limiting scope of the private. In other words, most of the population will, at some point in 
a lifetime, either be a caregiver or will need care. Changing the characters who populate 
the scene would invite this larger scene so that the distance between those who are 
dependent on care now and who will be dependent on care in the future becomes thinner. 
There are limited examples of pro-caregiving advocacy efforts that attempt to integrate 
future care-recipient voices into unpaid family caregiving discussions; however, most of 
those instances are utilized to reinforce the idea that the home is the desired “future” 
place for these future care-recipients. Pro-caregiving advocates should make future 
caregivers and future care-receivers a regular feature in their change rhetoric without 
falling prey to privileging the domestic home as the preferred scene of care. If we 
understand ourselves as part of the drama now in various present and future capacities, 
we may also see that unpaid family caregiving is not just a matter of the private and an 
issue relevant to biological female family members, but has social potentialities.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
 The overarching goal of this dissertation was to contribute to a larger rhetorical 
issue of public advocacy of an issue that is assumed to be private and is relevant for both 
scholars of applied rhetoric and practitioners of public advocacy. This dissertation 
revealed that public advocacy of unpaid family caregiving is troubling to pro-caregiving 
advocates and offered rhetorical lessons that might promote more positive movement in 
arguments that are created when public advocates must negotiate an issue that is 
commonly associated with the private sphere. Through these case studies, I illuminated 
several inherent barriers to shared responsibility of and greater responsibility for unpaid 
family caregiving issues being inadvertently perpetuated in pro-caregiving advocacy 
rhetoric. The three case studies that focused on definitions of crisis and care as well as on 
metaphors about family revealed the subtle ways in which unpaid family caregiving gets 
uncritically assumed to be privatized to the detriment of the advocacy goals. 
Additionally, each case study offered solutions for understanding the ways in which 
conversations like these can resist and sometimes maneuver inherent barriers toward 
more productive ends.  
I argued that pro-caregiving advocates, or rhetors who have set as an instrumental 
goal energizing public policy change for unpaid family caregiving, are themselves 
uncritically encouraging a rhetorical separation between public and private that continues 
to limit shared responsibility for unpaid family caregiving issues. In the introduction, I 
suggested that how we talk about caregiving matters; through case studies I have 
demonstrated that it is critical in pro-caregiving advocacy to explore the ways that “care” 
and “crisis” are defined, as well as how “family” is metaphorically framed, in negotiating 
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the difficult terrain of public advocacy of an issue assumed to be private. At the 
conclusion of this dissertation, I believe that pro-caregiving advocates are attempting to 
advance a shared understanding of unpaid family caregiving issues; however, the ways in 
which they are talking about their subject perpetuate barriers to systemic change for an 
issue that deserves social attention and participation by all to resolve the many ills being 
experienced, both socially and individually.   
My goal was to analyze pro-caregiving advocacy arguments that are intended to 
help make unpaid family caregiving issues a shared responsibility. The analysis chapters 
deconstructed the ways that common definitions of the situation of crisis are made 
rhetorically present in pro-caregiving advocacy policy statements, how the dominant 
definition of care revealed the practices of and attitudes about caregiving and implied a 
lack of unpaid family caregiver agency, and the ways in which family metaphors revealed 
the appropriate place of family caregiving and assumptions about and attitudes toward 
unpaid family caregivers. Each of my analysis chapters indicates that pro-caregiving 
advocates are comingling public and private aspects of unpaid family caregiving, 
attempting to make this issue shared as opposed to private. My analysis, however, reveals 
that their ways of comingling public and private does not always promote, and the 
particular ways it is done may rhetorically subvert, shared responsibility for unpaid 
family caregiver issues. This chapter will first review the key arguments of each analysis 
chapter and then offer a discussion about the type and nature of such arguments. 
Following this, I will discuss the usefulness and practical takeaways in rhetorical 
leadership and advocacy for pro-caregiving advocates in particular and citizen advocates 
in general. I will then discuss considerations for scholarship on care theory. I conclude 
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the chapter with an epilogue that reveals lessons I learned during the dissertation process 
and suggestions for moving forward by exploring some larger questions.   
 
Key Arguments 
My first research question asked: How might the ways pro-caregiving advocates 
talk about their subject contribute to the lack of effective public action, even if they 
produce a plethora of uncontested discourse? In chapter three I argued that pro-caregiving 
advocates are limiting shared responsibility by not offering concrete steps for public 
auditors to fully actualize their role as participants in supporting unpaid family 
caregiving. I also argued that pro-caregiving advocates offer only a partial solution to the 
persuasive ills. For example, pro-caregiving advocates effectively advance several 
financial and health-related private ills; however, the proposed solutions do not directly 
address how increased caregiver training will resolve the financial and health-related ills 
that are negatively impacting many unpaid family caregivers. In chapter four I argued 
that with the dominant definition of “complex” care, pro-caregiving advocates were 
limiting shared responsibility by suggesting that caring about a care-receiver will directly 
lead a family member into caring for that care-receiver. This problematic relationship 
creates an obligatory assumption in unpaid family caregiving that dissuades public 
auditors from accepting unpaid family caregiving as a social issue for which they share 
responsibility. Furthermore, the caregiving-as-personal-journey metaphor emphasizes 
individual challenges and implies that individuals are the ones who need to manage these 
challenges. Combined with a caregiving-as-gift metaphor that suggests unpaid family 
caregivers will be rewarded for their caregiving, these two metaphors create a sensible 
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perspective that public auditors should not intervene because it appears that unpaid 
family caregivers have already chosen this journey and will be individually rewarded for 
their participation in that journey. Finally, in chapter five I argued that the family-as-
biological and family-as-national metaphors reveal consistent assumptions and attitudes 
about the place of caregiving and the admirable family caregiver charged with the 
responsibility to maintain the dependency relationship in the home. I argue that each of 
these chapters reveal the subtlety of the attitudinal and philosophical barriers that are 
deeply embedded even in pro-caregiving change rhetoric. In other words, even as pro-
caregiving advocates attempt to energize shared responsibility, the ways in which crisis, 
care, and family are integrated into the advocacy rhetoric limit, and sometimes, 
discourage shared possibilities.   
 My second research question asked: What alternative rhetorical strategies might 
better serve pro-caregiving advocate goals in increasing public concern about and shared 
responsibility for policy action on unpaid caregiver challenges? Promisingly, I found that 
pro-caregiving advocates do not just have to abandon the dominant frames utilized in 
family metaphors and definitions of crisis and care. In fact, those frames are effective in 
serving some goals, needs, and solutions even if that frame is not itself sufficient to 
achieve the goal (e.g., fomenting a crisis). Making a crisis present, for example, is 
effective in pro-caregiving advocacy to garner a greater sense of social concern and 
direction for unpaid family caregiver issues. Chapter three’s argument, then, suggests 
there are reasons to revise or redeploy the frames to strengthen the goals, even if the goal 
is not necessary for public policy change such as cultivating a sense of crisis. In chapter 
three I argued that pro-caregiving advocates are effectively making both private and 
	  	   181 
public ills present and urgent in their definition of the situation of crisis though the 
proposed solutions do not fully address the persuasive ills being advanced in the policy 
statements. I suggested that pro-caregiving advocates create appropriate action steps 
within their policy statements, in particular, as well as directly address how the proposed 
solutions will work to resolve all of the specified ills, not just the ills for the care-
recipient and the public. There were limited examples that demonstrated pro-caregiving 
efforts to resolve a caregiver ill (e.g., FCA’s “working credits” in the social security 
system would address part of the financial hardships facing unpaid family caregivers); 
however, such solutions were sparse and, I argue, should become a dominant feature in 
policy statements since unpaid family caregivers are directly and immediately impacted 
by many of the ills. As currently set up, pro-caregiving advocates are delaying a crisis for 
taxpayers, businesses, and care-recipients but at the expense of and to the detriment of the 
caregiver’s immediate situation.  
In chapter four I suggested that pro-caregiving advocates seek ways to develop 
shared responsibility in the dominant definition of care, because this case study revealed 
that shared responsibility was most blatantly absent from pro-caregiving advocates’ 
dominant definition of care. In chapter five I suggested that pro-caregiving advocates 
expand the scene beyond the confines of the domestic home so that a rhetoric of shared 
responsibility for care would better encompass non-caregivers and non-care-receivers in 
addition to family members charged with the direct responsibility of caring for their 
loved ones. These key arguments serve as a reminder of the subtle nuances present 
among advocacy arguments and the issues that advocates champion. As the next section 
will argue, the type and nature of pro-caregiving advocacy arguments have reoccurred in 
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different forms and will likely reoccur, justifying continued rhetorical attention to public 
advocates who are attempting to make an issue that is traditionally associated with the 
private matter socially.   
 
When Has this Happened Before? 
The case of pro-caregiving advocacy represents a larger rhetorical issue of public 
advocates attempting to make an issue assumed to be private public. This particular kind 
of advocacy scenario is not isolated or limited to pro-caregiving advocacy. Close textual 
analysis has the capacity to capture the ways in which arguments are being deployed and 
has potential to reveal the dominant attitudes and values that motivate such arguments 
and, as such, offers a useful methodology to interrogate public arguments about issues 
assumed to be private.  
There are numerous public arguments, contemporary and historical, that reveal 
the contentious terrain where public and private interests are negotiated and where close 
textual analysis is useful. Such arguments have occurred during important moments in 
U.S. history. For instance, the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 represents a 
moment when those who advocated for shared responsibility for what were previously 
considered to be private matters, and were ultimately successful. The passage of this 
groundbreaking law was “enacted in the throes of the Great Depression” (“The Social 
Security Act,” n.d., para. 1) during a time when “[p]revailing American attitudes toward 
poverty relief were usually dubious, and governmental involvement was slight” (para. 2). 
The successful passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 reveals “a sharp departure 
from prior American tradition” that “had customarily stressed ‘pulling oneself up by the 
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bootstraps’ and voluntarism to alleviate social ills” (para. 6). It has been argued that 
“several significant social trends,” (para. 4) including the industrial revolution, “a 
population shift from the countryside to cities,” and “longer life expectancy” (para. 7), 
created an environment where arguments for shared social responsibility and government 
involvement in private affairs began to become more acceptable. Critics and advocates 
should be attuned to situational conditions that might be capitalized on for social change 
toward greater shared responsibility. 
Goodnight (1982) offers another example where homelessness functioned as an 
issue that, borrowing his language, shifted spheres due to the progressive movement. “In 
19th Century America,” explains Goodnight (1982), “the poor were generally considered 
to be poor because of personal character flaws” and “arguments made to the poor about 
the poor were grounded in the private sphere” (p. 221). However, “[w]ith the advent of 
the Progressive movement,…the grounding of arguments about poverty gradually shifted 
from the private to the public sphere” because of “recognition that the environment 
shaped people and the environment could be altered” (p. 221). As such, argues Goodnight 
(1982), “Progressives gradually transformed the issue of poverty to a public concern, one 
that was a shared rather than an individual responsibility” (p. 221). These two examples 
offer instances in different contexts that demonstrate how shared responsibility was 
established around issues previously viewed as personal responsibilities that were 
rhetorically moved into the public consciousness and became matters for shared 
responsibility and action.  
 I offer these two examples to point out that arguments revolving around issues of 
public and private where advocates seek shared responsibility for currently issues that are 
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assumed to be private are not new and will likely reoccur in different forms. These other 
case studies, similar to the case of unpaid family caregiving, illustrate that public/private 
boundaries and assumptions are not given, and thus are contestable and potentially 
changeable. Additionally, ideas do not change on their own, but rhetoric might play an 
indispensible part in defending and re-shaping what is treated as public or private. As 
long as a rhetorical boundary between public and private continues to be relevant in 
advocacy situations, there will be a need to critically analyze such arguments as well as 
coach individuals who are making such arguments on how to be more effective.  
There is also evidence to suggest that pro-caregiving arguments will not only 
continue to be a part of the advocacy landscape but will become more difficult because of 
the appearance that there has already been a public response and activity. For example, 
throughout this research process I have been collecting caregiving advocacy articles with 
a Google alert titled “Caregiving Advocacy” in addition to the articles generated from my 
earlier Google alerts of “caregiving crisis” and “caregiver crisis.” The articles generated 
from this Google alert indicate that caregiving advocacy is a movement with positive 
momentum in pro-caregiving advocacy. In other words, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that unpaid family caregiving issues are regularly being discussed and debated. 
However, as indicated to me by a representative at National Alliance for Caregiving, 
although many individuals are talking about unpaid family caregiver issues, creating state 
task forces, and proposing acts, there has not been adequate movement on the federal 
level in policy support for unpaid family caregiving issues. As such, it seemed to me as I 
was collecting texts to analyze that there existed positive momentum behind the push for 
policy change for unpaid family caregivers; however, the push, at least at the conclusion 
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of this dissertation, has not equated to overarching or effective public policy urgency. 
Such evidence not only qualifies that policy change is not happening for unpaid family 
caregiving issues, but that advocacy is going to become more difficult due to the 
appearance of a response that is already being addressed in the forms of task forces and 
acts that promise to give attention to unpaid family caregiver issues. This illusion of a 
response is contributing to rhetorical complications for pro-caregiving advocates and 
justifies more rhetorical attention for these types of arguments.  
Cultivating shared responsibility for traditionally private matters, like unpaid 
family caregiving, is an issue that is worthy of scholarly exploration, especially from a 
rhetorical perspective. Since such arguments and situations will likely reoccur in different 
forms, rhetorical analyses, like the one offered in this dissertation, are important because 
other social advocates can learn from these arguments. I do not mean to suggest that there 
is one answer to effective public advocacy when championing issues that are assumed to 
be private. However, as scholars and practitioners of public advocacy, we can learn from 
previous arguments, successes or failures, and continue to use rhetorical tools for 
inventional purposes in hopes that the contextual factors, material needs, and rhetorical 
arguments intersect in a way that might flag ineffective moves and garner more 
successful public advocacy when championing an issue usually assumed to be private.  
 
Usefulness for Rhetorical Leadership 
This dissertation offers several lessons for rhetorical leadership scholarship. Each 
analysis chapter offered teachable lessons for navigating the inherent barriers in pro-
caregiving advocacy rhetoric. One exciting outgrowth of this dissertation is the applied 
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usefulness of rhetorical tools including metaphor and definitions. Making those tools 
usable in practice by offering suggestions for reframing metaphors and redefinition in 
ongoing advocacy, not just as analytical methodological tools, is one small contribution 
that can yield large gains outside academia.  
If leadership is for everyone, then it is necessary for individual citizens to be 
equipped with tools to engage in advocacy, especially in situations when championing an 
issue that is traditionally associated with individual families and not social causes. In her 
essay on Educating Rhetorical Leaders, Olson (2006) points out that because “social 
inequities of position (e.g., class, gender, race) and power (e.g., resources, status, formal 
authority) persist,” “[a] rhetorical leadership program [that] helps level the playing field 
by helping those who enjoy fewer social privileges build a critically reflexive 
perspective, skills and sensibilities to take advantage of opportunities to lead for the 
common good” (p. 532) is important. Although this quotation is in reference to building a 
rhetorical leadership program in higher education, the ideals promoted within such a 
program illuminate the benefits of building an effective citizenry, populated with citizen 
advocates who understand how argument critiquing and argument building are 
foundational tools in the successful practice of rhetorical leadership.  
My interest in rhetorical leadership is based, partly, on the possibility for citizen 
advocates to be inspired to use rhetoric for the greater good as opposed to individual 
advancement. Through the process of analyzing pro-caregiving arguments, I have been 
inspired by the work of pro-caregiving advocates who are devoting their personal and 
professional time and resources to advocating for a population that is in need of policy 
assistance and shared responsibility. Social advocates, including pro-caregiving 
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advocates, are rhetorical leaders and are using their rhetoric primarily to promote a 
greater good rather than using their rhetoric to promote their own individual gains, 
though some pro-caregiving advocates may benefit personally from their change rhetoric 
if they are also caregivers. I hope that my critique of pro-caregiving arguments does not 
obscure my admiration for this group of individuals and organizations who have devoted 
their personal and professional lives to the greater good and to promoting an issue that 
should be a social one. It is also my hope that the findings in this dissertation could be of 
practical use to pro-caregiving advocates. 
There are three larger takeaway lessons that are specific to pro-caregiving 
advocates. First, in the introduction, I pointed out that mother-advocates must negotiate 
the “naturalness” of mothering as women’s work in the domestic sphere. My case studies 
reveal pro-caregiving advocates also need to confront and negotiate the “naturalness” of 
caregiving as women’s work in the domestic sphere. Specifically, pro-caregiving 
advocates should consider confronting and exposing assumptions, as opposed to 
reinforcing the idea that caregiving naturally proceeds from the family (via mothers and 
daughters) and the home. For example, in chapter four I argued that problematic rhetoric 
suggested caring for directly flowed from caring about. These two distinct types of care 
were treated as proceeding from one to the other. In this sense, all unpaid family 
caregivers who care about their family members were uncritically assumed to be the ones 
responsible to assume the burden to care for that person. When the assumption is that 
caring about leads to caring for, the problem to be solved becomes the individual 
caregiver’s problem and not a social responsibility. Pro-caregiving advocates should use 
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their change rhetoric to disrupt that problematic relationship and acknowledge that caring 
about someone does not necessarily lead to caring for that person.  
Second, in chapter three I argued that pro-caregiving advocates were not taking 
advantage of the rhetorical opportunities available in and motivation created by the policy 
statements in particular because no clear action steps were provided for public auditors to 
engage as citizens responsible for unpaid family caregiving issues. It is not enough to 
only garner appreciation for the ills facing various parties but that citizen power needs to 
be adequately harnessed to motivate public auditors, who may not be directly affected by 
the ills, to enact solutions offered. As I argue in chapter three, buy-in by both indirect and 
direct stakeholders is necessary in the public advocacy of unpaid family caregiving. In 
particular, what perhaps may be the most impactful strategy at this historical and cultural 
moment in U.S. history is to begin making small efforts to integrate these various 
stakeholders within the pro-caregiving advocacy conversation. Pro-caregiving advocates 
should look for ways to expand shared responsibility of unpaid family caregiver issues by 
appealing to a potential army of citizens open to appreciating and acting on unpaid family 
caregiving as a shared issue.  
Third, this dissertation confirms that, similar to mother-advocates, pro-caregiving 
advocates face several rhetorical obstacles when advocating for unpaid family caregiver 
issues. The first chapter cites a successful example of public advocacy of an issue that is 
similarly privatized but suggests there are rhetorical opportunities to reshape privatized 
notions. This is a central aspect of this dissertation because this work is not only about 
locating the textual flaws in pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric, but it also is about 
illuminating some rhetorical possibilities to reshape and unmoor a privatized subject from 
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“‘essentialist foundations’ and transforming it into a source of civic strength and political 
power” (Buchanan, 2013, pp. 13-14). I found that pro-caregiving advocates are 
conforming to the essentialist foundations of caregiving and need to take more intentional 
steps to disrupt and thus reshape the privatized notions that are embedded within their 
advocacy efforts. For instance, chapter five reveals that pro-caregiving advocates are 
constructing a formidable boundary between public and private by uncritically insisting 
that the preferred caregiving scene is in the domestic home with family. In sum, this 
study provides key takeaways for pro-caregiving advocates who are attempting to 
generate greater shared responsibility for unpaid family caregiving issues. Though these 
takeaways are specific to pro-caregiving advocates, the next section suggests that there 
are also useful takeways for social advocates who are facing similar situations by 
championing a cause that is assumed to be private.  
 
Rhetorical Lessons in Social Advocacy 
Beyond the findings in this dissertation, this analysis reveals four useful lessons 
for social advocates who are championing an issue assumed to be private. First, close 
textual analysis is a useful tool for scholars and practitioners to uncover and reveal 
inherent barriers that may be preventing advocates from achieving instrumental goals. In 
matters of public advocacy where advocates are not achieving their desired response, this 
rhetorical methodology provides an accessible means to diagnose what might be plaguing 
the rhetorical efforts.  
Second, revealing these inherent barriers through close textual analysis also opens 
up areas that might lead to transformations in the conversation. For example, by seeing 
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where the trained incapacities are in pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric, scholars and 
practitioners can also generate opportunities to adjust the conversation. These 
adjustments do not necessarily equate to resolution in policy change for unpaid family 
caregiving but do encourage movement in thought that may invite more shared 
responsibility.  
Third, through this analysis, close textual analysis revealed controlling attitudes 
and philosophies that make for a cohesive and sensible drama that might be particularly 
useful for advocates who are negotiating an issue with strong associations to the private 
in public advocacy. For example, in this drama, sensible understandings of the dominant 
family metaphors depend on the primary scene being invoked as the domestic home. This 
finding suggests that in situations where public advocates are advocating to move an 
issue that is considered to be traditionally private to the public, scene may reveal the 
organizing principle through which the inherent barriers might be most easily exposed 
and revised.  
Fourth, some of the work in this dissertation will be useful for advocates who 
need to advance a crisis understanding of a private issue. In chapter three, I focus on how 
pro-caregiving advocates rhetorically construct and effectively make present a crisis 
situation in their change rhetoric. One aspect that I argued pro-caregiving advocates are 
doing well is making unpaid family caregiving issues urgent and present. The rhetorical 
choices by which they accomplish urgency in crisis might provide insight for other social 
advocates who wish to make a situation urgent when urgency for that private issue is 
lacking. In other words, for social advocates fighting for shared support, establishing 
urgency in the change rhetoric might be a beneficial approach. However, in addition to an 
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urgent crisis, social advocates need to also create a matching and full solution to the 
urgent ills. For instance, in chapter three I argued that pro-caregiving advocates are 
effectively marshaling an urgent crisis situation; however, they are providing a partial 
solution by only focusing on how the proposed solutions will resolve the public ills and 
only the private ills related to care-receivers. This incomplete solution to the constructed 
ills, suggests, then, that social advocates pay careful attention to creating solutions that 
match the ills being advanced that make the crisis persuasive. In essence, effectively 
marshaling a crisis may not be enough in inviting a shared response. Coupling an urgent 
and shared crisis with a well-matched solution that addresses all of the public and private 
ills is a more productive approach.  
In sum, close textual analysis as a methodological tool combined with inherency 
analysis can offer valuable insight into other social advocacy efforts where issues that are 
assumed to be private might complicate the public advocacy aims. This practical utility of 
close textual analysis creates an accessible platform for maneuvering or resisting aspects 
of the rhetoric, as opposed to outright rejection of the current frames being used. As such, 
close textual analysis reveals a teachable way to engage in social advocacy—to be 
reflective of our choices and what our word choices reveal about how we are sizing up a 
situation and inviting action that might inadvertently be erecting barriers to our own 
instrumental goals. 
 
Considerations for Care Theory Scholarship 
Yet if we consider care as a universal, basic need for all citizens, then we can 
better understand caretaking as a social/political issue, not just a private one. This 
leads us to consider what respect and justice require in connection to home care 
workers and family caretakers. Clearly, we can and should do more to ensure that 
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the care work done by these citizens is better remunerated, recognized, and 
valued. (Parks, 2003, p. 73) 
 
This dissertation’s research questions were situated within a context of 
scholarship on care theory. This is partly because my larger scholarly goals revolve 
around issues of care and contributing to the complementary frameworks of applied 
rhetoric and feminist scholarship. One reason the efforts in this dissertation are 
rhetorically significant is due to public arguments that have the potential to influence 
some ideological and material implications facing women. Because the “pattern of 
women taking disproportionate responsibility for care is so well established that it is 
largely taken for granted, often not noticed, and when noticed, seen as natural” (Glenn, 
2010, p. 184), scholarship that makes visible this unseen pattern is necessary for 
contributing to a society where women have full participation. An overarching goal of 
this dissertation was to offer one contribution to the disruption of uncritical acceptance of 
the idea that caregiving can go unnoticed and be naturalized as women’s work.  
In chapter one, I situated my research questions within a context of scholarship on 
care theory and, in particular, in discussions related to ethics of care and ethics of justice 
as well as scholarship on caring for the caregiver. Framing my research questions within 
these larger discussions allowed me to see two potential ways that the work in this 
dissertation can reinvigorate care theory: (1) understanding limits to the doulia model in 
rhetorical leadership practice and (2) recognizing limits of transferring maternal thinking 
to a public consciousness in rhetorical leadership practice.  
First, this dissertation has implications for care theory feminist scholars to re-
examine the doulia model in rhetorical leadership practice. From a rhetorical leadership 
perspective, my research extends discussions of caring for the caregiver. In chapter one, I 
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introduced Kittay’s (1999) notion of the doulia where “the dependency worker is entitled 
not to a reciprocity from the charge herself, but to a relationship that sustains her as she 
sustains her charge” (p. 68). In pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric, I recognize that 
advocates are working to implement solutions that would strengthen the caregiver in his 
or her role through training and education, and this type of solution is consistent with 
Kittay’s (1999) notion of the doulia model. However, I argued that pro-caregiving 
advocates do not address the ways in which that type of solution (i.e., training and 
educating the caregiver) would solve some major private ills facing caregivers, including, 
but not limited to the financial hardships and emotional pressure involved with the 
caregiver role. It seems that in rhetorical leadership practice, within this specific context 
of pro-caregiving advocacy, the doulia model has limitations for resolving the private ills 
facing unpaid family caregivers because the proposed solutions for caregivers are 
foreclosing further rhetoric that might encourage greater shared responsibility. 
Additionally, I found that pro-caregiving advocacy arguments are embracing the 
doulia model by emphasizing the ways in which society should value and appreciate the 
work being done by unpaid family caregivers. Valuing and appreciating, as chapter five 
argued, are not equal to social participation and responsibility. One can appreciate and 
admire caregiving without participating, accepting, and sharing the responsibility. It was 
also argued that conflating appreciation and admiration for social participation is actually 
part of the barrier to solving the problems in unpaid family caregiving. That pro-
caregiving advocates are demonstrating attempts to enact a doulia model in their change 
rhetoric is positive, yet as demonstrated in the analysis of the family metaphors in pro-
caregiving advocacy rhetoric, invoking admiration does not equate to social participation. 
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As such, my research reveals limitations in the doulia model to develop a “public 
conception of care” (Kittay, 1999, p. 133) without limiting social participation to valuing 
and admiring of unpaid family caregivers only. The case studies presented in this 
dissertation invite care theory scholars to further interrogate the ways in which the doulia 
model might work more productively in public advocacy contexts and specifically when 
public advocates are championing a cause that is assumed to be a family responsibility.  
Second, this dissertation reveals limitations in transferring maternal thinking to a 
public consciousness in rhetorical leadership practice. In chapter one, I summarize 
Ruddick’s (1989) argument that suggests society can be empowered by moving a 
maternal ethic into public consciousness. I found that advancing maternal thinking in pro-
caregiving advocacy arguments may not always be the most productive way to invite 
shared responsibility, nor is this idea completely relevant to the strategies already in place 
by pro-caregiving advocates. For example, I point out in chapter four that the dominant 
definition of care being advanced by pro-caregiving advocates includes positive and 
empowering maternal elements that embrace Ruddick’s (1989) maternal thinking. For 
example, Ruddick’s maternal thinking holds the idea that “symbols of motherhood” can 
be productively transferred into “political speech” (Sander-Staudt, n.d., para. 38). 
Embedded in pro-caregiving arguments are notions of a caregiver as willingly self-
sacrificing, which runs parallel to dominant ideologies of motherhood that suggest, above 
all, that mothers should willingly sacrifice their needs and desires ahead of the needs and 
desires of their children (Hayes, 1996). In the case of unpaid family caregiving, the 
connection between willing self-sacrifice and admiration for caregivers creates symbolic 
tension between admiring caregiver work and sharing responsibility. Consequently, the 
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symbolic tension reveals potential limitations in transferring a maternal thinking to a 
public consciousness. Based on this finding, care theory scholars could revisit Ruddick’s 
(1989) maternal thinking to look at specific case studies that might complicate the 
compatibility between a maternal thinking and a rhetorical leadership purpose, especially 
in situations where the public advocate is attempting to energize public responsibility for 
an issue that has deep associations with the private.  
As I pointed out in chapter one, care theory scholarship tends to center around 
how gender is embedded in social structures. As should be apparent, the work in this 
dissertation focuses on language use and, more specifically, on pro-caregiving arguments. 
I am not suggesting that this research contributes to care theory but rather that my work 
and focus on rhetorical leadership reveals potential entry points and considerations in 
care theory regarding the doulia model and maternal thinking. My efforts demonstrate the 
compatibility between scholarship on care theory and applied rhetorical scholarship. I 
suggest that together these two scholarly frameworks help to reveal much needed 
movement in both fields of study and with this particular case study as well. In care 
theory, the arguments about the practicality of the doulia model in practice as well as 
about the compatibility between maternal thinking and public advocacy can be revitalized 
at the intersection of feminist discussions on care and the current case study of pro-
caregiving advocacy. In turn, applied rhetorical perspectives interested in public 
advocacy of issues that are traditionally deemed to be private benefit from a care theory 
feminist lens that assisted in uncovering ways to (1) understand and interpret the 
language use of pro-caregiving advocates (e.g., maternal thinking) and (2) propose 
productive alternatives (e.g., a doulia model) in pro-caregiving advocacy arguments. 
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More specifically, I found that part of the missing component in pro-caregiving advocacy 
arguments is a lack of social responsibility in caring for the caregiver. For example, in 
chapter three, I argued that pro-caregiving advocates are doing an effective job of 
establishing persuasive ills that are both public and private; however, at the same time, 
the solutions proposed show emphasis on solving a crisis for the public ills (i.e, taxpayers 
and businesses) but not careful attention to how the proposed solutions would benefit 
caregivers. In this way, the reciprocity idea, or caring for our caregivers, is relatively 
absent in discussions about solving a caregiver crisis, which seems to be 
counterproductive to the purported goals of pro-caregiving advocates.  
I suggest that these two complementary frameworks, care theory scholarship and 
applied rhetorical scholarship, are both needed in the case of unpaid family caregiving. 
As such, pairing these two frameworks might be useful for other scholars interested in 
identifying inherent barriers in policy discourse when advocates are championing a cause 
that animates an assumed separation between public and private. One of the overarching 
goals of this dissertation was to bring to the forefront an issue that is unseen because it is 
treated as domestic and women’s work. Approaching this dissertation from the 
complementary frameworks of applied rhetoric and care theory scholarship has been a 
productive undertaking to answer my research questions. Applied rhetoric focuses on 
arguments, and care theory is interested in women’s issues at the intersection of feminism 
and material impact. Pro-caregiving arguments about unpaid family caregiving as an 
object of study has allowed me to involve all of these aspects—argumentation, feminism, 
and material impact. The issue of unpaid family caregiving is important rhetorically, but 
also has many material impacts. My research efforts have enabled me to theorize about 
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the connection between theory and practice, through the specific example of unpaid 
family caregiving.  
The impetus of pro-caregiving arguments seems to be about caring for the 
caregiver; however, as I demonstrate, pro-caregiving arguments show a lack of regard for 
the caregiver and provide enough evidence to illuminate one way that caregiving, like 
motherhood, gets naturalized into public arguments to discourage policy changes 
beneficial for this population. I hope that my dissertation contributes to larger efforts to 
make caring a more central priority in our society. Pro-caregiving advocates have 
rhetorical opportunities to integrate a more productive doulia model that would 
intentionally lay out the ways in which shared responsibility for unpaid family caregivers 
becomes just as equally about the caregiver as it is for other indirect and direct 
stakeholders. These two bodies of thought offer much insight into how pro-caregiving 
arguments are reinforcing gendered assumptions about unpaid family caregiving and thus 
work to perpetuate their own barriers to policy change. Despite this, I am not suggesting 
that the rhetorical perspectives can resolve the gender issues in pro-caregiving advocacy. 
This dissertation is not meant to provide the answers to resolve the gender disparity in 
unpaid family caregiving; nonetheless, it is meant to promote advancement in applied 
rhetorical scholarship, pro-caregiving advocacy, and feminist thought on care theory. I 
still contend, at the conclusion of this project, that a rhetorical focus on arguments can 
promote the advancement of better arguments for feminist issues.  
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Epilogue: Lessons Learned and Moving Forward 
Pro-caregiving advocacy represents a growing body of rhetoric, one that I suggest 
is still in its nascent stages. In an informal conference call with a representative from 
National Alliance for Caregiving, I was told that, since 1996, many more individuals, 
organizations, and government officials are talking about unpaid family caregiver issues. 
Unpaid family caregiving is a new topic growing out of concerns rooted in a current 
climate of an aging population, among other factors. That this issue is growing and more 
people are talking about and taking the issue seriously demonstrates another reason to 
focus on building and developing more effective pro-caregiving arguments.  
The newness of pro-caregiving advocacy rhetoric posed a few difficulties during 
the writing of this dissertation. First, because unpaid family caregiving gets discussed 
extensively, especially in the circles that I gravitated toward due to my interest in this 
rhetoric, it became difficult to keep up with the texts because they were constantly 
changing. For example, I worked with the three policy statements of well-known pro-
caregiving advocacy organizations (AARP, FCA, and RCI) for so long, knowing that by 
the end of my dissertation process the policy statements would likely be updated. This is 
due, in part, to increased legislation that was being introduced during the writing of this 
dissertation. For instance, at the time I was writing this conclusion, the AARP CARE 
Act, or the Caregiver Advise, Record and Enable (A. 1323-A), an Act that “would ensure 
millions of family caregivers are properly prepared to provide quality and cost-effective 
care to older parents, spouses and loved ones who are sent home from the hospital” 
(“Helping Family Caregivers,” para. 3) had been introduced in ten states but had only 
been enacted in three. Second, during the writing of this dissertation it was pointed out to 
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me by my frontline source that there has been an increase in utilization of a military 
frame to “add legitimacy” to pro-caregiving advocacy efforts. Subsequently, in 2014-
2015, there has been an increase in programs created specifically for military caregivers, 
as a specific subset of pro-caregiving advocacy. As I was analyzing pro-caregiving 
advocacy rhetoric, it was difficult to not include the military-focused programs, such as 
Operation Family Caregiver, because they advocate for both veteran caregivers 
(including care-recipients who may be elder family members) and returning military 
personnel (including care-recipients who may be disabled family members). Although in 
chapter one I indicated that I would primarily be focusing on informal caregiving that 
includes caring for aging and/or disabled family members, veteran and wounded military 
care-recipients became increasingly subsumed under this category during the course of 
writing this dissertation.  
This project allowed me to communicate directly via email and phone with some 
pro-caregiving advocates who provided further evidence that studying unpaid family 
caregiving arguments at this moment in time is needed in order to stimulate shared 
responsibility. The pro-caregiving advocate with whom I spoke at National Alliance for 
Caregiving identified “ageism” as the most prevalent issue standing in the way of the 
organization’s advocacy goals. In fact, my frontline source indicated to me that there is a 
push to, borrowing from her language, “re-brand age” and that the intentional military 
frame “adds legitimacy” to the policy efforts because it ties public policy to the military 
and not to an aging population. I believe this revelation indicates two justifications for the 
academic study of unpaid family caregiving arguments. First, the fact that pro-caregiving 
advocates are hesitant to acknowledge the gendered aspects of this discourse is another 
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indicator that gender is hidden in their own rhetoric. To suggest that the way we talk 
about unpaid family caregiving inherently privatizes the subject should not come as a 
surprise. However, that the frames are being taken up uncritically by pro-caregiving 
advocates themselves suggests that the way this issue is assumed to be private is subtle, 
yet powerful. The subtleness is what requires careful rhetorical invention and 
maneuvering or resisting of the dominant frames that would be difficult to remove from 
the discourse (family, crisis, and care). Second, the focus on age suggests that pro-
caregiving advocates are still preoccupied with the care-receiver and not the caregiver. 
That a rhetorically constructed caregiving crisis is relevant to many stakeholders 
(taxpayers, businesses, caregivers, and care-receivers), but that pro-caregiving advocates 
prioritize their arguments on “re-branding age” instead of caregiving is to the detriment 
of the unpaid family caregivers who would benefit from more effective pro-caregiving 
arguments.   
 Throughout this entire dissertation, there is an inherently reciprocal relationship 
between the rhetorical and the material. This was difficult terrain to negotiate, but one 
that makes this issue unique and socially significant. I have emphasized at the end of each 
case study chapter that my suggestions are necessary to, but never sufficient for, solving 
the material problems within a socially constructed caregiving crisis. I want to reiterate 
here that my suggestions, even if implemented by pro-caregiving advocates, may not 
achieve the policy gains desired by pro-caregiving advocates. However, at the same time, 
it is necessary for me to point out that critical self-reflection is an important prior step 
before achieving material gains. What I mean to say is that there is worthiness in 
extending a conversation toward movement, even if that movement does not garner the 
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type or entirety of gains desired by pro-caregiving advocates. If pro-caregiving 
advocates, or other social advocates, become complacent in their rhetorical strategies, 
there will be likely stagnation in efforts to make policy gains for unpaid family 
caregivers, many of whom are facing chronic illness and financial hardships because of 
their efforts to care for a loved one.   
This dissertation has provided a starting point for (1) rhetorical scholars to 
evaluate and reposition the efforts of pro-caregiving advocates and (2) to provide social 
actors access to practical takeaways for confronting formidable barriers (i.e., to 
implement rhetorical appeals that may help to promote more effective public advocacy). 
By doing so, I hope this dissertation contributes to the work needing to be done by all 
members of society to play a role in “changing our culture in ways that elevate caring to a 
central priority” (Wood, 1994, p. xi).   
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INDEPENDENT COURSE DEVELOPMENT 
  
2010 Women’s Studies Themed Learning Community:  Writing Women Back Into 
(Her) Story (Linked first-year learning community including: S100-First Year 
Seminar, R110- Fundamentals of Public Speaking, and W105-Introduction to 
Women’s Studies), Indiana University- Purdue University Indianapolis. 
   
 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
2015 Online and Blended Teaching Certificate, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
2015 Midwest Winter Rhetoric Workshop, Northwestern University 
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2014 Learning Technology Center workshop, Online and Blended Teaching program 
2014 Learning Technology Center workshop, D2L-Just the Basics 
2014 Center for Instructional and Professional Development workshop: “Creating a 
Teaching Portfolio” 
2014 Midwest Winter Rhetoric Workshop, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
2012 Center for Instructional and Professional Development workshop: “Active 
Learning, Higher Learning, and Lecture: A Must Have Tool,” University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
2012 Center for Instructional and Professional Development workshop: “First Day 
Strategies,” University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
2012 Faculty Development Conference, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay 
2011 Gateway Summer Program-“Introducing Critical Thinking into Your Classroom,” 
Indiana University Purdue University-Indianapolis 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE 
 
2015 Chair, Central States Communication Association, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity Caucus 
2014 Paper reviewer, Central States Communication Association, Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity Caucus 
2014 Paper reviewer, Central States Communication Association, Graduate Student 
Caucus 
2013 Chair, National Communication Association, Basic Course Division 
2013 Paper reviewer, Central States Communication Association, Graduate Student 
Caucus 
2012 Paper reviewer, National Communication Association, Public Address Division 
2012 Paper reviewer, National Communication Association, Feminist and Women’s 
Studies Division 
2010 Panel reviewer, Central States Communication Association, Women’s Caucus 
2010 Judge, IUPUI Dominata Classic Speech Competition 
2010 Co-Director, Curtis Memorial Oratorical Contest  
 
 
UNIVERSITY SERVICE 
 
2014 Judge, UW System Undergraduate Research Symposium 
2013 Volunteer, NCA Graduate Fair Open House, Washington, D. C.  
2012 Volunteer, NCA Graduate Fair Open House, Orlando, FL 
2012 Volunteer, UWM Undergraduate Open House 
2011 Planner and moderator, A Celebration of Hoosier Women at IUPUI with invited 
guests, Mr. Mickey Maurer and Dr. Mercy Obeime 
2011 Planner, IUPUI Democracy Plaza, Gender and Education 
2011 Planner, IUPUI Communication Week 
2010 Planner and moderator, IUPUI Democracy Plaza, He Said, She Said, We Said: 
 Constructing Gender Stereotypes on Campus 
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2010 Planner and moderator, A Celebration of Hoosier Women at IUPUI with invited 
guests, Mr. Mickey Maurer and Ms. Patricia Miller 
2010 Committee Member, IUPUI Communication Week 
 
 
DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE 
 
2014 Chair, UWM Department of Communication Public Speaking Showcase 
2014 Committee member, Committee to Review Summer/Winterim Graduate Teaching 
Policy 
2014 PhD mentorship coordinator, UWM Communication Graduate Student Council 
2013 Chair, UWM Department of Communication Public Speaking Showcase 
2013 Treasurer/Fundraiser, CGSC, UWM 
2012 Undergraduate Committee Representative 
2012 Secretary, Rhetoric Society Association, UWM Student Chapter 
2012 PhD Graduate Advisory Committee Representative 
2011 Judge, UWM Department of Communication Public Speaking Showcase 
2011 Treasurer, Rhetoric Society Association, UWM Student Chapter 
2011 Member, Rhetoric Society Association, UWM Student Chapter 
2011 Member, UWM Communication Graduate Student Council 
2011 Chairperson, IUPUI Spring Speech Night, Preliminary Round 
2011 Invited guest, IUPUI Alumni Conference, March 
2010 Judge, IUPUI Fall Speech Night, Final Round 
2010 Moderator, IUPUI Deliberative Polling Project, Political Communication (R390) 
2010 President, IUPUI Graduate Communication Club 
2010 Member, IUPUI Spring Speech Night Committee 
2009 Secretary, IUPUI Graduate Communication Club 
2009 Critic, IUPUI Fall Speech Night, Preliminary Round 
2008  Member, IUPUI Graduate Communication Club 
 
 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
 
2013 Planner and Presenter, Special Course on Argumentation and Environmental 
Literacy, Girl Scouts of Wisconsin Southeast Teen Leadership Conference, 
January. 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AFFILIATIONS 
 
National Communication Association (NCA) 
Central States Communication Association (CSCA) 
Organization for the Study of Communication, Language, and Gender (OSCLG) 
 
 
 
